A much-needed survey and synopsis of literature on strategic culture and ways of war.

It clearly shows how national strategies and approaches to warfare are, to a significant extent, culturally determined. The concept of national 'ways of war' dates from the 1930s, when Basil H. Liddell Hart theorized that there was a 'British Way in Warfare'.

The concept of strategic culture dates from the 1970s, when Jack Snyder introduced it to explain why leaders of the Soviet Union did not behave according to rational choice theory. These ideas have gained wide acceptance among historians of international politics and warfare, and remain controversial for political scientists seeking general or universal theoretical understanding of such subjects. Because political scientists have focused on strategic culture and historians on ways of war, this work will greatly benefit both audiences and provide each with valuable exposure to the ideas of the other.

Written by leading historians and political scientists, this collection of essays offers a broad and comprehensive coverage of the role of war in American history.
Addressing the role of the armed force, and attitudes towards it, in shaping and defining the United States, the first four chapters reflect the perspectives of historians on this central question, from the time of the American Revolution to the US wars in Vietnam and Iraq. Chapters five and six offer the views of political scientists on the topic, one in light of the global systems theory, the other from the perspective of domestic opinion and governance. The concluding essay is written by historians Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, whose co-authored book The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500-2000 provided the common reading for the symposium which produced these essays.
America, War and Power will be of much interest to students and scholars of US military history, US politics and military history and strategy in general.

Written by leading historians and political scientists, this collection of essays offers a broad and comprehensive coverage of the role of war in American history.

Addressing the role of the armed force, and attitudes towards it, in shaping and defining the United States, the first four chapters reflect the perspectives of historians on this central question, from the time of the American Revolution to the US wars in Vietnam and Iraq. Chapters five and six offer the views of political scientists on the topic, one in light of the global systems theory, the other from the perspective of domestic opinion and governance. The concluding essay is written by historians Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, whose co-authored book The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500-2000 provided the common reading for the symposium which produced these essays.

America, War and Power will be of much interest to students and scholars of US military history, US politics and military history and strategy in general.

A much-needed survey and synopsis of literature on strategic culture and ways of war.

It clearly shows how national strategies and approaches to warfare are, to a significant extent, culturally determined. The concept of national 'ways of war' dates from the 1930s, when Basil H. Liddell Hart theorized that there was a 'British Way in Warfare'.

The concept of strategic culture dates from the 1970s, when Jack Snyder introduced it to explain why leaders of the Soviet Union did not behave according to rational choice theory. These ideas have gained wide acceptance among historians of international politics and warfare, and remain controversial for political scientists seeking general or universal theoretical understanding of such subjects. Because political scientists have focused on strategic culture and historians on ways of war, this work will greatly benefit both audiences and provide each with valuable exposure to the ideas of the other.

Series Information:
Warfare and History

This book looks at the transition of wooden sailing fleets to the modern steel navy. It details the technological breakthroughs that brought about this change - steampower, armour, artillery and torpedoes, and looks at their affect on naval strategy and tactics.
Part of the ever-growing and prestigious Warfare and History series, this book is a must for enthusiasts of military history.

Europe ruled the waves for most of the modern era and even when its navies were eclipsed in size by the US force, they continued to dominate world wars. In this unique history of Europe's naval forces, Larry Sondhaus charts the development of naval warfare from the transition to steam to recent actions in the Persian Gulf. Combining detailed technical information with an in-depth comparison of warfare and tactics across some of the key conflicts of the modern world, this is an absorbing account of European and British seapower, past and present.

This detailed study charts the uneven growth of the Austrian navy from its high point following Archduke Ferdinand Max's administration and the War of 1866 to its ultimate dissolution after World War 1. In following this development, Lawrence Sondhaus not only relates the operational aspects of the Habsburg navy but also traces the growth of popular navalism in Austria-Hungary, the role of naval expansion in stimulating industrial development, and the peculiar difficulties of navy commanders in dealing with the Habsburg nationality problem and the cumbersome politics of Austro-Hungarian dualism.

World War I and its aftermath witnessed a global revolution. This was reflected in the revolutionary war aims of most of the belligerents, the technological revolution that made the war so deadly, the revolutionary sentiment that grew among ordinary combatants, and the revolutionary pressures that led to the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires. In this revised edition of World War One, Lawrence Sondhaus synthesizes the latest scholarship on the war and incorporates insights from the vast body of work published during the war's centenary. He charts the political, economic, social and cultural history of the war at home and on the frontlines as well as the war's origins, ending and transformative effects on societal norms and attitudes, gender and labor relations, and international trade and finance. The accessible narrative is supported by chronologies, personal accounts, guides to key controversies and debates, and numerous maps and photographs.

World War I and its aftermath witnessed a global revolution. This was reflected in the revolutionary war aims of most of the belligerents, the technological revolution that made the war so deadly, the revolutionary sentiment that grew among ordinary combatants, and the revolutionary pressures that led to the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, and Ottoman empires. In this revised edition of World War One, Lawrence Sondhaus synthesizes the latest scholarship on the war and incorporates insights from the vast body of work published during the war's centenary. He charts the political, economic, social and cultural history of the war at home and on the frontlines as well as the war's origins, ending and transformative effects on societal norms and attitudes, gender and labor relations, and international trade and finance. The accessible narrative is supported by chronologies, personal accounts, guides to key controversies and debates, and numerous maps and photographs.

This is a major new naval history of the First World War which reveals the decisive contribution of the war at sea to Allied victory. In a truly global account, Lawrence Sondhaus traces the course of the campaigns in the North Sea, Atlantic, Adriatic, Baltic and Mediterranean and examines the role of critical innovations in the design and performance of ships, wireless communication and firepower. He charts how Allied supremacy led the Central Powers to attempt to revolutionize naval warfare by pursuing unrestricted submarine warfare, ultimately prompting the United States to enter the war. Victory against the submarine challenge, following their earlier success in sweeping the seas of German cruisers and other surface raiders, left the Allies free to use the world's sea lanes to transport supplies and troops to Europe from overseas territories, and eventually from the United States, which proved a decisive factor in their ultimate victory.