As constitutional law globalizes, the quest for a common grammar or 'generic constitutional law' becomes more pressing. Proportionality is one of the most prominent and controversial components of the modern, global constitutional discourse. In view of the alarming tension between the triumphant success of proportionality and the severity of the criticism directed towards it, this book offers an in-depth analysis of the critics of proportionality and demonstrates that their objections against the proportionality test are not convincing. It clarifies and further develops the current theories of proportionality and balancing. Building upon on Robert Alexy's predominant principles theory, the book suggests several modifications to this theory. Drawing examples from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, and various national constitutional courts it illustrates the argument in favour of proportionality and demonstrates its relevance for deciding concrete cases.

This volume gathers leading figures from legal philosophy and constitutional theory to offer a critical examination of the work of Robert Alexy. The contributions explore the issues surrounding the complex relations between rights, law, and morality and reflect on Alexy's distinctive work on these issues.
The focus across the contributions is on Alexy's main pre-occupations - his anti-positivist views on the nature of law, his approach to the nature of legal reasoning, and his understanding of constitutional rights as legal principles. In an extended response to the contributions in the volume, Alexy develops his views on these central issues.
The volume's juxtaposition of Anglo-American and German perspectives brings into focus the differences as well as the prospect of cross-fertilization between Continental and Anglo-American work in jurisprudence.

This is the first part of a 2-volume set that presents an in-depth investigation into the canon of constitutionally conforming interpretation. These volumes address the fundamental issues the canon raises in the national, supranational and international contexts. In volume 1, experts from 19 jurisdictions, including Brazil, Canada, India, the UK, and the USA, present reports which give concise overviews of the approaches and debates on constitutionally conforming interpretation. These reports cover the structural background, the conditions of application, as well as issues of competence. Further aspects discussed are its perceived normativity and popularity in everyday legal practice. Together with volume 2, which explores the canon’s use and theoretical impact beyond the national context in a comparative and critical manner, this book fills an important gap in legal scholarship and sets the stage for cross-national discourse.

Constitutionalism Justified analyzes leading Frankfurt School theorist Rainer Forst's theory of a basic right to justification, unique in combining insights from philosophy, constitutionalism, and legal theory. Drawing upon Kant's critical philosophy and Habermas's discourse theory, he has developed fresh perspectives on core topics like the concept of justice, the relation between modernity and emancipation, and human rights. The contributors to this volume explore Forst's work from three different perspectives: philosophy, legal philosophy, and constitutional theory. The first part of this volume addresses the philosophical argument of the basic right to justification, including the influence of Kantian thought on this right, the deontological versus teleological fundamentals, the tension between moral pluralism and universalism, and the relation of the right to justification with social and distributive justice. The second part covers how the right to justification is embedded in constitutional and legal frameworks. It explores the implications that Forst's right to justification has for conceptualizing constitutional democracy and its foundations, and how the moral right to justification may translate into particular practices of justification that are constrained by a legal framework. This includes discussion of the value of constitutionalism in general, of the relation between the formal structure of democracy and substantive justice, of the inclusion of outsiders to the constitutional setting, and of proportionality analysis and judicial review as forms of justification. The book concludes with Rainer Forst's reply to his interlocutors, making the book a valuable source for future research.

Legal argumentation consists in the interpretation of texts. Therefore, it has a natural connection to the philosophy of language. Central issues of this connection, however, lack a clear answer. For instance, how much freedom do judges have in applying the law? How are the literal and the purposive approaches related to one another? How can we distinguish between applying the law and making the law? This book provides answers by means of a complex and detailed theory of literal meaning. A new legal method is introduced, namely the further development of the law. It is so far unknown in Anglo-American jurisprudence, but it is shown that this new method helps in solving some of the most crucial puzzles in jurisprudence. At its centre the book addresses legal indeterminism and refutes linguistic-philosophical reasons for indeterminacy. It spells out the normative character of interpretation as emphasized by Raz and, with the help of Robert Brandom's normative pragmatics, it is shown that the relativism of interpretation from a normative perspective does not at all justify scepticism. On the contrary, it supports the claim that legal argumentation can be objective, and maintains that statements on the meaning of a statute can be right or wrong, and take on inter-subjective validity accordingly. This book breaks new ground in transferring Brandom's philosophy to legal theoretical problems and presents an original and exciting analysis of the semantic argument in legal argumentation. It was the recipient of the European Award for Legal Theory in 2002. 'This book represents, on the one hand, a reception of Robert Brandom's important theory including applications of this theory in the field of legal philosophy and, on the other, an exploration of the limits of an appeal in legal interpretation to the text. The enquiry thereby impinges upon the central juridico-philosophical themes of meaning, objectivity, and normativity. The author's work counts as a significant contribution to analytical jurisprudence and is deserving of a wide readership.' Robert Alexy, Professor for Public Law and Legal Philosophy, Kiel. 'Klatt focuses on a very profound theory of concept formation and uses this theory in a creative way to solve classical problems of legal argumentation.' Aleksander Peczenik