Inspired by Machiavelli's classic "The Prince," Leslie H. Gelb offers illuminating guidelines on how American power actually works and should be wielded in today's tumultuous world. Writing with the perspective of four decades of extraordinary access and influence in government, think tanks, and journalism, Gelb provides an incisive look at the major U.S. foreign-policy triumphs and tragedies of the past half century, and offers practical rules on how to effectively exercise power today. "Power Rules" is an impassioned challenge to both liberals and conservatives and a plea to reclaim the true meaning of power and the essential role of common sense in solving global problems.

If a historian were allowed but one book on the American involvement in Vietnam, this would be it." - Foreign Affairs. When first published in 1979, four years after the end of one of the most divisive conflicts in the United States, The Irony of Vietnam raised eyebrows. Most students of the war argued that the United States had "stumbled into a quagmire in Vietnam through hubris and miscalculation," as the New York Times's Fox Butterfield put it. But the perspective of time and the opening of documentary sources, including the Pentagon Papers, had allowed Gelb and Betts to probe deep into the decisionmaking leading to escalation of military action in Vietnam. The failure of Vietnam could be laid at the door of American foreign policy, they said, but the decisions that led to the failure were made by presidents aware of the risks, clear about their aims, knowledgeable about the weaknesses of their allies, and under no illusion about the outcome. The book offers a picture of a steely resolve in government circles that, while useful in creating consensus, did not allow for alternative perspectives. In the years since its publication, The Irony of Vietnam has come to be considered the seminal work on the Vietnam War.

Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter "was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system -the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures -was designed to do, and it did it." The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter.

How and why was the course of America's relationship to Asia changed? What are the prospects for detente with the People's Republic of China? How might the new course affect America's economy and her relations with other nations, especially Japan and the USSR? These questions form the basis of a wide-ranging inquiry held recently at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington and recorded in Peace with China? Government officials candidly discuss emerging foreign policies. Former members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations analyze the political and military realities as they saw them. Finally, critics of America's actions in Asia including spokemen for New Left and revisionist positions contribute their viewpoints and alternatives. The result is a unique scrutiny of the complex processes by which the White House, State Department, and Pentagon devise strategies, as well as a lively but scholarly debate on American options in Asia."