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For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians
have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The
work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view
has come to dominate the academic com-
nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,
non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to
say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be
examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt
to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed
non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend
can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective
expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut-
ity and subjective probability should not be de?ned in terms of
preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational
decision makers need only consider preferences over certain
outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions
derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating
preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of
maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this
non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory
could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the
Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others.
I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in
the literature
The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the most fiercely debated thought
experiments in philosophy and the social sciences, presenting the
simple insight that when two or more agents interact, the actions
that most benefit each individual may not benefit the group. The
fact that when you do what is best for you, and I do what is best
for me, we end up in a situation that is worse for both of us makes
the Prisoner's Dilemma relevant to a broad range of everyday
phenomena. This volume of new essays from leading philosophers,
game theorists, and economists examines the ramifications of the
Prisoner's Dilemma, the directions in which it continues to lead
us, and its links to a variety of topics in philosophy, political
science, social science, economics, and evolutionary biology. The
volume will be a vital and accessible resource for upper-level
students as well as for academic researchers.
Consequentialism, one of the major theories of normative ethics,
maintains that the moral rightness of an act is determined solely
by the act's consequences. The traditional form of consequentialism
is one-dimensional, in that the rightness of an act is a function
of a single moral aspect, such as the sum total of wellbeing it
produces. In this book Martin Peterson introduces a new type of
consequentialist theory: multidimensional consequentialism.
According to this theory, an act's moral rightness depends on
several separate dimensions, including individual wellbeing,
equality and risk. Peterson's novel approach shows that moral views
about equality and risk that were previously thought to be mutually
incompatible can be rendered compatible, and his precise
theoretical discussion helps the reader to understand better the
distinction between consequentialist and non-consequentialist
theories. His book will interest a wide range of readers in ethics.
The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the most fiercely debated thought
experiments in philosophy and the social sciences, presenting the
simple insight that when two or more agents interact, the actions
that most benefit each individual may not benefit the group. The
fact that when you do what is best for you, and I do what is best
for me, we end up in a situation that is worse for both of us makes
the Prisoner's Dilemma relevant to a broad range of everyday
phenomena. This volume of new essays from leading philosophers,
game theorists, and economists examines the ramifications of the
Prisoner's Dilemma, the directions in which it continues to lead
us, and its links to a variety of topics in philosophy, political
science, social science, economics, and evolutionary biology. The
volume will be a vital and accessible resource for upper-level
students as well as for academic researchers.
Risk has become one of the main topics in fields as diverse as
engineering, medicine and economics, and it is also studied by
social scientists, psychologists and legal scholars. This Springer
Essentials version offers an overview of the in-depth handbook and
highlights some of the main points covered in the Handbook of Risk
Theory. The topic of risk also leads to more fundamental questions
such as: What is risk? What can decision theory contribute to the
analysis of risk? What does the human perception of risk mean for
society? How should we judge whether a risk is morally acceptable
or not? Over the last couple of decades questions like these have
attracted interest from philosophers and other scholars into risk
theory. This brief offers the essentials of the handbook provides
for an overview into key topics in a major new field of research
and addresses a wide range of topics, ranging from decision theory,
risk perception to ethics and social implications of risk. It aims
to promote communication and information among all those who are
interested in theoretical issues concerning risk and uncertainty.
The Essentials of Risk Theory brings together internationally
leading philosophers and scholars from other disciplines who work
on risk theory. The contributions are accessibly written and highly
relevant to issues that are studied by risk scholars. The
Essentials of Risk Theory will be a helpful starting point for all
risk scholars who are interested in broadening and deepening their
current perspectives.
For quite some time, philosophers, economists, and statisticians
have endorsed a view on rational choice known as Bayesianism. The
work on this book has grown out of a feeling that the Bayesian view
has come to dominate the academic com-
nitytosuchanextentthatalternative,
non-Bayesianpositionsareseldomextensively researched. Needless to
say, I think this is a pity. Non-Bayesian positions deserve to be
examined with much greater care, and the present work is an attempt
to defend what I believe to be a coherent and reasonably detailed
non-Bayesian account of decision theory. The main thesis I defend
can be summarised as follows. Rational agents m- imise subjective
expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, ut-
ity and subjective probability should not be de?ned in terms of
preferences over uncertain prospects. On the contrary, rational
decision makers need only consider preferences over certain
outcomes. It will be shown that utility and probability fu- tions
derived in a non-Bayesian manner can be used for generating
preferences over uncertain prospects, that support the principle of
maximising subjective expected utility. To some extent, this
non-Bayesian view gives an account of what modern - cision theory
could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the
Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, de Finetti, Savage, and others.
I will not discuss all previous non-Bayesian positions presented in
the literature
Now revised and updated, this introduction to decision theory is
both accessible and comprehensive, covering topics including
decision making under ignorance and risk, the foundations of
utility theory, the debate over subjective and objective
probability, Bayesianism, causal decision theory, game theory, and
social choice theory. No mathematical skills are assumed, with all
concepts and results explained in non-technical and intuitive as
well as more formal ways. There are now over 140 exercises with
solutions, along with a glossary of key terms and concepts. This
second edition includes a new chapter on risk aversion as well as
updated discussions of numerous central ideas, including Newcomb's
problem, prisoner's dilemmas, and Arrow's impossibility theorem.
The book will appeal particularly to philosophy students but also
to readers in a range of disciplines, from computer science and
psychology to economics and political science.
Consequentialism, one of the major theories of normative ethics,
maintains that the moral rightness of an act is determined solely
by the act's consequences. The traditional form of consequentialism
is one-dimensional, in that the rightness of an act is a function
of a single moral aspect, such as the sum total of wellbeing it
produces. In this book Martin Peterson introduces a new type of
consequentialist theory: multidimensional consequentialism.
According to this theory, an act's moral rightness depends on
several separate dimensions, including individual wellbeing,
equality and risk. Peterson's novel approach shows that moral views
about equality and risk that were previously thought to be mutually
incompatible can be rendered compatible, and his precise
theoretical discussion helps the reader to understand better the
distinction between consequentialist and non-consequentialist
theories. His book will interest a wide range of readers in ethics.
Autonomous cars, drones, and electronic surveillance systems are
examples of technologies that raise serious ethical issues. In this
analytic investigation, Martin Peterson articulates and defends
five moral principles for addressing ethical issues related to new
and existing technologies: the cost-benefit principle, the
precautionary principle, the sustainability principle, the autonomy
principle, and the fairness principle. It is primarily the method
developed by Peterson for articulating and analyzing the five
principles that is novel. He argues that geometric concepts such as
points, lines, and planes can be put to work for clarifying the
structure and scope of these and other moral principles. This
geometric account is based on the Aristotelian dictum that like
cases should be treated alike, meaning that the degree of
similarity between different cases can be represented as a distance
in moral space. The more similar a pair of cases are from a moral
point of view, the closer is their location in moral space. A case
that lies closer in moral space to a paradigm case for some
principle p than to any paradigm for any other principle should be
analyzed by applying principle p. The book also presents empirical
results from a series of experimental studies in which experts
(philosophers) and laypeople (engineering students) have been asked
to apply the geometric method to fifteen real-world cases. The
empirical findings indicate that experts and laypeople do in fact
apply geometrically construed moral principles in roughly, but not
exactly, the manner advocates of the geometric method believe they
ought to be applied.
Now revised and updated, this introduction to decision theory is
both accessible and comprehensive, covering topics including
decision making under ignorance and risk, the foundations of
utility theory, the debate over subjective and objective
probability, Bayesianism, causal decision theory, game theory, and
social choice theory. No mathematical skills are assumed, with all
concepts and results explained in non-technical and intuitive as
well as more formal ways. There are now over 140 exercises with
solutions, along with a glossary of key terms and concepts. This
second edition includes a new chapter on risk aversion as well as
updated discussions of numerous central ideas, including Newcomb's
problem, prisoner's dilemmas, and Arrow's impossibility theorem.
The book will appeal particularly to philosophy students but also
to readers in a range of disciplines, from computer science and
psychology to economics and political science.
Due to the very old age and scarcity of this book, many of the
pages may be hard to read due to the blurring of the original text.
Due to the very old age and scarcity of this book, many of the
pages may be hard to read due to the blurring of the original text.
Involuntary Confessions of the Flesh in Early Modern France was
inspired by the observation that small slips of the flesh
(involuntary confessions of the flesh) are omnipresent in early
modern texts of many kinds. These slips (which bear similarities to
what we would today call the Freudian slip) disrupt and destabilize
readings of body, self, and text-three categories whose mutual
boundaries this book seeks to soften-but also, in their very
messiness, participate in defining them. Involuntary Confessions
capitalizes on the uncertainty of such volatile moments, arguing
that it is instability itself that provides the tools to navigate
and understand the complexity of the early modern world. Rather
than locate the body within any one discourse (Foucauldian,
psychoanalytic), this book argues that slips of the flesh create a
liminal space not exactly outside of discourse, but not necessarily
subject to it, either. Involuntary confessions of the flesh reveal
the perpetual and urgent challenge of early modern thinkers to
textually confront and define the often tenuous relationship
between the body and the self. By eluding and frustrating attempts
to contain it, the early modern body reveals that truth is as much
about surfaces as it is about interior depth, and that the self is
fruitfully perpetuated by the conflict that proceeds from seemingly
irreconcilable narratives. Interdisciplinary in its scope,
Involuntary Confessions of the Flesh in Early Modern France pairs
major French literary works of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries (by Marguerite de Navarre, Montaigne, Madame de
Lafayette) with cultural documents (confession manuals, legal
documents about the application of torture, and courtly handbooks).
It is the first study of its kind to bring these discourses into
thematic (rather than linear or chronological) dialog. In so doing,
it emphasizes the shared struggle of many different early modern
conversations to come to terms with the body's volatility.
Published by University of Delaware Press. Distributed worldwide by
Rutgers University Press.
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