This book investigates the effects of electoral systems on the relative legislative and, hence, regulatory influence of competing interests in society. Building on Ronald Rogowski and Mark Andreas Kayser's extension of the classic Stigler-Peltzman model of regulation, the authors demonstrate that majoritarian electoral arrangements should empower consumers relative to producers. Employing real price levels as a proxy for consumer power, the book rigorously establishes this proposition over time, within the OECD, and across a large sample of developing countries. Majoritarian electoral arrangements depress real prices by approximately ten percent, all else equal. The authors carefully construct and test their argument and broaden it to consider the overall welfare effects of electoral system design and the incentives of actors in the choice of electoral institutions.

Dynastic marriages mattered in early modern Europe: the creation of alliances and the outbreak of wars were tied to continental dynastic politics. Dynastic marriages mattered in early modern Europe. The creation of alliances and the outbreak of wars were tied to continental dynastic politics. This book combines cultural definitions of politics with a wider exploration of institutional, military, diplomatic and economic concerns with a view to providing a more comprehensive understanding of dynastic marriage negotiations. It covers a period from the signing of the Treaty of London in 1604 until afterthe Anglo-French and Anglo-Spanish peace treaties (1629-30). Stuart Marriage Diplomacy explores how the search for a bride for Princes Henry and Charles started a long process of protracted consultations between the key players of Europe: Spain, Italy, France, Rome, Brussels and the United Provinces. It shows the interconnections between these courts, thus advancing a 'continental turn' in the analysis of Stuart politics in the early seventeenth century, and considers how reason of state was often considered as more crucial than religion or economic concerns in the outcome of the Stuart-Habsburg and Stuart-Bourbon marriage negotiations. It also reveals the extent to which the interactions between Europe and non-European actors in both the Atlantic and the East contributed to a redefinition of European identity. It will engage not only scholars and students of early modern Europe but, more generally,those interested in the history of European courts and royalty. VALENTINA CALDARI is Departmental Lecturer in Early Modern History at Balliol College, University of Oxford. SARA J. WOLFSON is Senior Lecturer in Early Modern History at Canterbury Christ Church University. CONTRIBUTORS: Paul Arblaster, Valentina Caldari, David Coast, Thomas Cogswell, Robert Cross, Andrea De Meo, Kelsey Flynn, Ruben Gonzalez Cuerva, Melinda J. Gough, Helmer Helmers, Jose Eloy Hortal Munoz, Adam Marks, Steve Murdoch, Michael Questier, Manuel Rivero, Porfirio Sanz Camanes, Edmond Smith, R. Malcolm Smuts, Peter H. Wilson, Sara J. Wolfson

This book investigates the effects of electoral systems on the relative legislative and, hence, regulatory influence of competing interests in society. Building on Ronald Rogowski and Mark Andreas Kayser's extension of the classic Stigler-Peltzman model of regulation, the authors demonstrate that majoritarian electoral arrangements should empower consumers relative to producers. Employing real price levels as a proxy for consumer power, the book rigorously establishes this proposition over time, within the OECD, and across a large sample of developing countries. Majoritarian electoral arrangements depress real prices by approximately ten percent, all else equal. The authors carefully construct and test their argument and broaden it to consider the overall welfare effects of electoral system design and the incentives of actors in the choice of electoral institutions.