Since the days of Adam Smith, ethics and economics have been closely intertwined, and were nominally separated only with the advent of neoclassical economics in the beginning of the last century. This book features eleven essays by leading scholars in economics and philosophy who argue for a renewal of the bond between the two disciplines. Several of the contributors argue that the ethical content of economics and moral status of the market have been misunderstood, for better and for worse. Some recommend changes in the way that individual economic choice is modelled, in order to incorporate ethical as well as self-interested motivations. Finally, others question the way that societies assess economic policies that affect the welfare and dignity of their constituents. A wide range of philosophical perspectives is offered, drawing from the classic writings of Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and the ancient Stoics, to that of current scholars such as Amartya Sen, Elizabeth Anderson, and Christine Korsgaard. This book provides a comprehensive introduction to the cutting edge of interdisciplinary research between ethics and economics, and is sure to be an important resource for scholars in both fields. This book was published as a combination of the special issues Review of Political Economy and Review of Social Economy.

Since the days of Adam Smith, ethics and economics have been closely intertwined, and were nominally separated only with the advent of neoclassical economics in the beginning of the last century. This book features eleven essays by leading scholars in economics and philosophy who argue for a renewal of the bond between the two disciplines.

Several of the contributors argue that the ethical content of economics and moral status of the market have been misunderstood, for better and for worse. Some recommend changes in the way that individual economic choice is modelled, in order to incorporate ethical as well as self-interested motivations. Finally, others question the way that societies assess economic policies that affect the welfare and dignity of their constituents.

A wide range of philosophical perspectives is offered, drawing from the classic writings of Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, and the ancient Stoics, to that of current scholars such as Amartya Sen, Elizabeth Anderson, and Christine Korsgaard. This book provides a comprehensive introduction to the cutting edge of interdisciplinary research between ethics and economics, and is sure to be an important resource for scholars in both fields.

This book was published as a combination of the special issues Review of Political Economy and Review of Social Economy.

Upholding fair competition is a deeply engrained principle in the legal and political structures of most liberal democracies and is widely regarded as one of the foundations of a market economy. In this book, Mark D. White disputes this common understanding of competition and antitrust law. Drawing on concepts from economics, philosophy and law, White argues that the pre-eminent status accorded to the regulation of competition should be reconsidered by any government that claims to support property rights. Despite its populist origins, competition and antitrust law today is usually understood in terms of economics, which provides a solid foundation for the analysis of market competition. As this logic goes, governments restrict firms from engaging in behaviour regarded as uncompetitive or leading to a monopoly, to protect consumers, other firms and competition itself. At the same time, however, this neglects the fundamental property rights on which the market economy is based, an unfortunate implication of the utilitarian ethics at the heart of economics. As a result, firms are held responsible for maximizing welfare and penalized for failures to do so, even when their actions violate no recognized rights of consumers or competitors, which goes against the presumption of freedom of commerce in liberal societies. More generally, competition or antitrust law treats firms as if they were agents of the state rather than opportunities for individuals to interact in a market that allows them to pursue their interests in an environment where the rights of all are respected. As White explains, competition or antitrust law serves as a prime example of how economics privileges welfare and efficiency over rights and justice, promoting the maximization of outcomes while ignoring the rights of those generating them. Accessible and non-technical this book assumes no background in economics, philosophy, or law. It provides a fresh and thought-provoking perspective on competition/antitrust law that will challenge readers from all backgrounds and political stances to question the degree to which its wisdom is taken for granted.

Economics is often defined as the science of choice or human action. But choice and action are essentially mental phenomena, an aspect rarely mentioned in the economics discourse. Choice, while not always a conscious or rational process, is held to involve beliefs, desires, intentions and arguably even free will. Actions are often opposed to mere bodily movements, with the former being in some sense only understandable in reference to mental processes while the latter are understandable in entirely non-mental, physical terms. While philosophers have long concerned themselves with the connections between these concepts, economists have tended to steer clear of what might appear to be an a priori debate. At the same time, philosophers working on these important notions have tended to not dirty their hands with the empirical, real-world applications in which economists are specialized. This volume fills these gaps by bringing economists and philosophers of mind together to explore the intersection of their disciplines.

Economics is often defined as the science of choice or human action. But choice and action are essentially mental phenomena, an aspect rarely mentioned in the economics discourse. Choice, while not always a conscious or rational process, is held to involve beliefs, desires, intentions and arguably even free will. Actions are often opposed to mere bodily movements, with the former being in some sense only understandable in reference to mental processes while the latter are understandable in entirely non-mental, physical terms. While philosophers have long concerned themselves with the connections between these concepts, economists have tended to steer clear of what might appear to be an a priori debate. At the same time, philosophers working on these important notions have tended to not dirty their hands with the empirical, real-world applications in which economists are specialized. This volume fills these gaps by bringing economists and philosophers of mind together to explore the intersection of their disciplines.

This book explores the steady decline in the status of the individual in recent years and addresses common misunderstandings about the concept of individuality. Drawing from psychology, neuroscience, technology, economics, philosophy, politics, and law, White explains how and why the individual has been devalued in the eyes of scholars, government leaders, and the public. He notes that developments in science have led to doubts about our cognitive competence, while assumptions made in the humanities have led to questions about our moral competence. In this book, White goes on to argue that both of these views are mistaken and that they stem from overly simplistic ideas about how individuals make choices, however imperfectly, in their interests, which are multifaceted and complex. In response, he proposes a new way to look at individuals that preserves their essential autonomy while emphasizing their responsibility to others, inspired by the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the legal and political philosophy reflected in the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution. This book explains how individuality combines both rights and responsibilities, reconciles the popular yet false dichotomy between individual and society, and provides the basis for a humane and respectful civil society and government. This book is part of White's trilogy on the individual and society, which includes The Manipulation of Choice and The Illusion of Well-Being.

The use of measures of economic output to guide policymaking has been criticized for decades because of their weak ties to human well-being. Recently, many scholars and politicians have called for measures of happiness or subjective well-being to be used to guide policy in people's true interests. In The Illusion of Well-Being, Mark D. White explains why using happiness as a tool for policymaking is misguided and unethical. Happiness is too vague a term to define, and too general a concept, to measure in a way that captures people's true feelings. He extends this critique to well-being in general and concludes that no measure of well-being can do justice to people's true interests, which are complex, multifaceted, and subjective. White suggests instead that policymaking be conducted according to respect and responsiveness, promoting the true interests of citizens while addressing their real needs, and devoting government resources to where they can do the most good.

The use of measures of economic output to guide policymaking has been criticized for decades because of their weak ties to human well-being. Recently, many scholars and politicians have called for measures of happiness or subjective well-being to be used to guide policy in people's true interests. In The Illusion of Well-Being, Mark D. White explains why using happiness as a tool for policymaking is misguided and unethical. Happiness is too vague a term to define, and too general a concept, to measure in a way that captures people's true feelings. He extends this critique to well-being in general and concludes that no measure of well-being can do justice to people's true interests, which are complex, multifaceted, and subjective. White suggests instead that policymaking be conducted according to respect and responsiveness, promoting the true interests of citizens while addressing their real needs, and devoting government resources to where they can do the most good.

The economic approach to law, or law and economics, is by far the most successful application of basic economic principles to another scholarly field, but most of the critical appraisal of the field has been scattered among law reviews and economics journals. Theoretical Foundations of Law and Economics is the first original, book-length examination of the methodology and philosophy of law and economics, featuring new essays written by leading legal scholars, philosophers, and economists. The contributors take issue with many of the key tenets of the economic approach to law, such as its assumption of rational behavior, its reliance on market analogies, and its adoption of efficiency as the primary goal of legal decision-making. They discuss the relevance of economics to the law in general, as well as to substantive areas of the law, such as contracts, torts, and crime.

Upholding fair competition is a deeply engrained principle in the legal and political structures of most liberal democracies and is widely regarded as one of the foundations of a market economy. In this book, Mark D. White disputes this common understanding of competition and antitrust law. Drawing on concepts from economics, philosophy and law, White argues that the pre-eminent status accorded to the regulation of competition should be reconsidered by any government that claims to support property rights. Despite its populist origins, competition and antitrust law today is usually understood in terms of economics, which provides a solid foundation for the analysis of market competition. As this logic goes, governments restrict firms from engaging in behaviour regarded as uncompetitive or leading to a monopoly, to protect consumers, other firms and competition itself. At the same time, however, this neglects the fundamental property rights on which the market economy is based, an unfortunate implication of the utilitarian ethics at the heart of economics. As a result, firms are held responsible for maximizing welfare and penalized for failures to do so, even when their actions violate no recognized rights of consumers or competitors, which goes against the presumption of freedom of commerce in liberal societies. More generally, competition or antitrust law treats firms as if they were agents of the state rather than opportunities for individuals to interact in a market that allows them to pursue their interests in an environment where the rights of all are respected. As White explains, competition or antitrust law serves as a prime example of how economics privileges welfare and efficiency over rights and justice, promoting the maximization of outcomes while ignoring the rights of those generating them. Accessible and non-technical this book assumes no background in economics, philosophy, or law. It provides a fresh and thought-provoking perspective on competition/antitrust law that will challenge readers from all backgrounds and political stances to question the degree to which its wisdom is taken for granted.

While ethics has been an integral part of economics since the days of Adam Smith (if not Aristotle), many modern economists dismiss ethical concerns in favor of increasing formal mathematical and computational methods. But recent financial crises in the real world have reignited discussions of the importance of ethics to economics, including growing calls for a new approach to incorporating moral philosophy in economic theory, practice, and policy. Ironically, it is the ethics of virtue advocated by Aristotle and Adam Smith that may lead to the most promising way to developing an economics that emphasizes the virtues, character, and judgment of the agents it models. In Economics and the Virtues, editors Jennifer A. Baker and Mark D. White have brought together fifteen leading scholars in economics and philosophy to offer fresh perspectives on integrating virtue into economics. The first section covers five major thinkers and schools in the virtue tradition, tracing historical connections and suggesting new areas of cooperation. The second section applies the ethics of virtue to modern economic theory, delving into its current practices and methodology to suggest areas for integration with moral philosophy. Finally, the third section addresses specific topics such as markets, profits, and justice in the context of virtue and vice, offering valuable applications of virtue to economics. With insights that are novel as well as rooted in time-tested ethical thought, Economics and the Virtues will be of interest to economists, philosophers, and other scholars in the social sciences and humanities, as well as professionals and policymakers in the fields of economics and finance, and makes an invaluable contribution to the ongoing discussion over the role of ethics in economics.

How often is the defense of insanity or temporary insanity for accused criminals valid-or is it ever legitimate? This unique work presents multidisciplinary viewpoints that explain, support, and critique the insanity defense as it stands. What is the role of "the insanity defense" as a legal excuse? How does U.S. law handle criminal trials where the defendant pleads insanity, and how does our legal system's treatment differ from those of other countries or cultures? How are insanity defenses used, and how successful are these defenses for the accused? What are the costs of incarceration versus psychiatric treatment and confinement? This book presents a range of expert viewpoints on the insanity defense, exposing common myths; investigating its effectiveness and place in our legal system through history, case studies, and comparative analysis; and supplying perspectives from the disciplines of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and neuroscience. The content also addresses the ramifications of declaring citizens insane or incapacitated and examines trials that involved pleas of insanity and temporary insanity. Presents multidisciplinary coverage of this important topic-one that is typically polarizing for members of the general public Includes discussions of new advances in neuroscience that have revived debates regarding free will, culpability, and punishment Illustrates points with widely publicized and televised trials that have recently increased public awareness of the insanity defense as well as heated debates over its justification

While ethics has been an integral part of economics since the days of Adam Smith (if not Aristotle), many modern economists dismiss ethical concerns in favor of increasing formal mathematical and computational methods. But recent financial crises in the real world have reignited discussions of the importance of ethics to economics, including growing calls for a new approach to incorporating moral philosophy in economic theory, practice, and policy. Ironically, it is the ethics of virtue advocated by Aristotle and Adam Smith that may lead to the most promising way to developing an economics that emphasizes the virtues, character, and judgment of the agents it models. In Economics and the Virtues, editors Jennifer A. Baker and Mark D. White have brought together fifteen leading scholars in economics and philosophy to offer fresh perspectives on integrating virtue into economics. The first section covers five major thinkers and schools in the virtue tradition, tracing historical connections and suggesting new areas of cooperation. The second section applies the ethics of virtue to modern economic theory, delving into its current practices and methodology to suggest areas for integration with moral philosophy. Finally, the third section addresses specific topics such as markets, profits, and justice in the context of virtue and vice, offering valuable applications of virtue to economics. With insights that are novel as well as rooted in time-tested ethical thought, Economics and the Virtues will be of interest to economists, philosophers, and other scholars in the social sciences and humanities, as well as professionals and policymakers in the fields of economics and finance, and makes an invaluable contribution to the ongoing discussion over the role of ethics in economics.

When we fail to achieve our goals, procrastination is often the culprit. But how exactly is procrastination to be understood? It has been described as imprudent, irrational, inconsistent, and even immoral, but there has been no sustained philosophical debate concerning the topic. This edited volume starts in on the task of integrating the problem of procrastination into philosophical inquiry. The focus is on exploring procrastination in relation to agency, rationality, and ethics - topics that philosophy is well-suited to address. Theoretically and empirically informed analyses are developed and applied with the aim of shedding light on a vexing practical problem that generates a great deal of frustration, regret, and harm. Some of the key questions that are addressed include the following: How can we analyze procrastination in a way that does justice to both its voluntary and its self-defeating dimensions? What kind of practical failing is procrastination? Is it a form of weakness of will? Is it the product of fragmented agency? Is it a vice? Given the nature of procrastination, what are the most promising coping strategies?

In Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy, Professor Mark D. White and his contributors offer analysis and explanations of new developments in retributivism, the philosophical account of punishment that holds that wrongdoers must be punished as a matter of right, duty, or justice, rather than to serve some general social purpose. The contemporary debate over retributivist punishment has become particularly vibrant in recent years, focusing increasingly on its political and economic as well as its philosophical aspects, and also on its practical ramifications in addition to theoretical implications. The twelve chapters in this book, written by leading legal scholars and philosophers, cover the various justifications and conceptions of retributivism, its philosophical foundations (often questioning conventional understandings), and how retributivism informs actual criminal justice procedures and practices.

When we fail to achieve our goals, procrastination is often the culprit. But how exactly is procrastination to be understood? It has been described as imprudent, irrational, inconsistent, and even immoral, but there has been no sustained philosophical debate concerning the topic.
This edited volume starts in on the task of integrating the problem of procrastination into philosophical inquiry. The focus is on exploring procrastination in relation to agency, rationality, and ethics-topics that philosophy is well-suited to address. Theoretically and empirically informed analyses are developed and applied with the aim of shedding light on a vexing practical problem that generates a great deal of frustration, regret, and harm. Some of the key questions that are addressed include the following: How can we analyze procrastination in a way that does justice to both its voluntary and its self-defeating dimensions? What kind of practical failing is procrastination? Is it a form of weakness of will? Is it the product of fragmented agency? Is it a vice? Given the nature of procrastination, what are the most promising coping strategies?

The economic approach to law, or "law and economics," is by far the most successful application of basic economic principles to another scholarly field, but most of the critical appraisal of the field has been scattered among law reviews and economics journals. Theoretical Foundations of Law and Economics is the first original, book-length examination of the methodology and philosophy of law and economics, featuring new essays written by leading legal scholars, philosophers, and economists. The contributors take issue with many of the key tenets of the economic approach to law, such as its assumption of rational behavior, its reliance on market analogies, and its adoption of efficiency as the primary goal of legal decision-making. They discuss the relevance of economics to the law in general, as well as to substantive areas of the law, such as contracts, torts, and crime.