A result of a conference at the University of Trier, Germany, this volume mirrors its goals: * to provide an overview of recent advances in research on critical life events and the losses associated with them * to collect and stimulate new perspectives for the analysis of these events * to compare the psychology of victims experiencing stress and losses with the psychology of observers in their reactions to victims. Designed to prevent developmental psychological myths in the area of life crises, this collection questions, on an empirical basis, the adequacy of several widespread generalizations. At the same time its contributors attempt to draw paths to conceptualizations and theories in general psychology and social psychology which promise to be helpful in analyzing and interpreting phenomena in the field of life crises.

A result of a conference at the University of Trier, Germany, this volume mirrors its goals:
* to provide an overview of recent advances in research on critical life events and the losses associated with them
* to collect and stimulate new perspectives for the analysis of these events
* to compare the psychology of victims experiencing stress and losses with the psychology of observers in their reactions to victims.
Designed to prevent developmental psychological myths in the area of life crises, this collection questions, on an empirical basis, the adequacy of several widespread generalizations. At the same time its contributors attempt to draw paths to conceptualizations and theories in general psychology and social psychology which promise to be helpful in analyzing and interpreting phenomena in the field of life crises.

This volume was conceived out of the concern with what the imminent future holds for the "have" countries ... those societies, such as the United States, which are based on complex technology and a high level of energy consumption. Even the most sanguine projection includes as base minimum relatively rapid and radical change in all aspects of the society, reflecting adaptation or reactions to demands created by poten tial threat to the technological base, sources of energy, to the life-support system itself. Whatever the source of these threats-whether they are the result of politically endogeneous or exogeneous forces-they will elicit changes in our social institutions; changes resulting not only from attempts to adapt but also from unintended consequences of failures to adapt. One reasonable assumption is that whatever the future holds for us, we would prefer to live in a world of minimal suffering with the greatest opportunity for fulfilling the human potential. The question then becomes one of how we can provide for these goals in that scenario for the imminent future ... a world of threat, change, need to adapt, diminishing access to that which has been familiar, comfortable, needed."

What role does justice play in the formation of public opinion and the scholarly debates about social problems? Does the perception of injustice force problems to appear on the political agenda? Does the perception of an injustice give momentum to social change? Or are violations of self-interest or threats to one's material welfare the more important factors? Or are empathy-driven concerns for the needy and the disadvan taged motivations to solve societal problems? What is known about the role justice concerns play in leadership? In several chapters of this volume, justice concerns and justice motives are viewed in relation to other concerns and motivations; welfare, self-interest, altruism. It is argued that the consensus of political theorists converges on mutual advantage as the main criterion of acceptable solutions to solving socie tal problems. In economics, self-interest is considered the driving force and provides the criterion of acceptable solutions. Sociological and social psychological exchange theories share these basic assumptions. Thus, questions are raised and answered concerning how justice and these other important motives appear in the analyses of societal prob lems and the search for solutions. Moreover, in addition to the issue of conflicting motives-self interest, altruism, justice-it is commonly recognized that the definition of what is just and what is unjust is open to question. In public as well as in scientific dialogues, diverging views about justice have to be integrated or decided upon.

If the truth were told, this volume and its direct antecedents must rank among the most ambitious, if not simply pretentious, endeavors imag inable, at least in the social sciences. The titles of the volume and the chapters, promising to integrate the experiences of the sense of justice and the affectional bonding of people in close relations, seem straightforward and reasonable enough. What they fail to convey, however, is the simple bald fact that we in the human social sciences have no firm grasp on either of these two fundamental experiences-what we sometimes call "love" and "justice. " To begin with, even as "scientists" committed to under standing based upon systematic propositions linking publicly observable concepts, we have no clear consensus concerning the nature of the affec tional bonds linking people in close relationships-love, intimacy, caring, mutual responsiveness, or the sense of justice, fairness, deserving, and in our efforts to under entitlement. And we are continually handicapped stand these complex, moving experiences by the persistent tendency to reduce them to manifestations of, "nothing but," familiar psychological or even biological processes-"secondary rewards," "selfish genes. " So, why then this volume? Although there are many answers to the question, probably the most germane is that the basic issues are so im portant and intriguing that the recent past has seen rather dramatic paral lel growth in social scientists' interest in these two areas-justice and close relationships.

The preparation of this volume began with a conference held at Trier University, approximately thirty years after the publication of the first Belief in a Just World (BJW) manuscript. The location of the conference was especially appropriate given the continued interest that the Trier faculty and students had for BJW research and theory. As several chapters in this volume document, their research together with the other contributors to this volume have added to the current sophistication and status of the BJW construct. In the 1960s and 1970s Melvin Lerner, together with his students and colleagues, developed his justice motive theory. The theory of Belief in a Just World (BJW) was part of that effort. BJW theory, meanwhile in its thirties, has become very influential in social and behavioral sciences. As with every widely applied concept and theory there is a natural develop mental history that involves transformations, differentiation of facets, and efforts to identify further theoretical relationships. And, of course, that growth process will not end unless the theory ceases to develop. In this volume this growth is reconstructed along Furnham's stage model for the development of scientific concepts. The main part of the book is devoted to current trends in theory and research."

The preparation of this volume began with a conference held at Trier University, approximately thirty years after the publication of the first Belief in a Just World (BJW) manuscript. The location of the conference was especially appropriate given the continued interest that the Trier faculty and students had for BJW research and theory. As several chapters in this volume document, their research together with the other contributors to this volume have added to the current sophistication and status of the BJW construct. In the 1960s and 1970s Melvin Lerner, together with his students and colleagues, developed his justice motive theory. The theory of Belief in a Just World (BJW) was part of that effort. BJW theory, meanwhile in its thirties, has become very influential in social and behavioral sciences. As with every widely applied concept and theory there is a natural develop mental history that involves transformations, differentiation of facets, and efforts to identify further theoretical relationships. And, of course, that growth process will not end unless the theory ceases to develop. In this volume this growth is reconstructed along Furnham's stage model for the development of scientific concepts. The main part of the book is devoted to current trends in theory and research."

What role does justice play in the formation of public opinion and the scholarly debates about social problems? Does the perception of injustice force problems to appear on the political agenda? Does the perception of an injustice give momentum to social change? Or are violations of self-interest or threats to one's material welfare the more important factors? Or are empathy-driven concerns for the needy and the disadvan taged motivations to solve societal problems? What is known about the role justice concerns play in leadership? In several chapters of this volume, justice concerns and justice motives are viewed in relation to other concerns and motivations; welfare, self-interest, altruism. It is argued that the consensus of political theorists converges on mutual advantage as the main criterion of acceptable solutions to solving socie tal problems. In economics, self-interest is considered the driving force and provides the criterion of acceptable solutions. Sociological and social psychological exchange theories share these basic assumptions. Thus, questions are raised and answered concerning how justice and these other important motives appear in the analyses of societal prob lems and the search for solutions. Moreover, in addition to the issue of conflicting motives-self interest, altruism, justice-it is commonly recognized that the definition of what is just and what is unjust is open to question. In public as well as in scientific dialogues, diverging views about justice have to be integrated or decided upon."

If the truth were told, this volume and its direct antecedents must rank among the most ambitious, if not simply pretentious, endeavors imag inable, at least in the social sciences. The titles of the volume and the chapters, promising to integrate the experiences of the sense of justice and the affectional bonding of people in close relations, seem straightforward and reasonable enough. What they fail to convey, however, is the simple bald fact that we in the human social sciences have no firm grasp on either of these two fundamental experiences-what we sometimes call "love" and "justice. " To begin with, even as "scientists" committed to under standing based upon systematic propositions linking publicly observable concepts, we have no clear consensus concerning the nature of the affec tional bonds linking people in close relationships-love, intimacy, caring, mutual responsiveness, or the sense of justice, fairness, deserving, and in our efforts to under entitlement. And we are continually handicapped stand these complex, moving experiences by the persistent tendency to reduce them to manifestations of, "nothing but," familiar psychological or even biological processes-"secondary rewards," "selfish genes. " So, why then this volume? Although there are many answers to the question, probably the most germane is that the basic issues are so im portant and intriguing that the recent past has seen rather dramatic paral lel growth in social scientists' interest in these two areas-justice and close relationships."

This volume was conceived out of the concern with what the imminent future holds for the "have" countries ... those societies, such as the United States, which are based on complex technology and a high level of energy consumption. Even the most sanguine projection includes as base minimum relatively rapid and radical change in all aspects of the society, reflecting adaptation or reactions to demands created by poten tial threat to the technological base, sources of energy, to the life-support system itself. Whatever the source of these threats-whether they are the result of politically endogeneous or exogeneous forces-they will elicit changes in our social institutions; changes resulting not only from attempts to adapt but also from unintended consequences of failures to adapt. One reasonable assumption is that whatever the future holds for us, we would prefer to live in a world of minimal suffering with the greatest opportunity for fulfilling the human potential. The question then becomes one of how we can provide for these goals in that scenario for the imminent future ... a world of threat, change, need to adapt, diminishing access to that which has been familiar, comfortable, needed."

The "belief in a just world" is an attempt to capmre in a phrase one of the ways, if not the way, that people come to terms with-make sense out of-find meaning in, their experiences. We do not believe that things just happen in our world; there is a pattern to events which conveys not only a sense of orderli ness or predictability, but also the compelling experience of appropriateness ex pressed in the typically implicit judgment, "Yes, that is the way it should be." There are probably many reasons why people discover or develop a view of their environment in which events occur for good, understandable reasons. One explanation is simply that this view of reality is a direct reflection of the way both the human mind and the environment are constructed. Constancies, patterns which actually do exist in the environment-out there-are perceived, represented symbolically, and retained in the mind. This approach cenainly has some validity, and would probably suffice, if it were not for that sense of "appropriateness," the pervasive affective com ponent in human experience. People have emotions and feelings, and these are especially apparent in their expectations about their world: their hopes, fears, disappointments, disillusionment, surprise, confidence, trust, despondency, anticipation-and certainly their sense of right, wrong, good, bad, ought, en titled, fair, deserving, just."

This volume argues that the commitment to justice is a fundamental motive and that, although it is typically portrayed as serving self-interest, it sometimes takes priority over self-interest. To make this case, the authors discuss the way justice emerges as a personal contract in children's development; review a wide range of research studying the influences of the justice motive on evaluative, emotional, and behavioral responses; and detail common experiences that illustrate the impact of the justice motive. Through an extensive critique of the research on which some alternative models of justice are based, the authors present a model that describes the ways in which motives of justice and self-interest are integrated in people's lives. They close with a discussion of some positive and negative consequences of the commitment to justice.

This volume argues that the commitment to justice is a fundamental motive and that, although it is typically portrayed as serving self-interest, it sometimes takes priority over self-interest. To make this case, the authors discuss the way justice emerges as a personal contract in children's development; review a wide range of research studying the influences of the justice motive on evaluative, emotional, and behavioral responses; and detail common experiences that illustrate the impact of the justice motive. Through an extensive critique of the research on which some alternative models of justice are based, the authors present a model that describes the ways in which motives of justice and self-interest are integrated in people's lives. They close with a discussion of some positive and negative consequences of the commitment to justice.