This rare 10th anniversary edition (published in 2007) contains a new introduction by expert Soviet historian David M. Glantz. In addition all maps and graphics have been enhanced from the 1996 edition. "When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival." (From the original foreword by Hans Binnendijk, 1996)

Germany's Eastern Front in World War II saw many campaigns and battles that have been "forgotten" by a Soviet Union that tried to hide its military failures. The Red Army's invasion of Romania in April and May 1944 was one such campaign, which produced nearly 200,000 casualties and tarnished the reputations of its commanders. The redoubtable David Glantz, the world's leading authority on the Soviet military in World War II, now restores this tale to its proper place in the annals of World War II.

Working from newly available Russian and long-neglected German archives--plus Red Army unit histories and commanders' memoirs--Glantz reconstructs an imposing mosaic that reveals the immense scope and ambitious intent of the first Iasi-Kishinev offensive. His re-creation shows that Stalin was not as preoccupied with a direct route to Berlin as he was with a "broad front" strategy designed to gain territory and find vulnerable points in Germany's extended lines of defense. If successful, the invasion would have also eliminated Romania as Germany's ally, cut off the vital Ploiesti oilfields, and provided a base from which to consolidate Soviet power throughout the Balkans.

Glantz traces the 2nd Ukrainian Front's offensive along the Tirgu-Frumos, Iasi, and Dnestr River axes and the 3rd Ukrainian Front's simultaneous advance to the Dnestr River and dramatic struggle to seize bridgeheads across the river and capture Kishinev. He discloses General Ivan Konev's strategic plan as the 2nd Ukrainian Front prepared its Iasi offensive and fought a climactic battle with the German Eighth Army and its Romanian allies in the Tirgu-Frumos region in early May, then the regrouping of General Rodion Malinovsky's 3rd Ukrainian Front for its decisive offensive toward Kishinev, which aborted in the face of a skillful counterstroke by a threadbare German Sixth Army. Glantz describes how the Wehrmacht, with a nucleus of survived combat veterans, was able to beat back Soviet forces hampered by spring floods, while already fragile Soviet logistical support was further undermined by the Wehrmacht's scorched-earth strategy.

Although Konev's and Malinovsky's offensives ultimately failed, the Red Army managed to inflict heavy losses on Axis forces, exacerbating the effects of Germany's defeats in the Ukraine and making it more difficult for the Wehrmacht to contain the Soviet juggernaut's ultimate advance toward Berlin. By re-creating this forgotten offensive, Glantz commemorates a rich and important chapter in the history of a war that brought down the German Army and reshaped the map of Europe.

This volume begins with an investigation of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It draws upon eye-witness German accounts of what occurred, and supplements these with German archival and detailed Soviet materials. The Soviet government has released extensive amounts of formerly classified archival materials from the period. This material has been incorporated into the maps and text.

In history guerrilla warfare always played an important role whether it was of a large scale or of a limited character fighting. Grenkevich traces its impact on military history in the 18th and 19th century in Europe and North America. He carefully analyses the Russian partisan movement from the first bloody encounters in the 1870s, taking into account the social, economic and political configurations of Russia. The work details how the Communist Party studied the Red guerrillas' fighting experience at the end of 1918 and included in the Red Army's Field Manual a special chapter named 'Partisan Operations'. During the Second World War the most significant partisan war took place. The relationship between the Party, the Red Army and the Partisan Movements is covered in the main body of Grenkevich's historical research. This study is a response to the lack of a comprehensive bibliography and reliable books on the Partisan Movement. In preparing this research the author conducted interviews with surviving partisans; in addition, a significant amount of new Russian information on the activity of the Soviet partisans has become available in recent years.

In history guerrilla warfare always played an important role whether it was of a large scale or of a limited character fighting. Grenkevich traces its impact on military history in the 18th and 19th century in Europe and North America. He carefully analyses the Russian partisan movement from the first bloody encounters in the 1870s, taking into account the social, economic and political configurations of Russia. The work details how the Communist Party studied the Red guerrillas' fighting experience at the end of 1918 and included in the Red Army's Field Manual a special chapter named 'Partisan Operations'. During the Second World War the most significant partisan war took place. The relationship between the Party, the Red Army and the Partisan Movements is covered in the main body of Grenkevich's historical research. This study is a response to the lack of a comprehensive bibliography and reliable books on the Partisan Movement. In preparing this research the author conducted interviews with surviving partisans; in addition, a significant amount of new Russian information on the activity of the Soviet partisans has become available in recent years.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations", "deep battle", and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

This volume begins with an investigation of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. It draws upon eye-witness German accounts of what occurred, and supplements these with German archival and detailed Soviet materials. The Soviet government has released extensive amounts of formerly classified archival materials from the period. This material has been incorporated into the maps and text.

This text is the second of three volumes written by Colonel Glantz on the contribution of intelligence and deception operations to the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. It examines the area where intelligence and operations overlap; the nature of co-ordination between the two; and the support provided by intelligence to operational planning and execution (or the absence of such support). This is not a study of intelligence work as such, but of how intelligence can improve the chances of success on the battlefield by facilitating the more effective and economical use of troops.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as war of annihilations, deep battle, and deep operations have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.

In mid-December 1942, after encircling the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad, Soviet forces in southern Russia began a series of offensive operations which continued unabated into February 1943. In these offensives the Soviet High Command attempted to smash German resistance and encircle the bulk of two German army groups. For two months the German forces struck back. In a well co-ordinated counterstroke they inflicted a major operational defeat on the Soviets and stabilized the front until the summer.

In "Endgame at Stalingrad," the final volume of his acclaimed "Stalingrad Trilogy," David Glantz completes his definitive account of one of World War II's most infamous confrontations, the campaign that marked Germany's failure on the Eastern Front and proved to be a turning point in the war. In documenting the last days of the Stalingrad campaign, in particular the Red Army's counteroffensive known at Operation Uranus, Glantz takes on a plethora of myths and controversial questions surrounding these events, in particular, questions about why Operation Uranus succeeded and the German relief attempts failed, whether the Sixth Army could have escaped encirclement or been rescued, and who, finally was most responsible for its ultimate defeat.

In addition to a wide variety of traditional sources, this volume makes use of two major categories of documentary materials hitherto unavailable to researchers. The first consists of extensive records from the combat journal of the German Sixth Army, which had been largely missing since the war's end and were only recently rediscovered and published. The second is a vast amount of newly released Soviet and Russian archival material including excerpts from the Red Army General Staff's daily operational summaries; a wide variety of "Stavka" (High Command), People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO), and Red Army General Staff orders and directives; and the daily records of the Soviet 62nd Army and its subordinate divisions and brigades for most of the time fighting was underway in Stalingrad proper.

Because of the persistent controversy and mythology characterizing this period, many of these documents are included verbatim in English translation in this companion volume, providing concrete evidence in support of the conclusions put forward in "Volume Three." As such, the "Companion" contributes substantially to this final volume's unprecedented detail and fresh perspectives, interpretations, and evaluations of the later stages of the Stalingrad campaign.

No war has caused greater human suffering than the Second World War on Germany's Eastern Front. Victory in the war cost the Red Army over 29 million casualties, whose collective fate is only now being properly documented. Among the many millions of soldiers who made up that gruesome toll were an unprecedented number of Red Army general officers. Many of these perished on the battlefield or in prison camps at the hands of their German tormentors. Others fell victim to equally terrifying Stalinist repression. Together these generals personify the faceless nature of the war of the Eastern Front - the legions of forgotten souls who perished in the war. Covered up for decades, the saga of these victims of war can now be told and in this volume, A A Maslov begins the difficult process of memorializing these warrior casualties. Using formerly secret Soviet archival materials and personal interviews with the families of the officers, he painstakingly documents the fate of Red Army generals who fell victim to wartime enemy action.

The Soviet Study of War" series examines the lessons Soviet military theorists and commanders learned from the study of their own military experience. These are translations of Soviet documents.

The Soviet Study of War" series examines the lessons Soviet military theorists and commanders learned from the study of their own military experience. These are translations of Soviet documents.

In Book Two of the third volume of his magisterial Stalingrad Trilogy, David Glantz continues and concludes his definitive history of one of the most infamous battles of World War Two, the Stalingrad campaign that signaled Germany's failure on the Eastern Front and marked a turning point in the war. Book Two finds Germany's most famous army--General Friedrich Paulus's Sixth--in dire straits, trapped in the Stalingrad kessel, or pocket, by a Red Army that has seized the initiative in what the Soviets now term the Great Patriotic War. The Red Army's counteroffensive, Operation Uranus, is well underway, having largely destroyed the bulk of two Romanian armies and encircled the German Sixth and half of the German Fourth Panzer Army.
Drawing on materials previously unavailable or believed lost, Glantz gives a closely observed account of the final ten weeks of Germany's illfated Stalingrad campaign. In short order, the Red Army parried and then defeated two German attempts to rescue the Sixth Army, crushed the Italian Eighth and Hungarian Second Armies, severely damaged the German Fourth Panzer and Second Armies, and finally destroyed the German Sixth Army in the ruins of Stalingrad. With well over halfamillion soldiers torn from its order of battle, Hitler's Axis could only watch in horror as its status abruptly changed from victor to vanquished. This book completes a vivid and detailed picture of the Axis defeat that would prove decisive as a catastrophe from which Germany and its Wehrmacht could never recover.
As in the preceding volumes, Glantz extensively mines newly available materials to provide a clearer and more accurate picture of what actually happened at Stalingrad at this crucial moment in World War II--a "ground truth" that gets beyond the myths and misinformation surrounding this historic confrontation. And this concluding chapter, relating events even more steeped in myth than those that came before, is especially bracing as it takes on controversial questions about why Operation Uranus succeeded and the German relief attempts failed, whether the Sixth Army could have escaped encirclement or been rescued, and who, finally was most responsible for its ultimate defeat. The answers Glantz provides, embedded in a fullyrealized account of the endgame at Stalingrad, make this book the last word on one of history's epic clashes.

A comprehensive guide to the battle for the Ukraine from the Soviet perspective during the winter of 1943-1944. This volume is an unexpurgated translation of the originally classified Soviet General Staff Study No.14.

First published in 2006. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This new book is a chronological narrative of the experiences of Evgenii Moniushko, who lived through and survived the first year of the siege of Leningrad and who served as a junior officer in the Red Army during the last eighteen months of war and the first year of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

This volume presents an intensely human view of daily army life both in combat and garrison duty and unique perspectives on the conditions he and other junior officers and common soldiers endured while in army service.

This new book is a chronological narrative of the experiences of Evgenii Moniushko, who lived through and survived the first year of the siege of Leningrad and who served as a junior officer in the Red Army during the last eighteen months of war and the first year of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

This volume presents an intensely human view of daily army life both in combat and garrison duty and unique perspectives on the conditions he and other junior officers and common soldiers endured while in army service.

Armed revolution and civil war gave birth to the Soviet Union, world War II propelled it to global pre-eminence, and the Cold War contributed to the Soviet Union's demise. Given Marxism-Leninism's idological preoccupation with war and threats of war, it is understandable that the spectre of war should play a vital role in the life and fate of the Soviet state. This study of Soviet military strategy is based upon the twin pillars of Soviet political-military actions and Soviet writings on the subject of military strategy. Thanks to the policy of glasnost, it incorporates Soviet materials hitherto unavailable in the West. It aims to be not simply a retrospective account of what was, but to form part of the context for what will be in the future.

This volume offers detailed information about the Red Army's preparation for and conduct of the Battle of Kursk. Prepared by the Red Army General Staff in 1944 from combat reports and other top-secret archive materials, the work is a practical and candid document, which was written to educate the Red Army in the intricacies, demands and pitfalls of modern mobile warefare.

This volume offers detailed information about the Red Army's preparation for and conduct of the Battle of Kursk. Prepared by the Red Army General Staff in 1944 from combat reports and other top-secret archive materials, the work is a practical and candid document, which was written to educate the Red Army in the intricacies, demands and pitfalls of modern mobile warefare.

No war has caused greater human suffering than the Second World War on Germany's Eastern Front. Victory in the war cost the Red Army over 29 million casualties, whose collective fate is only now being properly documented. Among the many millions of soldiers who made up that gruesome toll were an unprecedented number of Red Army general officers. Many of these perished on the battlefield or in prison camps at the hands of their German tormentors. Others fell victim to equally terrifying Stalinist repression. Together these generals personify the faceless nature of the war of the Eastern Front - the legions of forgotten souls who perished in the war. Covered up for decades, the saga of these victims of war can now be told and in this volume, A A Maslov begins the difficult process of memorializing these warrior casualties. Using formerly secret Soviet archival materials and personal interviews with the families of the officers, he painstakingly documents the fate of Red Army generals who fell victim to wartime enemy action.

The Soviet military concept of operational art and the associated theories such as "war of annihilations," "deep battle," and "deep operations" have been observed by the West since World War II. The Soviet government hid their military-theoretical work behind a veil of secrecy. Here, the Soviet theories are revealed in the words of those who created them in peacetime and applied them in war.