This paper analyzes the relevancy of the terms center of gravity and decisive points at the operational level of war in communist insurgencies. It begins by proposing acceptable meanings for the terms center of gravity, decisive points, subversion, insurgency, and counter-insurgency. The subsequent portion of the analysis explores the characteristics of insurgent warfare. Historical examples illustrate each characteristic by establishing a situation and context of historical significance. It is in this context that the study examines the characteristics of communist insurgency and their relation to the terms center of gravity and decisive points at the operational level of conflict. This study found that an analysis of insurgencies clearly identifies an operational center of gravity for cellular-type insurgencies such as communist insurgencies. The communist cells of active supporters neatly fulfills the Clausewitzian concept for center of gravity with only minor modification. The most important characteristic is that they are truly the "hub of all power and movement, on which everything else depends." They are the source of supplies, recruits and intelligence for the entire insurgency. Although they are not physically concentrated as Clausewitz demands, they derive strength from the security of their dispersion and will concentrate when necessary. The communist cells and active supporters are the cohesion of the movement. As Clausewitz said, "Where there is cohesion, the analogy of center of gravity can be applied." Because a communist insurgency's center of mass is usually dispersed, its center of gravity is difficult to identify. Consequently, operational planners must normally strike the insurgency's center of gravity indirectly by attacking its decisive points. Thus, Jomini's decisive points are especially applicable to communist insurgencies. There are several decisive points the operational planner should target when planning a counterinsurgency operation. C

This study explores the experiences of the Army's only World War II era divisional unit designed specifically for employment in mountainous terrain, the 10th Mountain Division. It examines the reasons for its activation, its organization, training, and combat performance. Using this as a historical precedence, it then analyzes the current training programs for operations in mountainous terrain, drawing parallels between the training of the 10th of 1944 and that of the light infantry divisions of 1987. Investigation reveals that a rapid deployment force must be ready today to fight in any terrain to which they deploy. With this requirement comes a responsibility to conduct the training necessary for them to fight and win in any of the likely environments. Virtually every contingency area for the United States contains extensive mountain ranges. Light infantry divisions do not have to be terrain specific in their training, but historical evidence proves the necessity of their being terrain adaptable. Although most divisions currently train in desert, jungle, urban and forested terrain, almost none conduct training in mountainous terrain. The experiences of the 10th Mountain Division and Fifth Army in World War II illustrate the absolute necessity of units training in mountain operations if they are to be successful in combat in mountainous terrain. This thesis concludes that the Army leadership cannot ignore the peculiar requirements of combat in mountainous terrain. Rapid deployment forces, specifically light infantry divisions, must begin a concerted program of training in mountainous terrain. The problem is identified. Facilities are available for training. The risk of not beginning such a program is too high to ignore the problem any further.