Preoccupation with the EU's internal affairs risks ignoring the extent to which Europe itself will now be shaped by foreign affairs. The future of Europe lies in its own hands only if it organizes itself to adjust to events in a world diplomatic system over which it can hope to have only limited control. The global setting in which Europe will have to find a place is the reverse image of its post-1945 direction. Whereas Western Europe's states have renounced 'power politics' among themselves, the rest of the world has done no such thing. The basis of inter-state relations remains remarkably similar to Rousseau's description as the 'constant action and reaction of powers in continued agitation'. Failure to recognize the persistence of power politics is now among the principal obstacles to Europe's future. It is as if recovery from the nemesis of mid-century has produced hubris towards its end. Europe finds it hard to accept that it must coexist with the outside world on terms increasingly set not by its own virtuous example of reconciliation among old enemies and the creation of political union, but by states who see little reason to follow its example. More fundamental than blueprints and policies for European Monetary Union and the European Union enlargement, Europe needs a trustworthy grasp of the world's foreign affairs to which its diplomacy must apply and its statecraft contribute.

The literature of chivalry and of courtly love has left an indelible impression on western ideas. What is less clear is how far the contemporary warrior aristocracy took this literature to heart and how far its ideals had influence in practice, especially in war. These are questions that Maurice Keen is uniquely qualified to answer. This book is a collection of Maurice Keen's articles and deals with both the ideas of chivalry and the reality of warfare. He discusses brotherhood-in-arms, courtly love, crusades, heraldry, knighthood, the law of arms, tournaments and the nature of nobility, as well as describing the actual brutality of medieval warfare and the lure of plunder. While the standards set by chivalric codes undoubtedly had a real, if intangible, influence on the behaviour of contemporaries, chivalry's idealisation of the knight errant also enhanced the attraction of war, endorsing its horrors with a veneer of acceptability.

The popular heroes of the Middle Ages were semi-mythical figures. This text explores not only the famous Robin Hood and William Wallace, but also some now forgotten rogues such as Gamelyn and Fulke Fitzwarin. Apart from William Wallace, the heroes of the outlaw legends were not men who played a leading role on the historical stage. Nevertheless, this book reveals how they were remembered in tradition for generations. This book explains the popularity of these figures and looks at how the stories appealed to the common people of the Middle Ages. The author also discusses their origins, spirit and background. In this re-issue of "The Outlaws of Medieval Legend", a new introduction is provided to set the book in the context of recent work on these characters, The titles of which are: "England in the Later Middle Ages" (Routledge, 1975); "Heraldry" (Yale UP, 1986) and "Nobles, Knights and Men at Arms in the Middle Ages" (Hambleden Press, 1996).

Wonderfully written and beautifully presented , The Outlaws of Medieval Legend brings the popular heroes of the Middle-Ages to life. Featuring both famous - Robin Hood and William Wallace - and now forgotten rogues such as Gamelyn and Fulke Fitzwarin, this book explains the popularity of these semi-mythical figures, and how their stories appealed to the common people of the Middle Ages.
Long unavailable, and now featuring a new introduction from the author, this is the perfect book for anyone with a fondness for medieval history and folklore.

Many of the combatants in the European wars of the late middle ages fought for their own gain, but they observed a code of regulations, part chivalrous and part commercial which they called the 'law of arms'. This book, originally published in 1965, examines this soldiers' code, to understand its rules and how they were enforced. How did a soldier sue for ransom money if his prisoner would not pay it, and before what court? How did he know whether what he took by force was lawful spoil? As the answers to these and other questions reveal, the workings of the law of arms gave practical point to the contemporary cult of chivalry. It also had an important influence on the early development of ideas of international law.

Many of the combatants in the European wars of the late middle ages fought for their own gain, but they observed a code of regulations, part chivalrous and part commercial which they called the 'law of arms'. This book, originally published in 1965, examines this soldiers' code, to understand its rules and how they were enforced. How did a soldier sue for ransom money if his prisoner would not pay it, and before what court? How did he know whether what he took by force was lawful spoil? As the answers to these and other questions reveal, the workings of the law of arms gave practical point to the contemporary cult of chivalry. It also had an important influence on the early development of ideas of international law.

Preoccupation with the EU's internal affairs risks ignoring the extent to which Europe itself will now be shaped by foreign affairs. The future of Europe lies in its own hands only if it organizes itself to adjust to events in a world diplomatic system over which it can hope to have only limited control. The global setting in which Europe will have to find a place is the reverse image of its post-1945 direction. Whereas Western Europe's states have renounced 'power politics' among themselves, the rest of the world has done no such thing. The basis of inter-state relations remains remarkably similar to Rousseau's description as the 'constant action and reaction of powers in continued agitation'. Failure to recognize the persistence of power politics is now among the principal obstacles to Europe's future. It is as if recovery from the nemesis of mid-century has produced hubris towards its end. Europe finds it hard to accept that it must coexist with the outside world on terms increasingly set not by its own virtuous example of reconciliation among old enemies and the creation of political union, but by states who see little reason to follow its example. More fundamental than blueprints and policies for European Monetary Union and the European Union enlargement, Europe needs a trustworthy grasp of the world's foreign affairs to which its diplomacy must apply and its statecraft contribute.

Preoccupation with the EU's internal affairs risks ignoring the extent to which Europe itself will now be shaped by foreign affairs. The future of Europe lies in its own hands only if it organizes itself to adjust to events in a world diplomatic system over which it can hope to have only limited control. The global setting in which Europe will have to find a place is the reverse image of its post-1945 direction. Whereas Western Europe's states have renounced 'power politics' among themselves, the rest of the world has done no such thing. The basis of inter-state relations remains remarkably similar to Rousseau's description as the 'constant action and reaction of powers in continued agitation'. Failure to recognize the persistence of power politics is now among the principal obstacles to Europe's future. It is as if recovery from the nemesis of mid-century has produced hubris towards its end. Europe finds it hard to accept that it must coexist with the outside world on terms increasingly set not by its own virtuous example of reconciliation among old enemies and the creation of political union, but by states who see little reason to follow its example. More fundamental than blueprints and policies for European Monetary Union and the European Union enlargement, Europe needs a trustworthy grasp of the world's foreign affairs to which its diplomacy must apply and its statecraft contribute.

Written by twelve expert historians, this well-illustrated account of the great confrontations of medieval Europe (c.700-1500) examines major developments in the methods of warfare from the time of Charlemagne through to the end of the Crusades. The result is a rich and fascinating history of a culture steeped in martial ideas, whose aristocrats were also warriors in a society organized by its desire to wage war.

This book has been designed to enable all students of political ideas to gain a fuller appreciation of the great works which form the foundation of the subject. It spans a critical period: from the turbulent era of the American and French Revolutions through to the calmer waters of the nineteenth century. Seven classic texts have been chosen for analysis: Hamilton's The Federalist, Sieyes' What is the Third Estate?, Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, Hegel's The Philosophy of Right, de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, Marx and Engels' Communist Manifesto, and Mill's On Liberty. Together they illustrate and express the main themes of the period. The most prominent of these is the growing distinction between the state and society and the problems that this brings in its train. Other themes embrace the interplay of revolution and reaction, the growth of representative government, and the challenge posed by democracy. The clear analysis and explanation contained in each essay will enable the reader to return to the original texts with a new understanding and insight.

This is a lively and accessible introduction to some of the greatest works of political thought. Written by a team of specialist contributors, there are chapters on Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics, Augustine's City of God, Machiavelli's Discourses and The Prince, Hobbes's Leviathan, and Locke's Second Treatise on Government. Concentrating on the ideas contained in the texts themselves, the guide also helps readers understand why these classics remain indispensable today.