Historically, the U.S. Army faces numerous challenges planning for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Insurgencies by their very nature occur within the context of a complex operating environment that typically last years if not decades. The insurgency that erupted at the conclusion of major combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom represents an example of the complex operating environment that planners will continue to face in the future. The best available planning method for operational planners to frame operations over the duration of a protracted campaign is called logical lines of operation. Logical lines of operation provide a method for commanders to visualize and adjust operations over time, space and purpose to contribute to operational objectives and strategic end-state(s). This monograph analyzes the theoretical and historical underpinnings of lines of operation (physical and logical) as well as counterinsurgency operations. Subsequently, an analysis and assessment of both U.S. and British planning and counterinsurgency doctrine provides a look at the effectiveness of current doctrine in addressing the use of logical lines of operation in the complex operating environment. Case studies are analyzed to examine the practical application of logical lines of operation in COIN operations and subsequently determine whether the concept informs current doctrine. The monograph argues that a void exists in both U.S. Army and Joint doctrine with respect to the use of logical lines of operation-particularly with respect to planning COIN operations within protracted campaigns. Consequently, the monograph makes the following recommendations to improve the description and depiction of logical lines of operation in U.S. Joint and Army planning and counterinsurgency doctrine. First, "operationalize" counterinsurgency doctrine by including logical lines of operation as a planning framework. Second, clarify language and terminology across current joint and army doct