In the past generation, Brazil has risen to become the seventh largest economy and fourth largest democracy in the world. Yet its rise challenges the conventional wisdom that capitalist democracies will necessarily converge to become faithful adherents of a US-led global liberal order. Indeed, Brazil demonstrates that middle powers, even those of a deeply democratic bent, may differ in their views of what democracy means on the global stage and how international relations should be conducted among sovereign nations. This volume explores Brazil's postures on specific aspects of foreign relations, including trade, foreign and environmental policy, humanitarian intervention, nuclear proliferation and South-South relations, among other topics. The authors argue from a variety of perspectives that, even as Brazil seeks greater integration and recognition, it also brings challenges to the status quo that are emblematic of the tensions accompanying the rise to prominence of a number of middle powers in an increasingly multipolar world system.

Courts, like other government institutions, shape public policy. But how are courts drawn into the policy process, and how are patterns of policy debate shaped by the institutional structure of the courts?
Drawing on the experience of the Brazilian federal courts since the transition to democracy, "Judging Policy" examines the judiciary's role in public policy debates. During a period of energetic policy reform, the high salience of many policies, combined with the conducive institutional structure of the judiciary, ensured that Brazilian courts would become an important institution at the heart of the policy process. The Brazilian case thus challenges the notion that Latin America's courts have been uniformly pliant or ineffectual, with little impact on politics and policy outcomes.
"Judging Policy" also inserts the judiciary into the scholarly debate regarding the extent of presidential control of the policy process in Latin America's largest nation. By analyzing the full Brazilian federal court system--including not only the high court, but also trial and appellate courts--the book develops a framework with cross-national implications for understanding how courts may influence policy actors' political strategies and the distribution of power within political systems.

Brazil features regularly in global comparisons of large developing economies. Yet since the 1980s, the country has been caught in a low-level equilibrium, marked by lackluster growth and destructive inequality. One cause is the country's enduring commitment to a set of ideas and institutions labelled developmentalism. This book argues that developmentalism has endured, despite hyperactive reform, because institutional complementarities across economic and political spheres sustain and drive key actors and strategies that are individually advantageous, but collectively suboptimal. Although there has been incremental evolution in some institutions, complementarities across institutions sustain a pattern of 'decadent developmentalism' that swamps systemic change. Breaking new ground, Taylor shows how macroeconomic and microeconomic institutions are tightly interwoven with patterns of executive-legislative relations, bureaucratic autonomy, and oversight. His analysis of institutional complementarities across these five dimensions is relevant not only to Brazil but also to the broader study of comparative political economy.

Brazil's democracy has repeatedly suffered major corruption scandals, despite numerous reforms designed to overcome entrenched patterns of illicit behavior. Why? What has caused corruption scandals to recur across some four decades of presidential administrations? And what are the implications of Brazil's experience for efforts to enhance accountability elsewhere? Addressing these questions, Matthew Taylor and Luciano Da Ros provide a framework for evaluating the bottlenecks to effective accountability in Brazil and analyse the successes and failures of anticorruption efforts from the early days of the democratic transition through the demise of the massive Lava Jato investigations.

Brazil features regularly in global comparisons of large developing economies. Yet since the 1980s, the country has been caught in a low-level equilibrium, marked by lackluster growth and destructive inequality. One cause is the country's enduring commitment to a set of ideas and institutions labelled developmentalism. This book argues that developmentalism has endured, despite hyperactive reform, because institutional complementarities across economic and political spheres sustain and drive key actors and strategies that are individually advantageous, but collectively suboptimal. Although there has been incremental evolution in some institutions, complementarities across institutions sustain a pattern of 'decadent developmentalism' that swamps systemic change. Breaking new ground, Taylor shows how macroeconomic and microeconomic institutions are tightly interwoven with patterns of executive-legislative relations, bureaucratic autonomy, and oversight. His analysis of institutional complementarities across these five dimensions is relevant not only to Brazil but also to the broader study of comparative political economy.