'A further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. - GEOFFREY WHEATCROFT, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' - PHILIPPE SANDS, LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS Description All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by Tony Blair's government in a 60,000-word book. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britain the legal advice for the invasion intelligence about weapons of mass destruction and planning for a post-conflict Iraq. The behaviour of the GCHQ whistleblower Katharine Gun and the controversy over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction was the subject of the film Official Secrets. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action. UK policy before 9/11; The impact of 9/11; Decision to take the UN route; Negotiation of resolution 1441; The prospect of military action; The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens; The end of the UN route Why Iraq? Why now? Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?; The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in Iraq The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making. Collective responsibility Advice on the legal basis for military action. The timing of Lord Goldsmith's advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441; Goldsmith's advice of 7 March 2003; Goldsmith's arrival at a "better view"; The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003; Goldsmith's Written Answer of 17 March 2003 Weapons of mass destruction. Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003; The search for WMD Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The failure to plan or prepare for known risks; The planning process and decision-making Occupation. Looting in Basra; Looting in Baghdad; UK influence on post-invasion strategy: resolution 1483; UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority; A decline in security; The turning point Transition. UK influence on US strategy post-CPA; Planning for withdrawal; The impact of Afghanistan; Iraqiisation Preparation for withdrawal. A major divergence in strategy; A possible civil war; Force Level Review; The beginning of the end Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key Findings 1. Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002; Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 - "axis of evil" to Crawford; Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002 Key Findings 2. Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003; Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003; Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003; WMD search Key Findings 3. Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003; Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq; Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003; Military equipment (pre-conflict); Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq; Invasion Key Findings 4. The post-conflict period; Reconstruction; De-Ba'athification; Security Sector Reform; Resources; Military equipment (post-conflict); Civilian personnel; Service Personnel; Civilian casualties Lessons. The decision to go to war; Weapons of mass destruction; The invasion of Iraq; The post-conflict period; Reconstruction; De-Ba'athification; Security Sector Reform; Resources; Military equipment (post-conflict); Civilian personnel

The essential resource on military and political strategy and the making of the modern world.

The New Makers of Modern Strategy is the next generation of the definitive work on strategy and the key figures who have shaped the theory and practice of war and statecraft throughout the centuries. Featuring entirely new entries by a who’s who of world-class scholars, this new edition provides global, comparative perspectives on strategic thought from antiquity to today, surveying both classical and current themes of strategy while devoting greater attention to the Cold War and post-9/11 eras. The contributors evaluate the timeless requirements of effective strategy while tracing the revolutionary changes that challenge the makers of strategy in the contemporary world. Amid intensifying global disorder, the study of strategy and its history has never been more relevant. The New Makers of Modern Strategy draws vital lessons from history’s most influential strategists, from Thucydides and Sun Zi to Clausewitz, Napoleon, Churchill, Mao, Ben-Gurion, Andrew Marshall, Xi Jinping, and Qassem Soleimani.

With contributions by Dmitry Adamsky, John Bew, Tami Davis Biddle, Hal Brands, Antulio J. Echevarria II, Elizabeth Economy, Charles Edel, Eric S. Edelman, Andrew Ehrhardt, Lawrence Freedman, John Lewis Gaddis, Francis J. Gavin, Christopher J. Griffin, Ahmed S. Hashim, Eric Helleiner, Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, Seth G. Jones, Robert Kagan, Jonathan Kirshner, Matthew Kroenig, James Lacey, Guy Laron, Michael V. Leggiere, Margaret MacMillan, Tanvi Madan, Thomas G. Mahnken, Carter Malkasian, Daniel Marston, John H. Maurer, Walter Russell Mead, Michael Cotey Morgan, Mark Moyar, Williamson Murray, S.C.M. Paine, Sergey Radchenko, Iskander Rehman, Thomas Rid, Joshua Rovner, Priya Satia, Kori Schake, Matt J. Schumann, Brendan Simms, Jason K. Stearns, Hew Strachan, Sue Mi Terry, and Toshi Yoshihara.

Both the US and the UK seemed caught off-guard by the uprisings in Libya and Egypt and policymakers had to deal with leaders that switched from being allies to "pariahs." This collection of essays, written by leading scholars, examines the evolution of British and American perceptions of "adversaries" in the Middle East since the Cold War. It traces the evolution of how leaders have been perceived, what determined such perceptions, and how they can change over time. It shows that in many cases the beliefs held by policymakers have influenced their policies and the way they adapted during crisis. Each essay focuses on a Middle East leader, such as Nasser, Assad, Hussein, or Ahmadinejad, discussing what these leaders' objectives were perceived to be, the assessments of their willingness to take risks or negotiate, and how such assessments changed overtime and were evaluated in retrospect. This groundbreaking contribution to the literature on leadership attitudes and perceptions in policymaking toward the Middle East will appeal to anyone studying foreign policy, Middle East politics and political psychology.

Originally published in 1986, although the pace of arms control negotiations has been stepped up, there is still little sign of agreement. In this paper the author examines the current negotiating effort, with particular emphasis on its implications for European security. He provides an up-to-date analysis of the superpower discussions on nuclear arms control, including the impact of 'star wars', and also of the talks at Vienna on conventional force reductions and at Stockholm on confidence-building measures. He notes a shift in emphasis from 'parity' to 'transparency' in Western proposals, and questions whether this promises greater results than were achieved from earlier approaches. He also warns of the risks of arms control arrangements obstructing possibilities for reforming the European security system.

This book analyzes the strategic implications of the shift in focus for the US Armed Forces from regular to irregular war.
Lawrence Freedman closely examines the difficulty the US Armed Forces face in shifting their focus from preparing for regular wars, in which combat is separated from civil society, to irregular wars, in which combat is integrated with civil society. He argues that the political context of contemporary irregular wars requires that the purpose and practice of western forces be governed by liberal values, showing that this is also the case with regular wars, to the extent they occur, but it is the integration with civil society that makes the application of liberal values so challenging.
"The Transformation of Strategic Affairs" suggests that this challenge becomes easier to meet when military operations are understood to contribute to the development of a compelling narrative about the likely course and consequence of a conflict, in which these values are shown to be respected. At the same time, however, while it is vital that the employment of armed force remains sensitive at all times to the underlying political context, and sensitive to the role of narratives in shaping this context, the book shows that a key test of success will always be the defeat of the opposing forces. The "war on terror" has highlighted these issues, and this "Adelphi Paper" concludes with much-needed suggestions for a strategic response.
This book will be of great interest to students of the US Armed Forces, politics, strategic studies and military history.

This study attempts to bring the debate about nuclear weapons and arms control up to date by assessing the reasons for the recent superpower agreement, the decline of the peace movements, the new threats to international stability and the prospects for further detente.;The optimism of the first edition about an eventual return to arms control has been vindicated by events, but its pessimism about the deeply-rooted nature of superpower confrontation remains and the assessment is retained that the nuclear knot remains firmly tied.

Written in a lively and readable style by the world's leading authority on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and US-European relations, Defense of the West is the history of a transatlantic security relationship that has endured for over seventy years. This latest edition of a classic work looks at how developments inside NATO and European Union member states affect their ability to defend against external threats while preserving Western values, in the era of Trump and Brexit. Sloan frankly addresses the failures and shortcomings of Western institutions and member states. But the book emphasizes the continuing importance of value-based transatlantic security cooperation as a vital element of the defense and foreign policies of NATO and EU member states. At a time of heightened tension and political turmoil, at home and abroad, Stan Sloan's lucid and far-sighted analysis is more necessary than ever. -- .

Originally published in 1986, although the pace of arms control negotiations has been stepped up, there is still little sign of agreement. In this paper the author examines the current negotiating effort, with particular emphasis on its implications for European security. He provides an up-to-date analysis of the superpower discussions on nuclear arms control, including the impact of ‘star wars’, and also of the talks at Vienna on conventional force reductions and at Stockholm on confidence-building measures. He notes a shift in emphasis from ‘parity’ to ‘transparency’ in Western proposals, and questions whether this promises greater results than were achieved from earlier approaches. He also warns of the risks of arms control arrangements obstructing possibilities for reforming the European security system.

At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. The superpowers came to see for the first time that there was only one way to escape from the atomic hell of their respective arsenals: dialogue. The "peace through fear" and the "hotline" between Washington and Moscow prevented an atomic confrontation. Austria successfully demonstrated its new role as neutral state and host when Vienna became a meeting place in the Cold War. In The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.

Since 1969, the United Kingdom always has always had one submarine armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles underwater, undetected, in constant communication, ready at a set notice to fire at targets anywhere in the world. This is part of its Trident Programme, which includes the development, procurement, and operation of the current generation of British nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. Operated by the Royal Navy and based at Clyde Naval Base on Scotland's west coast, it is the most expensive and most powerful capability of the British military forces. In 2016, the United Kingdom had to decide on whether to go ahead and build the next generation of nuclear submarines that will allow the UK to remain in the nuclear business well into the second half of this century. The book presents the political, cultural, technical, and strategic aspects of Trident to provide a thoughtful overview of the UK's complex relationship with nuclear weapons. The authors, both scholars and practitioners, bring together diverse perspectives on the issue, discussing the importance of UK nuclear history as well as the political, legal, and diplomatic aspects of UK nuclear weapons-internationally and domestically. Also addressed are the new technical, military, and strategic challenges to the UK nuclear thinking and strategy.

At the beginning of June 1961, the tensions of the Cold War were supposed to abate as both sides sought a resolution. The two most important men in the world, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, met for a summit in Vienna. Yet the high hopes were disappointed. Within months the Cold War had become very hot: Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall and a year later he sent missiles to Cuba to threaten the United States directly. Despite the fact that the Vienna Summit yielded barely any tangible results, it did lead to some very important developments. The superpowers came to see for the first time that there was only one way to escape from the atomic hell of their respective arsenals: dialogue. The "peace through fear" and the "hotline" between Washington and Moscow prevented an atomic confrontation. Austria successfully demonstrated its new role as neutral state and host when Vienna became a meeting place in the Cold War. In The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History international experts use new Russian and Western sources to analyze what really happened during this critical time and why the parties had a close shave with catastrophe.

As the NATO Alliance enters its seventh decade, it finds itself involved in an array of military missions ranging from Afghanistan to Kosovo to Sudan. It also stands at the center of a host of regional and global partnerships. Yet, NATO has still to articulate a grand strategic vision designed to determine how, when, and where its capabilities should be used, the values underpinning its new missions, and its relationship to other international actors such as the European Union and the United Nations.

The drafting of a new strategic concept, begun during NATO's 60th anniversary summit, presents an opportunity to shape a new transatlantic vision that is anchored in the liberal democratic principles so crucial to NATO's successes during its Cold War years. Furthermore, that vision should be focused on equipping the Alliance to anticipate and address the increasingly global and less predictable threats of the post-9/11 world.

This volume brings together scholars and policy experts from both sides of the Atlantic to examine the key issues that NATO must address in formulating a new strategic vision. With thoughtful and reasoned analysis, it offers both an assessment of NATO's recent evolution and an analysis of where the Alliance must go if it is to remain relevant in the twenty-first century.

In the second volume of his official history of the Falklands Campaign, Lawrence Freedman provides a detailed and authoritative account of one of the most extraordinary periods in recent British political history and a vivid portrayal of a government at war.

After the shock of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in April 1982, Margaret Thatcher faced the crisis that came to define her premiership as she determined to recover the islands. The book covers all aspects of the campaign - economic and diplomatic as well as military - demonstrating the extent of the gamble that the government took.

There are important accounts of the tensions in relations with the United States, concerns among the military commanders about the risks they were expected to take, the problems of dealing with the media and the attempts to reach a negotiated settlement. This definitive account describes in dramatic detail events such as the sinking of the Belgrano, the Battle of Goose Green and the final push to Stanley. Special attention is also paid to the aftermath of the war, including the various enquiries, and the eventual restoration of diplomatic relations with Argentina.

This paperback edition has been updated, corrected and contains some new material.

Drawing on a vast range of previously classified government archives as well as interviews with key participants, this first volume of the official history of the Falklands Campaign is the most authoritative account of the origins of the 1982 war.

In the first chapters the author analyses the long history of the dispute between Argentina and Britain over the sovereignty of the Islands, the difficulties faced by successive governments in finding a way to reconcile the opposed interests of the Argentines and the islanders, and the constant struggle to keep the Islands viable. He subsequently gives a complete account of how what started as an apparently trivial incident over an illegal landing by scrap-metal merchants on the island of South Georgia turned into a major crisis. Thanks to his access to classified material, Sir Lawrence Freedman has been able to produce a detailed and authoritative analysis which extends the coverage given by the Franks Committee Report of 1983.

This volume is ultimately an extremely readable account of these events, charting the growing realisation within the British government of the seriousness of the situation, culminating in the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands at the start of April 1982.

Drawing on a vast range of previously classified government archives as well as interviews with key participants, this first volume of the official history of the Falklands Campaign is the most authoritative account of the origins of the 1982 war.

In the first chapters the author analyzes the long history of the dispute between Argentina and Britain over the sovereignty of the Islands, the difficulties faced by successive governments in finding a way to reconcile the opposed interests of the Argentines and the islanders, and the constant struggle to keep the Islands viable. He subsequently gives a complete account of how what started as an apparently trivial incident over an illegal landing by scrap-metal merchants on the island of South Georgia turned into a major crisis. Thanks to his access to classified material, Lawrence Freedman has been able to produce a detailed and authoritative analysis which extends the coverage given by the Franks Committee Report of 1983.

This volume is ultimately an extremely readable account of these events, charting the growing realization within the British government of the seriousness of the situation, culminating in the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands at the start of April 1982.

In this official history of the Falklands Campaign, Lawrence Freedman provides a detailed and authoritative account of one of the most extraordinary periods in recent British political history and a vivid portrayal of a government at war.

After the shock of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in April 1982, Margaret Thatcher faced the crisis that came to define her premiership as she determined to recover the islands. Freedman covers all aspects of the campaign - economic and diplomatic as well as military - and demonstrates the extent of the gamble that the government took. There are important accounts of the tensions in relations with the United States, concerns among the military commanders about the risks they were expected to take, the problems of dealing with the media and the attempts to reach a negotiated settlement. This definitive account describes in dramatic detail events such as the sinking of the Belgrano, the battle of Goose Green and the final push to Stanley. Special attention is also paid to the aftermath of the war, including the various enquiries, and the eventual restoration of diplomatic relations with Argentina.

Rapid developments in information technology and precision weaponry are said to herald a 'revolution in military affairs' (RMA), making possible quick and decisive victories with minimal casualties and collateral damage. But has such a revolution taken place? The issues that drive conflict will persist, and many of the technical advances associated with the RMA will not necessarily produce a transformation in the nature of warfare. The end of the Cold War has highlighted another revolution one in political affairs. Major powers appear less likely to go to war with one another than they are to intervene in conflicts involving weak states, with potential opponents including militia groups, drug cartels and terrorists. RMA technology may be less suited to conflicts such as these. If the cumulative effect of these changes has produced a revolution, it is a revolution in strategic, as much as military, affairs. This paper argues that: * the RMA is the practical expression of a 'Western Way of Warfare', the key features of which are: professional armed forces; intolerance of casualties; and intolerance of collateral damage * the key technological and conceptual components of the RMA were in place by the early 1970s. The trend has therefore been evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. The significant difference is in the new political setting of the end of the Cold War, and the revolution in perceptions of Western particularly US conventional military strength brought about by the Gulf War of 1991 * the Gulf conflict could mark the start of a true 'revolution' if future battles offer similar opportunities to exploit the RMA's technology. However, since the US and its allies appear unbeatable when fighting on their own terms, future opponents will fight differently * the West will therefore face opponents who will follow strategies that contradict the Western Way of Warfare. They will avoid pitched battles, will exploit the West's reluctance to inflict civilian suffering, and will target their opponent's domestic political base, as much as its forward troops. The problem for the West is not how to prevail, but how to do so in an acceptable manner. The more warfare becomes entwined with civilian activity, the more difficult it is to respond with the type of decisive and overwhelming military means embodied in the RMA. The RMA does not create a situation in which information is the only commodity at stake, and so does not offer the prospect of a 'virtual war'. The new circumstances and capabilities do not prescribe one strategy, but extend the range of strategies available. The issue underlying the RMA is the ability of Western countries, in particular the US, to follow a line geared to their own interests and capabilities.

This book analyzes the strategic implications of the shift in focus for the US Armed Forces from regular to irregular war. Lawrence Freedman closely examines the difficulty the US Armed Forces face in shifting their focus from preparing for regular wars, in which combat is separated from civil society, to irregular wars, in which combat is integrated with civil society. He argues that the political context of contemporary irregular wars requires that the purpose and practice of western forces be governed by liberal values, showing that this is also the case with regular wars, to the extent they occur, but it is the integration with civil society that makes the application of liberal values so challenging. The Transformation of Strategic Affairs suggests that this challenge becomes easier to meet when military operations are understood to contribute to the development of a compelling narrative about the likely course and consequence of a conflict, in which

For as long as there have been wars there have been fears about the next war. Where are the new dangers? What is the best defence? How might peace come about? This is the history of how over the last 150 years we have tried - rightly and wrongly - to predict war's future. 'Britain's leading academic strategist ... read this book' Economist 'Insightful and opinionated ... expertly covers centuries of evolving mayhem' Gary J. Bass, The New York Times 'A bonfire of predictions ... Freedman's purpose in this wise book is to discern patterns in the way we have thought about war's future' Shashank Joshi, Financial Times 'It reflects the author's immense knowledge and wisdom. It should feed our humility, because it reminds us of mankind's unlimited capacity for folly' Max Hastings, The Times

A delightfully illustrated version of Sunzi's classic The Art of War by bestselling cartoonist C. C. Tsai C. C. Tsai is one of Asia's most popular cartoonists, and his editions of the Chinese classics have sold more than 40 million copies in over twenty languages. This volume presents Tsai's delightful graphic adaptation of Sunzi's Art of War, the most profound book on warfare and strategy ever written--a work that continues to be read as a handbook for success not just by military commanders but also by leaders in politics, business, and many other fields. Conceived by a Chinese warrior-philosopher some 2,500 years ago, The Art of War speaks to those aspiring to rise through the ranks and help build successful countries. How can that goal best be achieved, and what is the role of warfare, if any, in the process? What are the powers and limits of the general in command? How can you win without going to war? Sunzi's answers to these and other questions are brought to life as never before by Tsai's brilliant cartoons, which show Sunzi fighting on dangerous ground, launching a surprise attack, spying on his enemies, and much more. A marvelously rich introduction to a timeless classic, this book also features a foreword by Lawrence Freedman, one of the world's leading authorities on military strategy, which illuminates how The Art of War has influenced Western strategic thought. In addition, Sunzi's original Chinese text is artfully presented in narrow sidebars on each page, enriching the books for readers and students of Chinese without distracting from the self-contained English-language cartoons. The text is skillfully translated by Brian Bruya, who also provides an introduction.

This book, originally published in 1991, discusses how Britain found itself in a radically different world in the 1990s. The events of the closing months of the 1980s in Eastern Europe, and the move towards an economically and politically integrated Western Europe, have heralded a distinct stage in international relations. In this book, leading academics in the fields of political economy, foreign policy analysis, defence studies and political theory offer alternative approaches to the study of British foreign policy. Each contributor surveys relevant literature of his/her topic and then considers the major questions that any analysis of Britain in the world in the 1990s must face. This book examines the study of 1990s Britain in world politics and the academic perspectives that bear upon it. Its multidisciplinary approach will ensure it is read by all students and specialists interested in the recent history of British, European and international politics.

Written in a lively and readable style by the world's leading authority on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and US-European relations, Defense of the West is the history of a transatlantic security relationship that has endured for over seventy years. This latest edition of a classic work looks at how developments inside NATO and European Union member states affect their ability to defend against external threats while preserving Western values, in the era of Trump and Brexit. Sloan frankly addresses the failures and shortcomings of Western institutions and member states. But the book emphasizes the continuing importance of value-based transatlantic security cooperation as a vital element of the defense and foreign policies of NATO and EU member states. At a time of heightened tension and political turmoil, at home and abroad, Stan Sloan's lucid and far-sighted analysis is more necessary than ever. -- .