Frankfurt School Critical Theory describes itself as an unmasking critique of power. However, it has surprisingly little to say about major structural oppressions, including gender. A distinctive feature of critique is that, in diagnosing what is wrong with the world, it ought to be guided by the experiences of oppressed groups. Yet, in practice, it tends to pay little heed to these experiences. The Gender of Critical Theory shows how these oversights and tensions stem from the preoccupation with normative foundations that has dominated Frankfurt School theory since Habermas and has given rise to a mode of paradigm-led inquiry that undermines an effective critique of oppression. The assumption of paradigm-led inquiry that too strong a focus on lived experience has parochializing effects on theory stands in tension with its other tenet that emancipatory critique ought to be primarily concerned with the situation of oppressed groups. To alleviate this tension, this book offers a reconfigured account of context-transcendence as the critical insight afforded not by a monist interpretative paradigm but by reasoning dialogically across experiential and theoretical perspectives. By bringing feminist work on gender to bear on Frankfurt School critical theory, it argues that, far from stymying emancipatory critique, attentiveness to the experiences of oppressed groups is one of its enabling conditions. Lived experience can reveal dimensions to oppression that are not necessarily visible from the external vantage point of the theorist. The ways in which vulnerable groups respond to their circumstances may also make an invaluable contribution to the development of models of transformative social practice. Combining feminist ideas with inherent but underutilised resources in the Frankfurt School tradition, this book proposes the idea of critique as theorising from experience.

Recognition is one of the most debated concepts in contemporary social and political thought. Its proponents, such as Axel Honneth, hold that to be recognized by others is a basic human need that is central to forming an identity, and the denial of recognition deprives individuals and communities of something essential for their flourishing. Yet critics including Judith Butler have questioned whether recognition is implicated in structures of domination, arguing that the desire to be recognized can motivative individuals to accept their assigned place in the social order by conforming to oppressive norms or obeying repressive institutions. Is there a way to break this impasse? Recognition and Ambivalence brings together leading scholars in social and political philosophy to develop new perspectives on recognition and its role in social life. It begins with a debate between Honneth and Butler, the first sustained engagement between these two major thinkers on this subject. Contributions from both proponents and critics of theories of recognition further reflect upon and clarify the problems and challenges involved in theorizing the concept and its normative desirability. Together, they explore different routes toward a critical theory of recognition, departing from wholly positive or negative views to ask whether it is an essentially ambivalent phenomenon. Featuring original, systematic work in the philosophy of recognition, this book also provides a useful orientation to the key debates on this important topic.

Recognition is one of the most debated concepts in contemporary social and political thought. Its proponents, such as Axel Honneth, hold that to be recognized by others is a basic human need that is central to forming an identity, and the denial of recognition deprives individuals and communities of something essential for their flourishing. Yet critics including Judith Butler have questioned whether recognition is implicated in structures of domination, arguing that the desire to be recognized can motivative individuals to accept their assigned place in the social order by conforming to oppressive norms or obeying repressive institutions. Is there a way to break this impasse? Recognition and Ambivalence brings together leading scholars in social and political philosophy to develop new perspectives on recognition and its role in social life. It begins with a debate between Honneth and Butler, the first sustained engagement between these two major thinkers on this subject. Contributions from both proponents and critics of theories of recognition further reflect upon and clarify the problems and challenges involved in theorizing the concept and its normative desirability. Together, they explore different routes toward a critical theory of recognition, departing from wholly positive or negative views to ask whether it is an essentially ambivalent phenomenon. Featuring original, systematic work in the philosophy of recognition, this book also provides a useful orientation to the key debates on this important topic.

This book reassesses theories of agency and gender identity against the backdrop of changing relations between men and women in contemporary societies. McNay argues that recent thought on the formation of the modern subject offers a one-sided or negative account of agency, which underplays the creative dimension present in the responses of individuals to changing social relations. An understanding of this creative element is central to a theory of autonomous agency, and also to an explanation of the ways in which women and men negotiate changes within gender relations.

In exploring the implications of this idea of agency for a theory of gender identity, McNay brings together the work of leading feminist theorists - such as Judith Butler and Nancy Fraser - with the work of key continental social theorists. In particular, she examines the work of Pierre Bourdieu, Paul Ricoeur and Cornelius Castoriadis, each of whom has explored different aspects of the idea of the creativity of action. McNay argues that their thought has interesting implications for feminist ideas of gender, but these have been relatively neglected partly because of the huge influence of the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan in this area. She argues that, despite its suggestive nature, feminist theory must move away from the ideas of Foucault and Lacan if a more substantive account of agency is to be introduced into ideas of gender identity.

This book will appeal to students and scholars in the areas of social theory, gender studies and feminist theory.