The Trans-Neptunian Solar System is a timely reference highlighting the state-of-the-art in current knowledge on the outer solar system. It not only explores the individual objects being discovered there, but also their relationships with other Solar System objects and their roles in the formation and evolution of the Solar System and other planets. Integrating important findings from recent missions, such as New Horizons and Rosetta, the book covers the physical properties of the bodies in the Trans-Neptunian Region, including Pluto and other large members of the Kuiper Belt, as well as dynamical indicators for Planet 9 and related objects and future prospects. Offering a complete look at exploration and findings in the Kuiper Belt and the rest of the outer solar system beyond Neptune, this book is an important resource to bring planetary scientists, space scientists and astrophysicists up-to-date on the latest research and current understandings.

This book provides a special interest theory of protection, developing a full general equilibrium theory that explains the distribution of income with goods markets, factor markets, lobbies, political parties, and voters all pursuing their self interest. This probabilistic voting model shows how well-organized groups can use seemingly irrational government policies to exploit poorly organized groups. Given rational predatory behaviour between these groups, protection or any other redistributive policy that improves the chances of election of a party increases political efficiency. This can create an economic black hole, conditions under which an entire economy can disappear into lobbying. Paradoxically, the tariff rates accompanying an economic black hole are very low. The economic waste is confined to lobbying costs. The book contains both theoretical and empirical work explaining protection in the United States (1900-88) and levels of protection in about sixty foreign countries in the 1980s.

This book provides a special interest theory of protection, developing a full general equilibrium theory that explains the distribution of income with goods markets, factor markets, lobbies, political parties, and voters all pursuing their self interest. This probabilistic voting model shows how well-organized groups can use seemingly irrational government policies to exploit poorly organized groups. Given rational predatory behaviour between these groups, protection or any other redistributive policy that improves the chances of election of a party increases political efficiency. This can create an economic black hole, conditions under which an entire economy can disappear into lobbying. Paradoxically, the tariff rates accompanying an economic black hole are very low. The economic waste is confined to lobbying costs. The book contains both theoretical and empirical work explaining protection in the United States (1900-88) and levels of protection in about sixty foreign countries in the 1980s.