Drawing on published works, correspondence and manuscripts, this book offers the most comprehensive reconstruction of Boscovich's theory within its historical context. It explains the genesis and theoretical as well as epistemological underpinnings in light of the Jesuit tradition to which Boscovich belonged, and contrasts his ideas with those of Newton, Leibniz, and their legacy. Finally, it debates crucial issues in early-modern physical science such as the concept of force, the particle-like structure of matter, the idea of material points and the notion of continuity, and shares novel insights on Boscovich's alleged influence on later developments in physics. With its attempt to reduce all natural forces to one single law, Boscovich's Theory of Natural Philosophy, published in 1758, left a lasting impression on scientists and philosophers of every age regarding the fundamental unity of physical phenomena. The theory argues that every pair of material points is subject to one mutual force - and always the same force - which is their propensity to be mutually attracted or repelled, depending on their distance from one another. Furthermore, the action of this unique force is visualized through a famous diagram that fascinated generations of scientists. But his understanding of key terms of the theory - such as the notion of force involved and the very idea of a material point - is only ostensibly similar to our current conceptual framework. Indeed, it needs to be clarified within the plurality of contexts in which it has emerged rather than being considered in view of later developments. The book is recommended for scholars and students interested in the ideas of the early modern period, especially historians and philosophers of science, mathematicians and physicists with an interest in the history of the discipline, and experts on Jesuit science and philosophy.

Drawing on published works, correspondence and manuscripts, this book offers the most comprehensive reconstruction of Boscovich's theory within its historical context. It explains the genesis and theoretical as well as epistemological underpinnings in light of the Jesuit tradition to which Boscovich belonged, and contrasts his ideas with those of Newton, Leibniz, and their legacy. Finally, it debates crucial issues in early-modern physical science such as the concept of force, the particle-like structure of matter, the idea of material points and the notion of continuity, and shares novel insights on Boscovich's alleged influence on later developments in physics. With its attempt to reduce all natural forces to one single law, Boscovich's Theory of Natural Philosophy, published in 1758, left a lasting impression on scientists and philosophers of every age regarding the fundamental unity of physical phenomena. The theory argues that every pair of material points is subject to one mutual force - and always the same force - which is their propensity to be mutually attracted or repelled, depending on their distance from one another. Furthermore, the action of this unique force is visualized through a famous diagram that fascinated generations of scientists. But his understanding of key terms of the theory - such as the notion of force involved and the very idea of a material point - is only ostensibly similar to our current conceptual framework. Indeed, it needs to be clarified within the plurality of contexts in which it has emerged rather than being considered in view of later developments. The book is recommended for scholars and students interested in the ideas of the early modern period, especially historians and philosophers of science, mathematicians and physicists with an interest in the history of the discipline, and experts on Jesuit science and philosophy.

This volume presents philosophy of science at its best, i.e. as a philosophical questioning informed by current scientific research, which carefully assesses and evaluates its commitments and consequences. As such it represents philosophy simpliciter at its best, for it is concerned with and dares to ask fundamental questions about the nature of the results of the natural sciences, arguably our most reliable sources of knowledge of the world. The contributions collected in this volume make clear that a philosophy that is disconnected from science is sterile and that the practice of science that is disconnected from a philosophical attempt to understand the natural world in its most general features is blind. Throughout the book we are confronted with questions about the nature of species, numbers, space, time, matter, consciousness and so on. Taking seriously these questions, along with other open problems in philosophy of sciences, and keeping the dialogue between science and philosophy wide open, is likely to be our best bet for a deeper understanding of what surrounds us. The book has a further, deeply important merit. Being the result of a post-graduate conference, it brings together not only leading, long established experts in the field but also new, young researchers, who usually find too small a place within the academic environment. Promoting exactly this kind of interaction is an essential step in constructing a new paradigm for an open, collaborative and fruitful scientific community.