Originally published in 1969. Since the seventeenth century the kind of knowledge afforded by mathematical physics has come more and more to furnish mankind with an ideal for all knowledge. The ideal also carries with it a new conception of the nature of things: all things whatsoever are held to be intelligible ultimately in terms of the laws of inanimate nature. This reductionist formula can be overcome only by the fundamental rethinking of our philosophical premises. To contribute towards thsi rethinking was the aim of the Study Group at whose meetings this collection originated. The essayists come from a wide range of disciplines but all want to address the conflict in our culture. The first part consists of discussions of various fundamental problems in the sciences. There are essays on the inter-relation of physics and psychology, on the possible reduction of biology to physics and chemistry, on new approaches to experimental psychology, against the possibility of giving a purely 'factual' account of social and political life, and for a fundamental reform of our concept of responsibility. The second section of the book suggests lines of philosophical inquiry which might help to resolve the epistemological and ethical problems arising at the foundations of physics, biology, psychology and the social sciences.

Originally published in 1969. Since the seventeenth century the kind of knowledge afforded by mathematical physics has come more and more to furnish mankind with an ideal for all knowledge. The ideal also carries with it a new conception of the nature of things: all things whatsoever are held to be intelligible ultimately in terms of the laws of inanimate nature. This reductionist formula can be overcome only by the fundamental rethinking of our philosophical premises. To contribute towards thsi rethinking was the aim of the Study Group at whose meetings this collection originated. The essayists come from a wide range of disciplines but all want to address the conflict in our culture. The first part consists of discussions of various fundamental problems in the sciences. There are essays on the inter-relation of physics and psychology, on the possible reduction of biology to physics and chemistry, on new approaches to experimental psychology, against the possibility of giving a purely 'factual' account of social and political life, and for a fundamental reform of our concept of responsibility. The second section of the book suggests lines of philosophical inquiry which might help to resolve the epistemological and ethical problems arising at the foundations of physics, biology, psychology and the social sciences.

Under the pretense of defending an obscure treatise by a Catalan theologian, Sebond, Montaigne attacks the philosophers who attempt rational explanations of the universe and argues for a skeptical Christianity based squarely on faith rather than reason. The result is the Apology for Raymond Sebond , a classic of Counter-Reformation thought and a masterpiece of Renaissance literature. This new translation by Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene achieves both accuracy and fluency, conveying at once the nuances of Montaigne's arguments and his distinctive literary style.

Prefatory Explanation It must be remarked at once that I am 'editor' of this volume only in that I had the honor of presiding at the symposium on Spinoza and the Sciences at which a number of these papers were presented (exceptions are those by Hans Jonas, Richard Popkin, Joe VanZandt and our four European contributors), in that I have given some editorial advice on details of some of the papers, including translations, and finally, in that my name appears on the cover. The choice of speakers, and of addi tional contributors, is entirely due to Robert Cohen and Debra Nails; and nearly all the burden of readying the manuscript for the press has been borne by the latter. In the introduction to another anthology on Spinoza I opened my remarks by quoting a statement of Sir Stuart Hampshire about inter pretations of Spinoza's chief work: All these masks have been fitted on him and each of them does to some extent fit. But they remain masks, not the living face. They do not show the moving tensions and unresolved conflicts in Spinoza's Ethics. (Hampshire, 1973, p. 297) The double theme of 'moving tensions' and 'unresolved conflicts' seems even more appropriate to the present volume. What is Spinoza's rela tion to the sciences? The answers are many, and they criss-cross one another in a number of complicated ways."

Prefatory Explanation It must be remarked at once that I am 'editor' of this volume only in that I had the honor of presiding at the symposium on Spinoza and the Sciences at which a number of these papers were presented (exceptions are those by Hans Jonas, Richard Popkin, Joe VanZandt and our four European contributors), in that I have given some editorial advice on details of some of the papers, including translations, and finally, in that my name appears on the cover. The choice of speakers, and of addi tional contributors, is entirely due to Robert Cohen and Debra Nails; and nearly all the burden of readying the manuscript for the press has been borne by the latter. In the introduction to another anthology on Spinoza I opened my remarks by quoting a statement of Sir Stuart Hampshire about inter pretations of Spinoza's chief work: All these masks have been fitted on him and each of them does to some extent fit. But they remain masks, not the living face. They do not show the moving tensions and unresolved conflicts in Spinoza's Ethics. (Hampshire, 1973, p. 297) The double theme of 'moving tensions' and 'unresolved conflicts' seems even more appropriate to the present volume. What is Spinoza's rela tion to the sciences? The answers are many, and they criss-cross one another in a number of complicated ways."

The philosophy of biology should move to the center of the philosophy of science - a place it has not been accorded since the time of Mach. Physics was the paradigm of science, and its shadow falls across con temporary philosophy of biology as well, in a variety of contexts: reduction, organization and system, biochemical mechanism, and the models of law and explanation which derive from the Duhem-Popper Hempel tradition. This volume, we think, offers ample evidence of how good contempo rary work in the philosophical understanding of biology has become. Marjorie Grene and Everett Mendelsohn aptly combine a deep philo sophical appreciation of conceptual issues in biology with an historical understanding of the radical changes in the science of biology since the 19th century. In this book, they present essays which probe such historical and methodological questions as reducibility, levels of organization, function and teleology, and the range of issues emerging from evolution ary theory and the species problem. In conjunction with Professor Grene's collection of essays on the philosophy of biology, The Under standing of Nature (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XXIII) and the occasional essays on these topics which we have published in other volumes (listed below), this volume contributes to bringing biology to the center of philosophical attention. Everett Mendelsohn, 'Explanation in Nineteenth Century Biology' (Boston Studies, Vol. II, 1965). David Hawkins, 'Taxonomy and Information', (Boston Studies, Vol. III, 1967)."

No student or colleague of Marjorie Grene will miss her incisive presence in these papers on the study and nature of living nature, and we believe the new reader will quickly join the stimulating discussion and critique which Professor Grene steadily provokes. For years she has worked with equally sure knowledge in the classical domain of philosophy and in modern epistemological inquiry, equally philosopher of science and metaphysician. Moreover, she has the deeply sensible notion that she should be a critically intelligent learner as much as an imaginatively original thinker, and as a result she has brought insightful expository readings of other philosophers and scientists to her own work. We were most fortunate that Marjorie Grene was willing to spend a full semester of a recent leave here in Boston, and we have on other occasions sought her participation in our colloquia and elsewhere. Now we have the pleasure of including among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science this generous selection from Grene's philosophical inquiries into the understanding of the natural world, and of the men and women in it. Boston University Center for the R. S. COHEN Philosophy and History of Science M. W. W ARTOFSKY April 1974 PREFACE This collection spans - spottily - years from 1946 ('On Some Distinctions between Men and Brutes') to 1974 ('On the Nature of Natural Necessity').

No student or colleague of Marjorie Grene will miss her incisive presence in these papers on the study and nature of living nature, and we believe the new reader will quickly join the stimulating discussion and critique which Professor Grene steadily provokes. For years she has worked with equally sure knowledge in the classical domain of philosophy and in modern epistemological inquiry, equally philosopher of science and metaphysician. Moreover, she has the deeply sensible notion that she should be a critically intelligent learner as much as an imaginatively original thinker, and as a result she has brought insightful expository readings of other philosophers and scientists to her own work. We were most fortunate that Marjorie Grene was willing to spend a full semester of a recent leave here in Boston, and we have on other occasions sought her participation in our colloquia and elsewhere. Now we have the pleasure of including among the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science this generous selection from Grene's philosophical inquiries into the understanding of the natural world, and of the men and women in it. Boston University Center for the R. S. COHEN Philosophy and History of Science M. W. W ARTOFSKY April 1974 PREFACE This collection spans - spottily - years from 1946 ('On Some Distinctions between Men and Brutes') to 1974 ('On the Nature of Natural Necessity').

First published in German in 1940 and widely recognized as a classic of philosophical anthropology, Laughing and Crying is a detailed investigation of these two particularly significant types of expressive behavior, both in themselves and in relation to human nature. Elaborating the philosophical account of human life he developed in Levels of Organic Life and the Human: An Introduction to Philosophical Anthropology, Plessner suggests that laughing and crying are expressions of a crisis brought about in certain situations by the relation of a person to their body. With a new foreword by J. M. Bernstein that situates the book within the broader framework of Plessner's philosophical anthropology and his richly suggestive and powerful account of human bodily life, Laughing and Crying is essential reading for anyone interested in the philosophy of the body, emotions, and human behavior.

In this engrossing double volume, the work and thought of Nicolas Malebranche is examined through the eyes of Simon Foucher and Dortous de Mairan. Part 1 consists of Richard A. Watson’s translation of the first published critique, by Simon Foucher, of Malebranche’s main philosophical work, Of the Search for the Truth. In the second part, Marjorie Grene presents a meticulous translation of the long correspondence between Malebranche and Jean-Jacques Dortous de Mairan that ended shortly before Malebranche’s death. Both Watson and Grene provide insightful introductions to their translations.The influence of the works of Malebranche has been extensive, as has the influence of the lesser works of his first critic, Simon Foucher. Although Foucher was a minor philosopher of the seventeenth century, he provided arguments that led to a crucial turning point in modern philosophy. Listened to with care and treated with respect by Leibniz, Foucher’s arguments were utilized by Bayle, Berkeley, and Hume toward the destruction not only of Cartesian metaphysics but of substance philosophy as well. In this translation of Foucher’s work, it is now possible for readers of Malebranche’s Of the Search for the Truth to evaluate the immediate response of a young philosopher about town to one of the most important philosophical works of his day. The correspondence between Jean-Jacques Dortous de Mairan, an obscure provincial, and Nicolas Malebranche has usually been viewed as a small addendum to the works of Malebranche. Marjorie Grene, however, in her translation of this correspondence, considers it not only a contribution to the Malebranchian corpus but also an example of a reaction to Spinoza. Born at Béziers in the south of France in 1678, Mairan went to Paris in 1698, where he studied mathematics with Malebranche. Their correspondence began four years later when Mairan returned to Béziers to accept a position with the local bishop. In his letters to Malebranche, Mairan reveals himself to be one of no more than a handful of known readers of Spinoza who, in the early eighteenth century, admitted fascination with Spinoza’s presentation of his thoroughly unorthodox God and his equally unorthodox nature.

The philosophic search for truth has been evident in all ages and among all peoples. The developments of each generation require new philosophies and the recasting of old ones. The eighteenth century was no exception, and the scientific advances of the times brought about many innovations in philosophic thought. At a time when scientists were reducing certain phenomena of the natural world to expressions of a few simple mathematical laws, men such as Berkeley, Hume, and Kant were trying to discover how far and on what basis human reason could be applied with similar success in other fields. The selections in this book, preceded by short biographical sketches, document this philosophic search. "The selections are liberal and well chosen, indeed only an examination of the table of contents will give an adequate idea of the value of this volume. . . . How better can one become a modern thinker than by reading and studying at first hand the writings that have made modern thought possible?"--Roger W. Holmes," The Philosophical Review"

Modern thought and modes of living have been immeasurably influenced by the philosophers of the Enlightenment--men such as Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Newton, Leibniz, and Locke. Gathered together in this book and preceded by valuable biographical sketches are selections from the basic and most significant writings of each of these men.

AThink of the word "evolution": the name Darwin and the term "natural selection" come to mind. But any powerful general theory of evolution must account for social evolution, both human and nonhuman, and contemporary Darwinism has not persuasively made such an accounting. In "Interactions: The Biological Context of Social Systems, " Niles Eldredge and Marjorie Grene argue effectively and coherently against the reductionist tendencies in modern Darwinism, which they call ultra-Darwinism, also known as genic reduction.

This book explores the biological underpinnings of social systems from invertebrates to mammals, particularly humans. These social systems, the authors argue, represent fusions between the economic and reproductive interests of organisms. Their theory moves away from the more prominent emphasis on reproductive biology at the core of sociobiology to reinstate the importance of economics in social organizations of all types.

Is life different from the non-living? If so, how? And how, in that case, does biology as the study of living things differ from other sciences? These questions are traced through an exploration of episodes in the history of biology and philosophy. The book begins with Aristotle, then moves on to Descartes, comparing his position with that of Harvey. In the eighteenth century the authors consider Buffon and Kant. In the nineteenth century the authors examine the Cuvier-Geoffroy debate, pre-Darwinian geology and natural theology, Darwin and the transition from Darwin to the revival of Mendelism. Two chapters deal with the evolutionary synthesis and such questions as the species problem, the reducibility or otherwise of biology to physics and chemistry, and the problem of biological explanation in terms of function and teleology. The final chapters reflect on the implications of the philosophy of biology for philosophy of science in general.

Under the pretense of defending an obscure treatise by a Catalan theologian, Sebond, Montaigne attacks the philosophers who attempt rational explanations of the universe and argues for a skeptical Christianity based squarely on faith rather than reason. The result is the Apology for Raymond Sebond , a classic of Counter-Reformation thought and a masterpiece of Renaissance literature. This new translation by Roger Ariew and Marjorie Grene achieves both accuracy and fluency, conveying at once the nuances of Montaigne's arguments and his distinctive literary style.

Originally published in paperback in 1986, the essays in this book discuss questions about the growth and conceptual structure of the modern evolutionary synthesis, or 'neo-Darwinism'. Written by biologists, historians and philosophers, the collection provides a penetrating analysis of the development, meaning and problems of twentieth-century evolutionary theory. Part I includes discussion of the role of eugenics in shaping the biological interests of R. A. Fisher; the abandonment of Lamarckism; the influence of systematics and the concepts of adaptation and random drift in the development of Sewall Wright's theory; and explanation of how the synthesis 'hardened' in the decades following its original presentation. Part II examines the history of mimetic theory as a case study in evolutionary thought, while Part III introduces the reader to some aspects of the German tradition. Finally, Part IV addresses the debates that existed around the time of publication.

Is life different from the non-living? If so, how? And how, in that case, does biology as the study of living things differ from other sciences? These questions are traced through an exploration of episodes in the history of biology and philosophy. The book begins with Aristotle, then moves on to Descartes, comparing his position with that of Harvey. In the eighteenth century the authors consider Buffon and Kant. In the nineteenth century the authors examine the Cuvier-Geoffroy debate, pre-Darwinian geology and natural theology, Darwin and the transition from Darwin to the revival of Mendelism. Two chapters deal with the evolutionary synthesis and such questions as the species problem, the reducibility or otherwise of biology to physics and chemistry, and the problem of biological explanation in terms of function and teleology. The final chapters reflect on the implications of the philosophy of biology for philosophy of science in general.