One hundred years ago, Russell and Whitehead published their epoch-making Principia Mathematica (PM), which was initially conceived as the second volume of Russell's Principles of Mathematics (PoM) that had appeared ten years before. No other works can be credited to have had such an impact on the development of logic and on philosophy in the twentieth century. However, until now, scholars only focused on the first parts of the books - that is, on Russell's and Whitehead's theory of logic, set-theory and arithmetic.
Sebastien Gandon aims at reversing the perspective. His goal is to give a picture of Russell's logicism based on a detailed reading of the developments dealing with advanced mathematics - namely projective geometry and the theory of quantity. This book is not only the first study ever made of the 'later' portions of PoM and PM, it also shows how this shift of perspective compels us to change our view of the logicist program taken as a whole.

A new approach to reading Frege's notations that adheres to the modern view that terms and well-formed formulas are any disjoint syntactic categories. On this new approach, we can at last read Frege's notations in their original form revealing striking new solutions to many of the outstanding problems of interpreting his philosophy.

The author demonstrates the significant role that some of the Edwardian philosophers played in the formation of Russell's work on the problem of the external world done at the tail-end of a controversy which raged between about 1900-1915.

In the early twentieth century an apparently obscure philosophical debate took place between F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell. The historical outcome was momentous: the demise of the movement known as British Idealism, and its eventual replacement by the various forms of analytic philosophy. Since then, a conception of this debate and its rights and wrongs has become entrenched in English-language philosophy. Stewart Candlish examines afresh the events of this formative period in twentieth-century thought and comes to some surprising conclusions.

This book consists of a series of chapters on Carnap's ideal of explication as an alternative to the naturalistic conceptions of science, setting it in its historical context, discussing specific cases of explications, and entiching the on-going debate on conceptual engineering and naturalism in analytic philosophy.

Leading scholars in the field offer new ways of looking at Wittgenstein's papers as well as clear, comprehensive and original philosophical interpretations of them. The volume includes two texts by Wittgenstein previously unpublished in English.

Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

This volume brings together new essays that consider Wittgenstein's treatment of the phenomenon of aspect perception in relation to the broader idea of conceptual novelty; that is, the acquisition or creation of new concepts, and the application of an acquired understanding in unfamiliar or novel situations. Over the last twenty years, aspect perception has received increasing philosophical attention, largely related to applying Wittgenstein's remarks on the phenomena of seeing-as, found in Part II of Philosophical Investigations (1953), to issues within philosophical aesthetics. Seeing-as, however, has come to occupy a broader conceptual category, particularly in philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology. The essays in this volume examine the exegetical issues arising within Wittgenstein studies, while also considering the broader utility and implications of the phenomenon of seeing-as in the fields of aesthetics, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of mathematics, with a thematic focus on questions of novelty and creativity. The collection constitutes a fruitful interpretative engagement with the later Wittgenstein, as well as a unique contribution to considerations of philosophical methodology.

The first book in English to offer a systematic survey of Bolzano's philosophical logic and theory of knowledge, it offers a reconstruction of Bolzano's views on a series of key issues: the analysis of meaning, generality, analyticity, logical consequence, mathematical demonstration and knowledge by virtue of meaning.

This volumes aim is to provide an introduction to Carnaps book from a historical and philosophical perspective, each chapter focusing on one specific issue. The book will be of interest not only to Carnap scholars but to all those interested in the history of analytical philosophy.

This study looks to the work of Tarski's mentors Stanislaw Lesniewski and Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and reconsiders all of the major issues in Tarski scholarship in light of the conception of Intuitionistic Formalism developed: semantics, truth, paradox, logical consequence.

This historically-informed critical assessment of Dummett's account of abstract objects, examines in detail some of the Fregean presuppositions of Dummett's account whilst also engaging with phenomenological approaches and recent work on the problem of abstract entities.

The volume combines a historical and philosophical study of Russell's theory of descriptions. It defends, develops and extends the theory as a contribution to natural language semantics while also arguing for a reassessment of the important of linguistic inquiry to Russell's philosophical project.

'what can be said at all can be said clearly; and of what one cannot talk, about that one must be silent' Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, first published in German in 1921 and in English translation in 1922, is one of the most influential philosophical texts of the twentieth century. It played a fundamental role in the development of analytic philosophy, and its philosophical ideas and implications have been fiercely debated ever since. This new translation improves on the two main earlier translations, taking advantage of the scholarship over the last century that has deepened our understanding of both the Tractatus and Wittgenstein's philosophy more generally, scholarship that has also involved discussion of the difficulties in translating the original German text and the issues of interpretation that arise. Michael Beaney's translation is accompanied by two introductory essays, the first explaining the background to Wittgenstein's work, its main ideas and their subsequent development and influence, and some of the central debates, and the second providing an account of the history of the text and the two earlier translations. It is accompanied by detailed notes, explaining key points of translation and interpretation, a glossary, chronology, and other editorial material designed to help the reader understand the Tractatus and its place in the history of philosophy.

This volume brings together new essays that consider Wittgenstein's treatment of the phenomenon of aspect perception in relation to the broader idea of conceptual novelty; that is, the acquisition or creation of new concepts, and the application of an acquired understanding in unfamiliar or novel situations. Over the last twenty years, aspect perception has received increasing philosophical attention, largely related to applying Wittgenstein's remarks on the phenomena of seeing-as, found in Part II of Philosophical Investigations (1953), to issues within philosophical aesthetics. Seeing-as, however, has come to occupy a broader conceptual category, particularly in philosophy of mind and philosophical psychology. The essays in this volume examine the exegetical issues arising within Wittgenstein studies, while also considering the broader utility and implications of the phenomenon of seeing-as in the fields of aesthetics, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of mathematics, with a thematic focus on questions of novelty and creativity. The collection constitutes a fruitful interpretative engagement with the later Wittgenstein, as well as a unique contribution to considerations of philosophical methodology.

This collection, with contributions from leading philosophers, places analytic philosophy in a broader context comparing it with the methodology of its most important rival tradition in twentieth-century philosophy--phenomenology, whose development parallels the development of analytic philosophy in many ways. The Analytic Turn will be of great interest to historians of philosophy generally, analytic philosophers, and phenomenologists.

This collection, with contributions from leading philosophers, places analytic philosophy in a broader context comparing it with the methodology of its most important rival tradition in twentieth-century philosophy--phenomenology, whose development parallels the development of analytic philosophy in many ways. The Analytic Turn will be of great interest to historians of philosophy generally, analytic philosophers, and phenomenologists.

This historically-informed critical assessment of Dummett's account of abstract objects, examines in detail some of the Fregean presuppositions of Dummett's account whilst also engaging with phenomenological approaches and recent work on the problem of abstract entities.

The book consists of a series of chapters on Carnap's ideal of explication as an alternative to the naturalistic conceptions of science, setting it in its historical context, discussing specific cases of explications, and enriching the on-going debate on conceptual engineering and naturalism in analytic philosophy.

In the early twentieth century, an apparently obscure philosophical debate took place between F.H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell. The outcome was momentous: the demise of British Idealism and the rise of analytic philosophy. Stewart Candlish examines afresh this formative period in twentieth-cenutry thought and comes to some surprising conclusions.

During the course of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy developed into the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world. In the last two decades, it has become increasingly influential in the rest of the world, from continental Europe to Latin America and Asia. At the same time there has been deepening interest in the origins and history of analytic philosophy, as analytic philosophers examine the foundations of their tradition and question many of the assumptions of their predecessors. This has led to greater historical self-consciousness among analytic philosophers and more scholarly work on the historical contexts in which analytic philosophy developed. This historical turn in analytic philosophy has been gathering pace since the 1990s, and the present volume is the most comprehensive collection of essays to date on the history of analytic philosophy. It contains state-of-the-art contributions from many of the leading scholars in the field, all of the contributions specially commissioned. The introductory essays discuss the nature and historiography of analytic philosophy, accompanied by a detailed chronology and bibliography. Part One elucidates the origins of analytic philosophy, with special emphasis on the work of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein. Part Two explains the development of analytic philosophy, from Oxford realism and logical positivism to the most recent work in analytic philosophy, and includes essays on ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy as well as on the areas usually seen as central to analytic philosophy, such as philosophy of language and mind. Part Three explores certain key themes in the history of analytic philosophy.

Originating in the pioneering work of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the four decades around the turn of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy established itself in various forms in the 1930s. After the Second World War, it developed further in North America, in the rest of Europe, and is now growing in influence as the dominant philosophical tradition right across the world, from Latin America to East Asia. In this Very Short Introduction Michael Beaney introduces some of the key ideas of the founders of analytic philosophy by exploring certain fundamental philosophical questions and showing how those ideas can be used in offering answers. Considering the work of Susan Stebbing, he also explores the application of analytic philosophy to critical thinking, and emphasizes the conceptual creativity that lies at the heart of fruitful analysis. Throughout, Beaney illustrates why clarity of thinking, precision of expression, and rigour of argumentation are rightly seen as virtues of analytic philosophy. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

During the course of the twentieth century, analytic philosophy developed into the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world. In the last two decades, it has become increasingly influential in the rest of the world, from continental Europe to Latin America and Asia. At the same time there has been deepening interest in the origins and history of analytic philosophy, as analytic philosophers examine the foundations of their tradition and question many of the assumptions of their predecessors. This has led to greater historical self-consciousness among analytic philosophers and more scholarly work on the historical contexts in which analytic philosophy developed. This historical turn in analytic philosophy has been gathering pace since the 1990s, and the present volume is the most comprehensive collection of essays to date on the history of analytic philosophy. It contains state-of-the-art contributions from many of the leading scholars in the field, all of the contributions specially commissioned. The introductory essays discuss the nature and historiography of analytic philosophy, accompanied by a detailed chronology and bibliography. Part One elucidates the origins of analytic philosophy, with special emphasis on the work of Frege, Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein. Part Two explains the development of analytic philosophy, from Oxford realism and logical positivism to the most recent work in analytic philosophy, and includes essays on ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy as well as on the areas usually seen as central to analytic philosophy, such as philosophy of language and mind. Part Three explores certain key themes in the history of analytic philosophy.

A new approach to reading Frege's notations that adheres to the modern view that terms and well-formed formulas are any disjoint syntactic categories. On this new approach, we can at last read Frege's notations in their original form revealing striking new solutions to many of the outstanding problems of interpreting his philosophy.

This study looks to the work of Tarski's mentors Stanislaw Lesniewski and Tadeusz Kotarbinski, and reconsiders all of the major issues in Tarski scholarship in light of the conception of Intuitionistic Formalism developed: semantics, truth, paradox, logical consequence.