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Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are
always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral
relativism, has become common currency among the liberally
educated. This remains the case even while political crises become
intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of
public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification
is extremely limited. The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments
insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible
for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination
of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology,
and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value
is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate
justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the
'is-ought' issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility
and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of
argument.
Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are
always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral
relativism, has become common currency among the liberally
educated. This remains the case even while political crises become
intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of
public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification
is extremely limited. The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments
insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible
for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination
of the three main approaches to moral theory: axiology, deontology,
and agent morality. A pluralistic account of the concept of value
is expounded, and a solution to the problem of ultimate
justification is suggested. Analyses of valuation, evaluation, the
'is-ought' issue, and the concepts of obligation, responsibility
and the good person are all incorporated into the main line of
argument.
Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations, first published in 1977,
comprehensively examines the general justifications for systems of
private property rights, and discusses with great clarity the major
arguments as to the rights and responsibilities of property
ownership. In particular, the arguments that hold that there are
natural rights derived from first occupancy, labour, utility,
liberty and virtue are considered, as are the standard
anti-property arguments based on disutility, virtue and inequality,
and the belief that justice in distribution must take precedence
over private ownership. Lawrence Becker goes on to contend that
there are four sound lines of argument for private property that,
together with what is sound in the anti-property arguments, must be
co-ordinated to form the foundations of a new theory. He therefore
expounds a concise but sophisticated theory of property that is
relevant to the modern world, and concludes by indicating some of
the implications of his theory.
What would stoic ethics be like today if stoicism had survived as a
systematic approach to ethical theory, and if it had coped
successfully with the challenges of modern philosophy and
experimental science? What would stoic ethics be like today if
stoicism had survived as a systematic approach to ethical theory,
if it had coped successfully with the challenges of modern
philosophy and experimental science? A New Stoicism proposes an
answer to that question, offered from within the stoic tradition
but without the metaphysical and psychological assumptions that
modern philosophy and science have abandoned. Lawrence Becker
argues that a secular version of the stoic ethical project, based
on contemporary cosmology and developmental psychology, provides
the basis for a sophisticated form of ethical naturalism, in which
virtually all the hard doctrines of the ancient Stoics can be
clearly restated and defended. Becker argues, in keeping with the
ancients, that virtue is one thing, not many; that it, and not
happiness, is the proper end of all activity; that it alone is
good, all other things being merely rank-ordered relative to each
other for the sake of the good; and that virtue is sufficient for
happiness. Moreover, he rejects the popular caricature of the stoic
as a grave figure, emotionally detached and capable mainly of
endurance, resignation, and coping with pain. To the contrary, he
holds that while stoic sages are able to endure the extremes of
human suffering, they do not have to sacrifice joy to have that
ability, and he seeks to turn our attention from the familiar,
therapeutic part of stoic moral training to a reconsideration of
its theoretical foundations.
The tendency to reciprocate - to return good for good and evil for
evil - is a potent force in human life, and the concept of
reciprocity is closely connected to fundamental notions of
'justice', 'obligation' or 'duty', 'gratitude' and 'equality'. In
Reciprocity, first published in 1986, Lawrence Becker presents a
sustained argument about reciprocity, beginning with the strategy
for developing a moral theory of the virtues. He considers the
concept of reciprocity in detail, contending that it is a basic
virtue that provides the basis for parental authority, obligations
to future generations, and obedience to law. Throughout the first
two parts of the book, Becker intersperses short pieces of his own
narrative fiction to enrich reflection on the philosophical
arguments. The final part is devoted to extensive bibliographical
essays, ranging over anthropology, psychology, political theory and
law, as well as the relevant ethics and political philosophy.
Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations, first published in 1977,
comprehensively examines the general justifications for systems of
private property rights, and discusses with great clarity the major
arguments as to the rights and responsibilities of property
ownership. In particular, the arguments that hold that there are
natural rights derived from first occupancy, labour, utility,
liberty and virtue are considered, as are the standard
anti-property arguments based on disutility, virtue and inequality,
and the belief that justice in distribution must take precedence
over private ownership. Lawrence Becker goes on to contend that
there are four sound lines of argument for private property that,
together with what is sound in the anti-property arguments, must be
co-ordinated to form the foundations of a new theory. He therefore
expounds a concise but sophisticated theory of property that is
relevant to the modern world, and concludes by indicating some of
the implications of his theory.
The tendency to reciprocate - to return good for good and evil for
evil - is a potent force in human life, and the concept of
reciprocity is closely connected to fundamental notions of
'justice', 'obligation' or 'duty', 'gratitude' and 'equality'. In
Reciprocity, first published in 1986, Lawrence Becker presents a
sustained argument about reciprocity, beginning with the strategy
for developing a moral theory of the virtues. He considers the
concept of reciprocity in detail, contending that it is a basic
virtue that provides the basis for parental authority, obligations
to future generations, and obedience to law. Throughout the first
two parts of the book, Becker intersperses short pieces of his own
narrative fiction to enrich reflection on the philosophical
arguments. The final part is devoted to extensive bibliographical
essays, ranging over anthropology, psychology, political theory and
law, as well as the relevant ethics and political philosophy.
As one of the most important ethicists to emerge since the Second
World War, Alan Gewirth continues to influence philosophical
debates concerning morality. In this ground-breaking book,
Gewirth's neo-Kantianism, and the communitarian problems discussed,
form a dialogue on the foundation of moral theory. Themes of
agent-centered constraints, the formal structure of theories, and
the relationship between freedom and duty are examined along with
such new perspectives as feminism, the Stoics, and Sartre. Gewirth
offers a picture of the philosopher's theory and its applications,
providing a richer, more complete critical assessement than any
which has occurred to date.
A collection of essays examining how philosophers in the Western
tradition have viewed and written about children through the ages.
The Philospoher's Child is an edited collection of 9 contemporary
essays (7 new works, 2 revised from previously published work),
each of which examines the views of a different philosopher
(Socrates, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Mill, Wittgenstein,
Rawls, and Firestone) on the topic of children. Each of the
contributors to this groundbreaking volume is a specialist in the
area of the philosopher he or she considers and offers to the
reader both the opportunity to review the thoughts of these
important thinkers on a subject that is fast becoming an issue of
great urgency and the chance to those thoughts in a critical
context.
Lawrence C. Becker introduces an unconventional set of background
ideas for future philosophical work on normative theories of basic
justice. The organizing concept is habilitation -- the process of
equipping a person or thing with functional abilities or
capacities. The specific proposals drawn from the concept of
habilitation are independent of any particular set of distributive
principles. The result is a framework for theory that includes a
metric for the pursuit of basic justice, but not a normative theory
of it.
The basic idea is that receiving and providing habilitation is a
lifelong necessity for human beings, from their nearly helpless
newborn state through their struggles to survive and thrive
thereafter, even into the most severe diminishments of old age.
This lifelong human necessity underlies all questions about basic
justice, and the possibilities for habilitation define the
circumstances under which those questions arise.
Focusing on the circumstances of habilitation calls attention to
the central role of physical and psychological health. Without
basic good health in both domains, it is not possible to cope with
the habilitative demands of one's physical and psychological
endowments, and one's physical and social environments. And for
human beings, a particular aspect of human health effectively sums
up these matters: namely human agency; the nature and extent of the
ability to act effectively.
The book proposes, specifically, that normative theories of basic
justice adopt the habilitation framework. What then appears to
follow is that the most plausible comprehensive metric for
assessing progress toward basic justice will be the level and
distribution of basic good health. Moreover, achieving robustly
healthy agency will be the most plausible tactical target for
making progress toward basic justice -- no matter what one's
favored distributive principles might be.
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