This book, first published in 1968, examines the disastrous defeat suffered by inexperienced American troops, newly landed in North Africa, at the hands of Rommel. The news of Kasserine shocked the United States militarily and politically, and led to swift changes in equipment and tactics. This book traces the battle through to its aftermath in ‘a remarkable piece of battlefield investigation’ (Manchester Evening News).

This book, first published in 1968, examines the disastrous defeat suffered by inexperienced American troops, newly landed in North Africa, at the hands of Rommel. The news of Kasserine shocked the United States militarily and politically, and led to swift changes in equipment and tactics. This book traces the battle through to its aftermath in 'a remarkable piece of battlefield investigation' (Manchester Evening News).

Major General Maurice Rose (1899-1945), commander of 3rd Amored, First Army's legendary "Spearhead" division, was the highest-ranking American Jewish officer ever killed in battle, and the only individual casualty to spark a War Crimes Investigation. This, the first and only biography of this important World War II figure, tells the dramatic story of Rose's life--from his childhood as a son of a rabbi, through his experiences in World War I and in the U.S. cavalry, to his meteoric rise as America's answer to Rommel. In 1943, Rose negotiated and accepted the surrender of the German Army in Tunisia, the first large-scale surrender to an American force during World War II. At the Battle of Carentan in June 1944, he saved the 506th Parachute Infantry (of Band of Brothers fame), and might very well have saved the entire Normandy beachhead from a catastrophic German counterattack. His brilliant, daring, and aggressive defensive tactics during the Battle of the Bulge prevented an enemy breakthrough to the Meuse River and beyond, thereby frustrating the German advance. Based on original archival research and exclusive interviews, this biography shatters old myths and factual distortions, and offers a refreshingly inquisitive and critical perspective. Steven L. Ossad and Don R. Marsh reveal new insights into Rose's controversial death--was he killed because he was Jewish or because he went for his weapon?--and about the even more controversial investigations that followed. As compelling and extraordinary as the life that it describes, this biography pays long-overdue tribute to one of America's greatest heroes.

One of World War II's most brilliant and controversial generals, George S. Patton (1885-1945) fought in North Africa and Sicily, as commander of the Third Army, spearheaded the Allies'spectacular 1944-1945 sweep through France, Belgium, and Germany. Martin Blumenson is the only historian to enjoy unlimited access to the vast Patton papers. his many books include Masters of the Art of Command (available from Da Capo Press) and Patton: The Man Behind the Legend.

Tells the story of the Air Force's involvement in the region from the end of the second World War until the major infusion of American troops into Vietnam in 1965. During these years, and most noticeably after 1961, the Air Force's principal role in Southeast Asia was to advise the Vietnamese Air Force in its struggle against insurgents seeking the collapse of the Saigon government. This story includes some issues of universal applicability to the Air Force: the role of air power in an insurgency, the most effective way to advise a foreign ally, and how to coordinate with other American agencies (both military and civilian) which are doing the same thing. It also deals with issues unique to the Vietnamese conflict: how to coordinate a centralized, technological modern air force with a feudal, decentralized, indigenous one without overwhelming it, and how best to adapt fighter, reconnaissance, airlift, and liaison planes to a jungle environment.

This Discussion Paper seeks to furnish systematic data on litigation under Section 1983 of the U.S. Code, which the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted to permit prisoners to sue correctional officials in Federal court when the conditions of confinement fail to meet constitutional standards. Section 1983 litigation represents 1 in 10 of the civil cases filed in U.S. district courts. This profile of such lawsuits examining more than 2,700 cases disposed of in 1992 in 9 States (Alabama, California, Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas) shows that 95% of cases result in dismissals, 4% result in stipulated dismissals or settlements, and 2% result in trial verdicts (of these, less than 1/2 of 1% result in a favorable verdict for the prisoner). Half the cases last 6 months or less because they fail to meet Section 1983 requirements. In cases lasting 6 to 12 months, the percent of issues the court dismissed decreases, with a corresponding increase in stipulated dismissals and successful defendants' motions to dismiss, a relative decrease in cases challenging convictions and sentences, and an increase in the relative number of cases concerning inadequate medical treatment, lack of due process, and denial of access to the courts. In cases surviving up to 2 years, issues of physical security become more frequent; the cases are more likely to have appointed counsel and evidentiary hearings; and successful prisoner litigation becomes more likely, with both settlements and verdicts resulting in financial awards to prisoners. The authors, Hanson and Daley of the National Center for State Courts, state that (1) cases that lack an adequate basis in law or fact should be resolved through State administrative grievance procedures instead of through litigation in the U.S. courts, and (2) under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, intended to resolve prisoners' grievances through State administrative procedures, the U.S. Attor

This publication tells the story of the United States Ari Force's involvement in the region form the end of the second World War until the major infusion of American troops into Vietnam in1965. During these years, and most noticeably after 1961, the Air Force's principal role in Southeast Asia was to advise the Vietnamese Air Force in its struggle against insurgents seeking the collapse of the Saigon government. This story includes some issues of universal applicability to the Air Force: the role of air power in an insurgency, the most effective way to advise a foreign ally, and how to coordinate with other American agencies (both military and civilian) which are doing the same thing. It also deals with issue unique to the Vietnamese conflict: how to coordinate a centralized, technological modern air force with a feudal, decentralized, indigenous one without overwhelming it, and how best to adapt fighter, reconnaissance, airlift, and liaison planes to a jungle environment.

In the many decades since the German army smashed into the American lines in the Battle of the Bulge, opinion of the U.S. senior command's leadership capabilities has fluctuated between hero worship and scorn, with the latter view becoming more predominant as the initial glow of victory faded. Rather than a conventional study of the Ardennes offensive, "Generals of the Ardennes: American Leadership in the Battle of the Bulge" studies five examples of American command leadership at different levels to answer two questions: what characteristics of leadership did these generals display, and how did they affect the overall battle? Based on extensive documentation and personal interviews with participants, "Generals of the Ardennes" provides a description and analysis of: Dwight Eisenhower's role as coalition commander; Omar Bradley's direction of the 12th Army Group during the crisis; Lieutenant General William Simpson's contribution to the Ninth Army's part in defeating the German onslaught; Major General Troy Middleton's stand with the VIII Corps in the center of the fighting; Major General Alan Jones and Brigadier General Bruce Clarke and how they dealt with the challenges and confusions at "the point of the spear." Amid the countless books in many languages that tell and retell the history of the Battle of the Bulge, this one is unique in its focus on American generalship during those epic and decisive weeks that turned the tide of World War II in Europe. For that reason, it stands as both a significant history and an important document for the study of command and control. First published in 1994. 452 pages. ill.

In the shadow of Monte Cassino on January 21-22, 1944, the U.S. Army's 36th "Texas" Division tried to cross Italy's Rapido River. The rout of this former National Guard unit from Texas was one of the worst defeats Americans suffered on the battlefields of World War II, one that prompted veterans to present charges of incompetent leadership before Congress. In Bloody River, first published in 1970, Martin Blumenson presents his view of how the "personal equation" figured into the debacle. Focusing on the generals responsible for the ill-fated attack, Blumenson traces key points in the personal profiles of the diffident 36th Division commander Fred L. Walker; Gen. Mark "Wayne" Clark, the imperious commander of American ground forces; and the tactful and tactically gifted former cavalry officer Gen. Geoffrey T. Keyes, commander of II Corps and Walker's immediate superior. Walker, serving under the younger Clark and Keyes, witnessed the destruction of villages and the exhaustion of the non-Regular Army soldiers in his division. Blumenson argues that Walker, relatively far down the chain of command, saw his soldiers' and the civilians' suffering and lost confidence and respect for his superiors and constantly questioned their fitness to devise appropriate strategy and tactics. Despite reports of the severe situation in the Rapido Valley, General Clark, responsible for ensuring the success of the Anzio landing, would not cancel the 36th Division's supporting attack across the Rapido. In two days, the two front-line infantry regiments of the division suffered severe casualties, as did the attached units of engineers, quartermaster troops, and artillerymen. Meanwhile, General Clark's Anzio landing was accomplished with relatively little resistance. Blumenson argues that Walker's pessimism about the Rapido attack plan may have permeated his troops and robbed them of their will to win. This concise survey of the command situations that led to the Rapido tragedy should be of interest to all readers who wish to learn the high-priced lessons of war in affordable and accessible form.

Generals of the Ardennes is not a conventional history of the Battle of the Bulge, but a study of US command leadership at different levels during that fiery December of 1944 when a German offensive against the center of the American lines threatened to split the massed Allied Armies. It shows how US commanders from Eisenhower himself down through Army Group, Army, Corps, and Division commanders met the heavy burdens of leadership in the crucible of that bloody winter.Amid the countless books in many languages that tell and retell the history of the Battle of the Bulge, this one is unique in its focus on American generalship during those epic and decisive weeks that turned the tide of World War II in Europe. For that reason, it stands as both a significant history and an important document for the study of command and control.

For the Allies, D day was only the beginning. Having succeeded in that epic venture, they faced the prospect of moving beyond the beaches of France.For the Germans who had failed to halt the Allies at the water's edge, the question was how to stop the enemy from further advance before it was too late.Martin Blumenson never forgets that the Allies' spectacular dash from their Normandy beachhead to the German border in the summer of 1944 was accomplished by men of flesh and blood--and led by officers with human doubts, limitations, and determination. He shows us how war is conducted, makes us share the pressures and responsibilities of the commanders, and unforgettably opens us to the hopes and fears of the men who constantly faced the imminence of death. Here are the familiar figures, but revealed in new perspective--Eisenhower, Montgomery, Bradley, Patton, Rommel. This is a masterly and dramatic military narrative in the great tradition--and a moving human record of a turning point in history.

A wide-ranging series of essays on military leaders, ancient and modern, whose actions and personalities provide insights into the interplay of time, circumstance, and individual character and ability that makes for success or failure. The authors cover "some masters of the art" including Sulla, Saxe, Thomas, Huebner etc, "masters of mobile warfare" such as Iberville, Crook, Wolseley, Hart, Montgomery, Patton, and experts in "coalition warfare" such as Rochambeau, Eisenhower. This book provides a study of the historical fields of battle, intended to appeal to the military professional or student of military history.

Heroes Never Die is an informative, provocative, and entertaining compendium of fifty never-before-collected essays on World War II by former soldier and military historian Martin Blumenson. Commanders profiled include Eisenhower, Bradley, Rommel, and Montgomery, as well as the best of Blumenson's extensive writings on General George S. Patton. Included are four never before published essays on Patton, Hitler, von Rundstedt, and Audie Murphy. Skillful and insightful re-examinations of key battles and the soldiers who fought them cover the allied disaster at Kasserine Pass, America's first military encounter with the Germans; the American invasion of Southern Italy; the bloody landing at Salerno; the lethal battle of the Hedgerows; the grisly stalemate of Anzio; the liberation of Paris; and much more. From the biting desert sands of Northern Africa to the bloody beaches of Europe, Blumenson takes the reader to the frontlines of many of the twentieth century's greatest battles and into the personalities of legendary commanders. He does so with a soldier's understanding of the dynamics of battle and with an officer's insight into the evolving tactics of war.