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In the 77 days from 20 January to 18 March of 1968, two divisions
of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) surrounded a regiment of U.S.
Marines on a mountain plateau in the northwest corner of South
Vietnam known as Khe sanh. The episode was no accident; it was in
fact a carefully orchestrated meeting in which both sides got what
they wanted. The north Vietnamese succeeded in surrounding the
Marines in a situation in many ways similar to Dien Bien Phu, and
may have been seeking similar tactical, operational, and strategic
results. General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of the
joint U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV),
meanwhile, sought to lure the NVA into the unpopulated terrain
around the 26th Marines in order to wage a battle of annihilation
with air power. In this respect Khe Sanh has been lauded as a great
victory of air power, a military instrument of dubious suitability
to much of the Vietnam conflict. The facts support the assessment
that air power was the decisive element at Khe Sanh, delivering
more than 96 percent of the ordnance used against the NVA. This
work focuses mainly on fixed-wing close air support, or the support
provided by jet and propeller-driven conventional aircraft, to the
general exclusion of rotary-wing aircraft, also known as
helicopters. There are several reasons for this, none of which are
meant to belittle the contributions or heroism of the Marine, Army,
and Air Force helicopter pilots who fought in the hills around Khe
Sanh. First, until the arrival of the AH-1G Cobra in April 1969,
there was no helicopter designed for dedicated close air support of
Marines in Vietnam. The primary gunship during the battle of Khe
Sanh was the UH-1E outfitted with machine guns and rocket launchers
for the escort of unarmed helicopters. These helicopters were
sometimes used for the direct support of ground troops with
suppressive fires and were frequently used as forward air
controllers, spotting and marking targets for fixed-wing aircraft
with heavier ordnance. These roles are appropriately discussed
alongside the contributions of the fixed-wing aircraft, but as a
general rule, analysis remains focused on the heavier attack
aircraft.
The Marines in Vietnam, 1954-1973, An Anthology and Annotated
Bibliography, based on articles that appeared in the U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, Naval Review, and Marine Corps Gazette, has
served well for 14 years as an interim reference on the Vietnam
War. It has both complemented and supplemented our official
histories on Marine operations in Vietnam. Since its publication in
1974, however, events in Vietnam and the appearance of additional
significant articles in the three periodicals have made both the
anthology and bibliography somewhat dated. This expanded edition
extends the coverage of the anthology to 1975 and the entries in
the bibliography to 1984.
U.S. Marines as advisors have a long history, from Presley O'Bannon
at Tripoli through Iraq and Afghanistan via Haiti, Dominican
Republic, Nicaragua, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, and
Vietnam. While most Marines think of the Vietnamese Marine Corps as
the primary advisory experience during that conflict, others served
with various other advisory programs with the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy,
U.S. Joint Special Operations, and U.S. Civil Operations and Rural
Development Support. One of these is the subject of this study:
Marine advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Units
(PRUs). This narrative is a combination of experience, research,
and reflection. While other journalistic or academic accounts have
been published, this is a narrative of participants. Many
historians consider the two most effective counterinsurgency
organizations employed during the Vietnam War to have been the PRU
and USMC Combined Action Platoons (CAP). In both cases, U.S.
Marines played a significant role in the success of these
innovative programs. It should be pointed out, however, that the
number of U.S. Marines assigned to these programs was small and the
bulk of the forces were locally recruited fighters. Both programs
used a small cadre of Marines providing leadership, training, and
combat support for large numbers of indigenous troops, and in so
doing, capitalized on the inherent strengths of each. The author
believes that both of these programs have applicability in any
counterinsurgency where U.S. forces are called upon to assist a
host government. Obviously, adjustments to these programs would
have to be made to take into account local conditions, but the core
concept of providing U.S. Marines to command or advise local
militia and special police units is one that has great promise for
success. With a clear understanding of why the PRUs and CAPs
worked, and with the necessary adjustments to take into account
local conditions, similar units can be created to defeat future
insurgencies. With this in mind, the author hopes that this work
will provide U.S. military planners with insights into creating and
managing units capable of defeating a well-organized and highly
motivated insurgent political infrastructure.
Includes many full color illustrations and maps.
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The Battle for Khe Sanh (Paperback)
Moyers S. Shore; Foreword by W. C. Westmoreland; Marine Corps History & Museums Division
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R707
Discovery Miles 7 070
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Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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Originally published in 1998. From the foreword: "In view of his
unique experiences as a senior Marine commander in Vietnam and his
extensive efforts to communicate his views and his combat knowledge
to the troops he commanded, it was decided to republish a series of
articles that Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., wrote in
1969-1970 while he was Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious
Force (III MAF), which were published in Sea Tiger, the weekly
newspaper distributed throughout the III MAF area of northern South
Vietnam. General Nickerson commanded the 1st Marine Division in
Vietnam from 1 October 1966 to 31 May 1967 and returned to that
embattled country to command the III MAF from 27 March 1969 through
9 March 1970. During this latter tour of duty, in order to make up
in part for an in-person briefing and welcome he used to give
incoming officers and staff noncommissioned officers of the 1st
Division, he began writing a series of articles for publication in
Sea Tiger. In these short pieces, he covered a wide range of
topics, some related to combat service in Vietnam, but many more to
the Vietnamese people and the role of Americans in their support."
Orginally published in 1976. From the foreword: "This history,
which traces the development of helicopters in the Marine Corps
from 1946 to 1962, offers a tribute to the creative vision and
planning of a handful of Marine officers who conceived of the
vertical assault concept in amphibious operations at a time when
suitable aircraft to make it work did not exist. The story of the
subsequent struggle to procure and develop those aircraft, to
refine a doctrine for their employment, and to familiarize the
Marine Corps with their use is an interesting and vital part of
modern Marine Corps history. The documentary basis for this
monograph was primarily the official records of the Marine Corps
and Navy Department, but considerable use was made of interviews
and correspondence with key individuals involved in all phases of
helicopter development."
Originally published in 1978, this history traces the development
of helicopters in the Marine Corps from 1962 to 1973 and is the
second in a series of two volumes which between them cover the
story of Marines and helicopters from 1946 to the present. In the
period covered by this volume, the Marines at last acquired
helicopters fully capable of carrying out an amphibious vertical
assault, and they further elaborated their helicopter doctrines and
tactics. In the Vietnam war, pilots and machines met and surmounted
the test of actual combat. The documentary basis for this monograph
was primarily the official records of the Marine Corps and Navy
Department, but considerable use was made of interviews and
correspondence with key individuals involved in all phases of
helicopter development.
The author first served with Vietnamese Marines in 1972 when they
came on board the U.S. Navy ships that Battalion Landing Team 1/9
was embarked on. They were preparing for an amphibious landing to
counter the North Vietnamese Army's Spring Offensive in Military
Region 1 (I Corps) in South Vietnam. They brought with them their
U.S. Marine advisors who were known by the senior members of the
battalion. They had already witnessed or heard of the exploits of
then-Captain John Ripley and Lieutenant Colonel Gerry Turley in
blunting the initial attacks of the Easter Offensive. As the
Vietnamese were formed into helicopter or boat teams and fed a meal
before going ashore, they bantered with the American Marines and
Sailors, telling them to come along to "kill communists." After a
turbulent start to the offensive, the Vietnamese Marines exhibited
the fighting spirit that elite units create for themselves. This
was reflected in the various names of their battalions that were
the focus of their unit identification. The infantry battalions had
a series of nicknames and slogans that were reflected on their unit
insignia: 1st Battalion's "Wild Bird," 2d Battalion's "Crazy
Buffalo," 3d Battalion's "SeaWolf," 4th Battalion's "Killer Shark,"
5th Battalion's "Black Dragon," 6th Battalion's "Sacred Bird," 7th
Battalion's "Black Tiger," 8th Battalion's "Sea Eagle," and 9th
Battalion's "Mighty Tiger." For the artillery units, this was the
1st Battalion's "Lightning Fire," 2d Battalion's "Sacred Arrow,"
and 3d Battalion's "Sacred Bow." Support and service battalions
followed this example as well. The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
and its embarked troops provided helicopters, amphibious tractors,
and landing craft support for a series of attacks leading to the
recapture of Quang Tri City through the fall of 1972. In addition,
command and control facilities and liaison were provided to the
Republic of Vietnam's I Corps and Military Advisory Command
Vietnam's 1st Regional Advisory Command in the sustained
counteroffensive. This reinforced the impression made by the
Vietnamese Marines themselves. This began the interest in the story
that follows. The period after World War II saw a number of
associated Marine Corps formed in the republics of China, Korea,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. They had been
founded, with the help of foreign military aid, to fight the
various conflicts to contain communist expansion in the region.
Also present at various times were other Marines from the
Netherlands, France, and Great Britain. The beginnings of the Cold
War witnessed this proliferation of amphibious forces in Asia, in
part because of the reputation the U.S. Marines had earned in the
cross Pacific drive against Japan and in other postwar
confrontations. This is about one of them, the Vietnamese Marine
Corps or Thuy Quan Luc Chien (TQLC). This occasional paper provides
documents on the topics of the Vietnamese Marines and the U.S.
Marine Advisory Unit from this period.
This bibliography presents an interim survey of published material
about the Marines of the Revolutionary War.
Includes FULL COLOR maps and illustrations. Presents a significant
look at the cold weather and mountain training facility of the U.S.
Marine Corps in the Sierra Nevada mountain range of California.
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