Part I of this project overviewed the literature on the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS) and provided a primer on the Committee's governance and functions. It also engaged with the current theories on legitimacy and discussed what legitimacy meant for the global governance of banking and how it could be assessed. This part investigates the BCBS's governance, operation, and policy outcomes to determine the extent to which it is and has been legitimate. The assessment is conducted based on three principles of reasoned decision making, transparency, and accountability. Maziar Peihani argues that the BCBS has gradually become a more legitimate institution but there still exists significant room for improvement. He highlights a number of areas for reform and sets out policy prescriptions to enhance the BCBS's legitimacy.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) was established in 1974 as an informal group of central bankers and bank supervisors with the mandate to formulate supervisory standards and guidelines. Although the Committee does not have any formal supranational authority, it is the de facto global banking regulator and its recommendations have been widely implemented by member and non-member states. Maziar Peihani investigates the BCBS's governance, operation, and policy outcomes to determine the extent to which it is and has been legitimate. The project is comprised of two parts. This part overviews the literature on the BCBS, outlines its contribution, and provides a primer on the Committee's governance and functions. In addition, it engages with the current theories on legitimacy and discusses what legitimacy means for the global governance of banking and how it can be assessed.