The commander, or chief of staff, of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is a prominent public figure in Israel. His decisions, advice, and persona exert direct influence on force design and military strategy, and indirectly impact social, economic, and foreign affairs. This first-ever in-depth comparative study on the role and performance of the IDF chiefs of staff throughout modern Israel's history offers lessons for practitioners and students of strategy, military history, and leadership everywhere.

This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises--ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or combat doctrines?
Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm--with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy's capabilities--generally doesn't work.
Based on historical case analysis of successful "under-fire" recovery and failure to recover, he identifies the variables that have determined these outcomes, and he presents an innovative method for military force planning that will enables armies to deal with the uncertainties of future wars "in real time."
His proposed method combines conceptual, doctrinal, cognitive, command, organizational, and technological elements to produce optimal battlefield flexibility and adaptability. He then demonstrates that, when properly applied, this method can eliminate most obstacles to overcoming battlefield surprises.

This book addresses one of the basic questions in military studies: How can armies cope effectively with technological and doctrinal surprises--ones that leave them vulnerable to new weapons systems and/or combat doctrines?
Author Meir Finkel contends that the current paradigm--with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield and the enemy's capabilities--generally doesn't work.
Based on historical case analysis of successful "under-fire" recovery and failure to recover, he identifies the variables that have determined these outcomes, and he presents an innovative method for military force planning that will enables armies to deal with the uncertainties of future wars "in real time."
His proposed method combines conceptual, doctrinal, cognitive, command, organizational, and technological elements to produce optimal battlefield flexibility and adaptability. He then demonstrates that, when properly applied, this method can eliminate most obstacles to overcoming battlefield surprises.