Modern economics is like a metropolitan area. Economists' ideas about business and markets are like the magnificent buildings of the city centre. Yet most growth and prosperity is in the suburbs - lately many of economics' greatest successes have been outside the traditional boundaries of the discipline. In the study of law, economic ideas have been the intellectual focus and "law and economics" has become a major field. In the study of politics, economists and political scientists using economics-type methods are uniquely influential. In sociology and history, economics has had a smaller but growing influence through "rational choice sociology" and "cliometrics". The influence of the economists type thinking in other social sciences is bringing about a theoretical integration of all the social sciences under one overarching paradigm. The chapters of the book illustrate the intellectual advances that account for this unified view of economies and societies.

A compelling theory on the rationale for the changing fortunes of nations

This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mancur Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort. The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"-goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law, and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods. The services the labor union provides for the worker it represents, or the benefits a lobby obtains for the group it represents, are public goods: they automatically go to every individual in the group, whether or not he helped bear the costs. It follows that, just as governments require compulsory taxation, many large private organizations require special (and sometimes coercive) devices to obtain the resources they need. This is not true of smaller organizations for, as this book shows, small and large organizations support themselves in entirely different ways. The theory indicates that, though small groups can act to further their interest much more easily than large ones, they will tend to devote too few resources to the satisfaction of their common interests, and that there is a surprising tendency for the "lesser" members of the small group to exploit the "greater" members by making them bear a disproportionate share of the burden of any group action. All of the theory in the book is in Chapter 1; the remaining chapters contain empirical and historical evidence of the theory's relevance to labor unions, pressure groups, corporations, and Marxian class action.

This book shows that, in calling economics the `dismal science', Thomas Carlyle was profoundly wrong. Economic ideas have illuminated behaviour in all of the social sciences in addition to the economists' traditional domain. The broadening of economics and the use of economists' methods by social scientists in other fields is leading to a unified and positive view of economies and societies.

This final work by a world-renowned economist should take its place among the classics of political economy. Why do some economies do better than others? How does society encourage the kind of market economy that generates continually increasing incomes? How do particular styles of government affect economic performance? Economist Mancur Olson tackles these questions and others in what should surely be regarded as his magnum opus. Olson contends that governments can play an essential role in the development of markets. Reliable enforcement of private contracts and protection of individual rights to property depend on governments strong enough to guarantee these rights yet constrained enough not to undermine them. His exploration of market-augmenting governments will stand as an important work on economic growth and provide a useful framework in which to consider the Asian financial crisis and its aftermath.