This volume discusses ways in which the history of philosophy has been written, from 1800 to 1950, and how it has been informed and guided by institutional, cultural, political, philosophical, and non-philosophical factors. Since its inception as a discipline, histories of philosophy have been written in different ways, depending on author, place, and time; they have varied according to institutional frameworks, cultural settings, and philosophical and non-philosophical contexts. At each stage of the discipline’s development and evolution, philosophy has constantly used the history of philosophy for its own purposes by adapting it, transforming it, rejecting it, embracing it, and rewriting it at every step of the way. The chapters in this book examine the methods deployed by historians of philosophy, epistemological foundations laid down for those methods, and the philosophical (or non-philosophical) aims pursued using those methods. This book will be a great resource for academics, researchers, and advanced students of philosophy and related fields, including political philosophy and history of philosophy. It was originally published as a special issue of the British Journal for the History of Philosophy.

This work synthesizes work previously published in leading journals in the field into a coherent narrative that has a distinctive focus on Germany while also being aware of a broader European dimension. It argues that the German Lutheran Christoph August Heumann (1681-1764) marginalized the biographical approach to past philosophy and paved the way for the German Lutheran Johann Jacob Brucker's (1696-1770) influential method for the writing of past philosophy, centred on depersonalised and abstract systems of philosophy. The work offers an authoritative and engaging account of how late ancient Platonism, Plotinus in particular, was interpreted in eighteenth-century Germany according to these new precepts. Moreover, it reveals the Lutheran religious assumptions of this new approach to past philosophy, which underpinned the works of Heumann and Brucker, but also influential reviews that rejected the English Plato translator Thomas Taylor (1758-1835) and his understanding and evaluation of late ancient Platonism.

Through the concept of contraction, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) endeavoured to explain the relationship of God to his Creation in a way that conformed with his pantheistic view of nature as well as his heterodox view of man's relationship to God. The concept of contraction is twofold. In the ontological sense it denotes the way in which the One, or God, descends to multiplicity. In the noetic sense it accounts for the ways in which the individual human soul ascends towards God through a reversed process of contemplation. Bruno denied the efficacy of the several psychical, psychological and medical states traditionally thought to aid contemplation and noetic ascent towards God. In his view the only means was philosophical contemplation, the use of memory being one important form. Philosophical contemplation elevated the mind from the fragmented multiplicity of sense impressions to an understanding of the principles governing the sensible world. This publication is the first book-length study dedicated to concept of contraction in Bruno's philosophy. Moreover, it explores his sources for this concept. Traditionally Ficino's translation of Plotinus, dating from the second half of the fifteenth century, has been seen as a key source to the Neoplatonism informing Bruno's philosophy. In The Concept of Contraction in Giordano Bruno's Philosophy another Neoplatonic source is considered, namely the pseudo-Aristotelian Liber de Causis (Book of causes), which has not yet been examined in the context of Renaissance Neoplatonism. This work, probably written in Arabic in the ninth century, was translated into Latin in the twelfth century and remained well known to many late Medieval and Renaissance philosophers. Catana argues that this work may have prepared for Ficino's translation of Plotinus, and that in some instances it provided a common source to Renaissance philosophers, Bruno and Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) being conspicuous examples discussed in this book.

Through the concept of contraction, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) endeavoured to explain the relationship of God to his Creation in a way that conformed with his pantheistic view of nature as well as his heterodox view of man's relationship to God. The concept of contraction is twofold. In the ontological sense it denotes the way in which the One, or God, descends to multiplicity. In the noetic sense it accounts for the ways in which the individual human soul ascends towards God through a reversed process of contemplation. Bruno denied the efficacy of the several psychical, psychological and medical states traditionally thought to aid contemplation and noetic ascent towards God. In his view the only means was philosophical contemplation, the use of memory being one important form. Philosophical contemplation elevated the mind from the fragmented multiplicity of sense impressions to an understanding of the principles governing the sensible world. This publication is the first book-length study dedicated to concept of contraction in Bruno's philosophy. Moreover, it explores his sources for this concept. Traditionally Ficino's translation of Plotinus, dating from the second half of the fifteenth century, has been seen as a key source to the Neoplatonism informing Bruno's philosophy. In The Concept of Contraction in Giordano Bruno's Philosophy another Neoplatonic source is considered, namely the pseudo-Aristotelian Liber de Causis (Book of causes), which has not yet been examined in the context of Renaissance Neoplatonism. This work, probably written in Arabic in the ninth century, was translated into Latin in the twelfth century and remained well known to many late Medieval and Renaissance philosophers. Catana argues that this work may have prepared for Ficino's translation of Plotinus, and that in some instances it provided a common source to Renaissance philosophers, Bruno and Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) being conspicuous examples discussed in this book.

This work synthesizes work previously published in leading journals in the field into a coherent narrative that has a distinctive focus on Germany while also being aware of a broader European dimension. It argues that the German Lutheran Christoph August Heumann (1681-1764) marginalized the biographical approach to past philosophy and paved the way for the German Lutheran Johann Jacob Brucker's (1696-1770) influential method for the writing of past philosophy, centred on depersonalised and abstract systems of philosophy. The work offers an authoritative and engaging account of how late ancient Platonism, Plotinus in particular, was interpreted in eighteenth-century Germany according to these new precepts. Moreover, it reveals the Lutheran religious assumptions of this new approach to past philosophy, which underpinned the works of Heumann and Brucker, but also influential reviews that rejected the English Plato translator Thomas Taylor (1758-1835) and his understanding and evaluation of late ancient Platonism.