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The question, "Why should I obey the law?" introduces a
contemporary puzzle that is as old as philosophy itself. The puzzle
is especially troublesome if we think of cases in which breaking
the law is not otherwise wrongful, and in which the chances of
getting caught are negligible. Philosophers from Socrates to H.L.A.
Hart have struggled to give reasoned support to the idea that we do
have a general moral duty to obey the law but, more recently, the
greater number of learned voices has expressed doubt that there is
any such duty, at least as traditionally conceived. The thought
that there is no such duty poses a challenge to our ordinary
understanding of political authority and its legitimacy. In what
sense can political officials have a right to rule us if there is
no duty to obey the laws they lay down? Some thinkers, concluding
that a general duty to obey the law cannot be defended, have gone
so far as to embrace philosophical anarchism, the view that the
state is necessarily illegitimate. Others argue that the duty to
obey the law can be grounded on the idea of consent, or on
fairness, or on other ideas, such as community.
Holiness is the attribute most emphatically ascribed to God in
Scripture, but there has been little attention devoted to
characterizing and considering the entailments of divine holiness.
In Divine Holiness and Divine Action, Mark C. Murphy defends an
account of holiness indebted to Rudolf Otto's description of the
experience of the holy as that of a mysterium tremendum et
fascinans. God's being holy consists in God's being someone with
whom intimate union is both extremely desirable for us and yet
something for which we-and indeed any limited beings-are unfit.
This notion of divine holiness is useful for addressing disputed
theological questions regarding divine action. In contrast to
standard accounts of divine action that begin with assumptions
regarding God's moral perfection or God's maximal love, the appeal
to divine holiness supports a rival framework for explaining and
predicting divine action-the holiness framework-according to which
God is motivated to act in ways that are a response to God's own
value by keeping distance from that which is deficient, defective,
or in any way limited in goodness. This study exhibits the
fruitfulness of a reorientation from the morality and love
frameworks to the holiness framework by showing how such a
reorientation suggests distinct approaches to perennial problems of
divine action regarding creation, incarnation, atonement, and
salvation. From the treatment of these perennial problems, a
general theme regarding divine action emerges: that God's
interaction with the world exhibits a radical sort of humility.
Does God's existence make a difference to how we explain morality?
Mark C. Murphy critiques the two dominant theistic accounts of
morality--natural law theory and divine command theory--and
presents a novel third view. He argues that we can value natural
facts about humans and their good, while keeping God at the centre
of our moral explanations.
The characteristic methodology of theistic ethics is to proceed by
asking whether there are features of moral norms that can be
adequately explained only if we hold that such norms have some sort
of theistic foundation. But this methodology, fruitful as it has
been, is one-sided. God and Moral Law proceeds not from the side of
the moral norms, so to speak, but from the God side of things: what
sort of explanatory relationship should we expect between God and
moral norms given the existence of the God of orthodox theism? Mark
C. Murphy asks whether the conception of God in orthodox theism as
an absolutely perfect being militates in favor of a particular view
of the explanation of morality by appeal to theistic facts. He puts
this methodology to work and shows that, surprisingly, natural law
theory and divine command theory fail to offer the sort of
explanation of morality that we would expect given the existence of
the God of orthodox theism. Drawing on the discussion of a
structurally similar problem--that of the relationship between God
and the laws of nature--Murphy articulates his new account of the
relationship between God and morality, one in which facts about God
and facts about nature cooperate in the explanation of moral law.
Natural law is a perennial though poorly represented and understood
issue in political philosophy and the philosophy of law. In this
2006 book, Mark C. Murphy argues that the central thesis of natural
law jurisprudence - that law is backed by decisive reasons for
compliance - sets the agenda for natural law political philosophy,
demonstrating how law gains its binding force by way of the common
good of the political community. Murphy's work ranges over the
central questions of natural law jurisprudence and political
philosophy, including the formulation and defense of the natural
law jurisprudential thesis, the nature of the common good, the
connection between the promotion of the common good and requirement
of obedience to law, and the justification of punishment.
Morality and religion: intimately wed, violently opposed, or
something else? Discussion of this issue appears in pop culture,
the academy, and the media often generating radically opposed
views. At one end of the spectrum are those who think that unless
God exists, ethics is unfounded and the moral life is unmotivated.
At the other end are those who think that religious belief is
unnecessary for and even a threat to ethical knowledge and the
moral life. This volume provides an accessible, charitable
discussion that represents a range of views along this spectrum.
The book begins with a lively debate between Paul Kurtz and William
Lane Craig on the question, Is goodness without God good enough?
Kurtz defends the affirmative position and Craig the negative.
Following the debate are new essays by prominent scholars. These
essays comment on the debate and advance the broader discussion of
religion and morality. The book closes with final responses from
Kurtz and Craig.
Morality and religion: intimately wed, violently opposed, or
something else? Discussion of this issue appears in pop culture,
the academy, and the media_often generating radically opposed
views. At one end of the spectrum are those who think that unless
God exists, ethics is unfounded and the moral life is unmotivated.
At the other end are those who think that religious belief is
unnecessary for_and even a threat to_ethical knowledge and the
moral life. This volume provides an accessible, charitable
discussion that represents a range of views along this spectrum.
The book begins with a lively debate between Paul Kurtz and William
Lane Craig on the question, Is goodness without God good enough?
Kurtz defends the affirmative position and Craig the negative.
Following the debate are new essays by prominent scholars. These
essays comment on the debate and advance the broader discussion of
religion and morality. The book closes with final responses from
Kurtz and Craig.
Natural law theory has been undergoing a revival, especially in
political philosophy and jurisprudence. Yet, most fundamentally,
natural law theory is not a political theory, but a moral theory,
or more accurately a theory of practical rationality. According to
the natural law account of practical rationality, the basic reasons
for actions are basic goods that are grounded in the nature of
human beings. Practical rationality aims to identify and
characterize reasons for action and to explain how choice between
actions worth performing can be appropriately governed by rational
standards. These standards are justified by reference to features
of the human goods that are the fundamental reasons for action.
This book is a defence of a contemporary natural law theory of
practical rationality, demonstrating its inherent plausibility and
engaging systematically with rival egoist, consequentialist,
Kantian and virtue accounts.
Alasdair MacIntyre's writings on ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of the social sciences and the history of philosophy have established him as one of the philosophical giants of the last fifty years. His best-known book, After Virtue (1981), spurred the profound revival of virtue ethics. Moreover, MacIntyre, unlike so many of his contemporaries, has exerted a deep influence beyond the bounds of academic philosophy. This volume focuses on the major themes of MacIntyre's work with critical expositions of MacIntyre's views on the history of philosophy, the role of tradition in philosophical inquiry, the philosophy of the social sciences, moral philosophy, political theory, and his critique of the assumptions and institutions of modernity. Written by a distinguished roster of philosophers, this volume will have a wide appeal outside philosophy to students in the social sciences, law, theology, and political theory. Mark C. Murphy is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. He is author of Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge, 2001) and An Essay on Divine Authority (Cornell, 2002), as well as of a number of articles on natural law theory, political obligation, and Hobbes' moral, political, and legal philosophy. His papers have appeared in Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Nous, Faith and Philosophy, Law and Philosophy, American Philosophical Quarterly, the Thomist, and elsewhere.
Alasdair MacIntyre's writings on ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of the social sciences and the history of philosophy have established him as one of the philosophical giants of the last fifty years. His best-known book, After Virtue (1981), spurred the profound revival of virtue ethics. Moreover, MacIntyre, unlike so many of his contemporaries, has exerted a deep influence beyond the bounds of academic philosophy. This volume focuses on the major themes of MacIntyre's work with critical expositions of MacIntyre's views on the history of philosophy, the role of tradition in philosophical inquiry, the philosophy of the social sciences, moral philosophy, political theory, and his critique of the assumptions and institutions of modernity. Written by a distinguished roster of philosophers, this volume will have a wide appeal outside philosophy to students in the social sciences, law, theology, and political theory. Mark C. Murphy is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University. He is author of Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge, 2001) and An Essay on Divine Authority (Cornell, 2002), as well as of a number of articles on natural law theory, political obligation, and Hobbes' moral, political, and legal philosophy. His papers have appeared in Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Nous, Faith and Philosophy, Law and Philosophy, American Philosophical Quarterly, the Thomist, and elsewhere.
In the first book wholly concerned with divine authority, Mark C.
Murphy explores the extent of God's rule over created rational
beings. The author challenges the view widely supported by theists
and nontheists alike that if God exists, then humans must be bound
by an obligation of obedience to this being. He demonstrates that
this view, the "authority thesis," cannot be sustained by any of
the arguments routinely advanced on its behalf, including those
drawn from perfect being theology, metaethical theory, normative
principles, and even Scripture and tradition. After exposing the
inadequacies of the various arguments for the authority thesis, he
develops his own solution to the problem of whether, and to what
extent, God is authoritative.For Murphy, divine authority is a
contingent matter: while created rational beings have decisive
reason to subject themselves to the divine rule, they are under
divine authority only insofar as they have chosen to allow God's
decisions to take the place of their own in their practical
reasoning. The author formulates and defends his arguments for this
view, and notes its implications for understanding the
distinctiveness of Christian ethics."
The question, 'Why should I obey the law?' introduces a
contemporary puzzle that is as old as philosophy itself. The puzzle
is especially troublesome if we think of cases in which breaking
the law is not otherwise wrongful, and in which the chances of
getting caught are negligible. Philosophers from Socrates to H.L.A.
Hart have struggled to give reasoned support to the idea that we do
have a general moral duty to obey the law but, more recently, the
greater number of learned voices has expressed doubt that there is
any such duty, at least as traditionally conceived. The thought
that there is no such duty poses a challenge to our ordinary
understanding of political authority and its legitimacy. In what
sense can political officials have a right to rule us if there is
no duty to obey the laws they lay down? Some thinkers, concluding
that a general duty to obey the law cannot be defended, have gone
so far as to embrace philosophical anarchism, the view that the
state is necessarily illegitimate. Others argue that the duty to
obey the law can be grounded on the idea of consent, or on
fairness, or on other ideas, such as community.
Natural law is a perennial though poorly represented and understood
issue in political philosophy and the philosophy of law. In this
2006 book, Mark C. Murphy argues that the central thesis of natural
law jurisprudence - that law is backed by decisive reasons for
compliance - sets the agenda for natural law political philosophy,
demonstrating how law gains its binding force by way of the common
good of the political community. Murphy's work ranges over the
central questions of natural law jurisprudence and political
philosophy, including the formulation and defense of the natural
law jurisprudential thesis, the nature of the common good, the
connection between the promotion of the common good and requirement
of obedience to law, and the justification of punishment.
According to the natural law account of practical rationality, the basic reasons for actions are basic goods that are grounded in the nature of human beings. Practical rationality aims to identify and characterize reasons for action and to explain how choice between actions worth performing can be appropriately governed by rational standards. Natural Law and Practical Rationality is a defense of a contemporary natural law theory of practical rationality, demonstrating its inherent plausibility and engaging systematically with rival egoist, consequentialist, Kantian and virtue accounts.
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