|
Showing 1 - 3 of
3 matches in All Departments
somewhat like Henkin's nonstandard interpretation of higher-order
logics, while the right semantics [or logical modalities is an
analogue to the standard of type theory in Henkin's sense.
interpretation Another possibility would be to follow W.V. Quine's
advice to give up logi- cal modalities as being beyond repair. Or
we could also try to develop a logic of conceptual possibility,
restricting the range of our "possible worlds" to those compatible
with the transcendental presuppositions of our own conceptual sys-
tem. This looks in fact like one of the most interesting possible
theories I have dreamt of developing but undoubtedly never will.
Its kinship with Kant's way of thinking should be obvious. Besides
putting the entire enterprise of possible-worlds semantics into a
perspective, we can also see that the actual history of
possible-worlds seman- tics is more complicated than it might first
appear to be. For the standard in- terpretation of modal logics has
reared its beautiful head repeatedly in the writings of Stig
Kanger, Richard Montague the pre-Montague-semantics theorist, and
Nino Cocchiarella.
somewhat like Henkin's nonstandard interpretation of higher-order
logics, while the right semantics [or logical modalities is an
analogue to the standard of type theory in Henkin's sense.
interpretation Another possibility would be to follow W.V. Quine's
advice to give up logi- cal modalities as being beyond repair. Or
we could also try to develop a logic of conceptual possibility,
restricting the range of our "possible worlds" to those compatible
with the transcendental presuppositions of our own conceptual sys-
tem. This looks in fact like one of the most interesting possible
theories I have dreamt of developing but undoubtedly never will.
Its kinship with Kant's way of thinking should be obvious. Besides
putting the entire enterprise of possible-worlds semantics into a
perspective, we can also see that the actual history of
possible-worlds seman- tics is more complicated than it might first
appear to be. For the standard in- terpretation of modal logics has
reared its beautiful head repeatedly in the writings of Stig
Kanger, Richard Montague the pre-Montague-semantics theorist, and
Nino Cocchiarella.
Are Western epistemology, metaphysics, methodology and the
philosophy of science grounded only in men's distinctive
understandings of themselves, others, and nature? Does this less
than human understanding distort our models of reason and of
scientific inquiry? In different ways, the papers in this
collection explore the evidence for these increasingly reasonable
and intriguing questions. They identify how it is distinctively
masculine perspectives on masculine experience which have shaped
the most fundamental and formal aspects of systematic thought in
philosophy and the natural and social sciences - precisely the
aspects of thought believed most gender-neutral. They show how
these understandings ground Aristotle's biology and metaphysics;
the very definition of the problems of philosophy in Plato,
Descartes, Hobbes and Rousseau; the adversary method' which is the
paradigm of philosophic and scientific reasoning; principles of
individuation in philosophical ontology and the philosophy of
language; individualistic assumptions in psychology; functionalism
in sociological and biological theory; evolutionary theory; the
methodology of political science; Marxist political economy; and
conceptions of objective inquiry' in the social and natural
sciences. These essays also begin to identify for us the distictive
aspects of women's experience which can provide the resources
needed for the creation of a truly human understanding. Audience:
The book will be of interest to those involved in epistemology, and
philosophy of the natural and social sciences, as well as feminist
scholars in philosophy. The work will also be of value for
theorists, methodologists, and feminist scholars in the natural and
social sciences.
|
|