World War II coincided with cinema's golden age. Movies now considered classics were created at a time when all sides in the war were coming to realize the great power of popular films to motivate the masses. Through multinational research, One World, Big Screen reveals how the Grand Alliance-Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States-tapped Hollywood's impressive power to shrink the distance and bridge the differences that separated them. The Allies, M. Todd Bennett shows, strategically manipulated cinema in an effort to promote the idea that the United Nations was a family of nations joined by blood and affection. Bennett revisits Casablanca, Mrs. Miniver, Flying Tigers, and other familiar movies that, he argues, helped win the war and the peace by improving Allied solidarity and transforming the American worldview. Closely analyzing film, diplomatic correspondence, propagandists' logs, and movie studio records found in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the former Soviet Union, Bennett rethinks traditional scholarship on World War II diplomacy by examining the ways that Hollywood and the Allies worked together to prepare for and enact the war effort.

This volume documents U.S. national security policy in the context of the Vietnam War and the changing Cold War strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. When President Richard Nixon assumed office in January 1969, he was confronted with the fact that the United States no longer held commanding military superiority over its superpower rival. Since the end of his stint as Vice President in 1961, the Soviets had achieved a rough strategic parity that left the United States with "significant vulnerabilities" vis-a-vis the USSR. This work documents the Nixon administration's efforts to grapple with this new strategic situation and provides coverage of the following: The administration's review of U.S. nuclear and general purpose forces and strategic doctrine; its attempts to ascertain the level of technological sophistication achieved by the Soviet missile program; and its decision to deploy Safeguard, a modified anti-ballistic missile system. The page contained in this volume also examines chemical and biological weapons policy; U.S. nuclear policy in Asia; the evolution of the administration's strategic priorities in light of an ever-shrinking defense budget; and the transition from military conscription to an all-volunteer armed force. Additionally, it provides previously unreleased material regarding the October 1969 Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, in which Nixon secretly placed on alert portions of the United States military, including its nuclear forces.
Throughout this comprehensive and historical volume, a consistent theme is the relationship between military strength and diplomatic strength; in particular, the importance of military might--real or perceived--to the United States' ability to maintain credibility in the eyes of allies and adversaries alike.