Given recent work in quantum physics suggesting that our world is just one world in a series of many, Leland Royce Harper calls for a shift in our concept of the monotheistic God of Judeo-Christian tradition. In Multiverse Deism: Shifting Perspectives of God and the World, Harper argues that those who wish to maintain that the Judeo-Christian God exists ought to revise how they define this God and what they expect of Him so as to maintain consistency between modern theism and the growing body of scientific knowledge. While this revision entails several concessions by the theist, the overall result is a stronger and more coherent account of who God really is. By removing the expectation that God will act in the natural world, Harper argues that we are left with a concept of God that maintains all of the traditional divine attributes, is consistent with current scientific advances, remains compatible with contemporary and historical arguments for the existence of God, and better refutes contemporary and historical arguments for atheism than the traditional, active God.

Given recent work in quantum physics suggesting that our world is just one world in a series of many, Leland Royce Harper calls for a shift in our concept of the monotheistic God of Judeo-Christian tradition. In Multiverse Deism: Shifting Perspectives of God and the World, Harper argues that those who wish to maintain that the Judeo-Christian God exists ought to revise how they define this God and what they expect of Him so as to maintain consistency between modern theism and the growing body of scientific knowledge. While this revision entails several concessions by the theist, the overall result is a stronger and more coherent account of who God really is. By removing the expectation that God will act in the natural world, Harper argues that we are left with a concept of God that maintains all of the traditional divine attributes, is consistent with current scientific advances, remains compatible with contemporary and historical arguments for the existence of God, and better refutes contemporary and historical arguments for atheism than the traditional, active God.

"Hey, that was kind of racist." "I'm not a racist! I have Black friends." This exchange highlights a problem with how people in the United States tend to talk about racially tricky situations. As Racist, Not Racist, Antiracist: Language and the Dynamic Disaster of American Racism explores, such situations are ordinarily categorized as either racist or not racist (or, in other cases, as antiracist). The problem is, there are often situations that are racially not good, but that we do not want to categorize as racist, either. However, since we don't have the language to describe this in-between, we are forced to fall back on the racist/not racist/antiracist trinary, which tends to shut down productive discussion. This is especially true for white people, who tend to take claims of racism-be they interpersonal or institutional-as a personal attack. This is problematic, not only because it means that white people never learn about their own racially troubling behaviors, but also because such fragility keeps them from being able to engage in productive discussions about systemic racial oppression. Leland Harper and Jennifer Kling demonstrate how expanding our racial vocabulary is crucial for the attainment of justice equally enjoyed by all.