Countries, governments, and organizations devise constitutions to reflect their visions of governance and rules for their leaders. They vary considerably in both formats and consequences. Disputes over constitutions can lead to fights, contests, debates, and more. Vincent Ostrom is one of America's leading scholars on constitutions and has spent a lifetime researching, analyzing, and writing about constitutions in America and overseas. He provides methods to judge and to implement constitutions as citizens struggle with their formulation. In this book, scholars from around the world add to this intellectual quest of massive scholarly and practical importance. Using the research and methodology pioneered by Ostrom, they identify and analyze the criteria for successful constitutions in both theory and practice.

In addition to winning the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for her path-breaking research on "economic governance, especially the commons," Elinor (Lin) Ostrom also made important contributions to other fields of political economy and public policy. This four-volume compendium of papers written by Lin (often with coauthors, most notably her husband, Vincent), along with papers by others expanding on her work, brings together the strands of her entire empirical, analytical, theoretical, and methodological research program. Together with Vincent's important theoretical contributions, they defined a distinctive "Bloomington School" of political-economic thought. Volume 3 collects explores the historical development of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, illustrates its application to a wide range of specific policy problems, and highlights recent extensions that ensure it will remain a vibrant focus of research for years to come. The IAD framework emerged from a long series of interdisciplinary collaborative research projects, but the guiding figure in its development was Elinor Ostrom. Anyone familiar with the full range of her research will recognize common presuppositions and themes for which she used the IAD framework as an organizing device. This book collects examples of policy-relevant applications of IAD to a wide range of policy sectors. In a fundamental sense, the IAD framework helps us understand how Ostrom's mind worked when she approached a particular problem of policy, and it highlights those factors that she asserted needed to be considered in any complete analysis. Unfortunately, she did not leave us a complete or definitive guidebook on how to apply this framework. This volume collects important components of such a guidebook from a wide range of sources, including previously unpublished papers, and as such it should help anyone seeking to use this framework to analyze a variety of policy areas.

Elinor (Lin) Ostrom was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for her pathbreaking research on "economic governance, especially the commons," but she also made important contributions to several other fields of political economy and public policy. The range of topics she covered and the multiple methods she used might convey the mistaken impression that her body of work is disjointed and incoherent. This four-volume compendium of papers written by Lin, alone or with various coauthors (most notably including her husband and partner, Vincent), supplemented by others expanding on their work, brings together the common strands of research that serve to tie her impressive oeuvre together. That oeuvre, together with Vincent's own impressive body of work, has come to define a distinctive school of political-economic thought, the "Bloomington School." Each of the four volumes is organized around a central theme of Lin's work. The fourth and final volume, "Policy Applications and Extensions," collects sixteen papers that explore further applications and extensions of Ostrom's work. In fact, Ostrom had been writing about the scaling up of Bloomington School ideas to treat such problems since the mid-1990's. Her contributions to the climate change literature have been very impactful. An increasing number of scholars working on climate policy are now promoting various polycentric approaches to the problem. Equally influential, even seminal, was Ostrom's work (with Charlotte Hess) on the so-called "knowledge commons," a "hot" area of research dealing with contested issues such as the appropriate balance between private ownershipand open-access to information resources. The third part of the volume moves from applications of Ostrom's ideas to continuing her own efforts to improve the IAD and SES frameworks so as to make them even more useful for researchers and analysts. Finally, the volume concludes with two papers by Ostrom reflecting on continuing challenges confronting the social sciences generally and interdisciplinary research in particular. They are reminders that much work remains to be done.

In addition to winning the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for her path-breaking research on "economic governance, especially the commons," Elinor (Lin) Ostrom also made important contributions to other fields of political economy and public policy. This four-volume compendium of papers written by Lin (often with coauthors, most notably her husband, Vincent), along with papers by others expanding on her work, brings together the strands of her entire empirical, analytical, theoretical, and methodological research program. Together with Vincent's important theoretical contributions, they defined a distinctive "Bloomington School" of political-economic thought. Volume 3 explores the historical development of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, illustrates its application to a wide range of specific policy problems, and highlights recent extensions that ensure it will remain a vibrant focus of research for years to come. The IAD framework emerged from a long series of interdisciplinary collaborative research projects, but the guiding figure in its development was Elinor Ostrom. Anyone familiar with the full range of her research will recognize common presuppositions and themes for which she used the IAD framework as an organizing device. This book collects examples of policy-relevant applications of IAD to a wide range of policy sectors. In a fundamental sense, the IAD framework helps us understand how Ostrom's mind worked when she approached a particular problem of policy, and it highlights those factors that she asserted needed to be considered in any complete analysis. Unfortunately, she did not leave us a complete or definitive guidebook on how to apply this framework. This volume collects important components of such a guidebook from a wide range of sources, including previously unpublished papers, and as such it should help anyone seeking to use this framework to analyze a variety of policy areas.

Countries, governments, and organizations devise constitutions to reflect their visions of governance and rules for their leaders. They vary considerably in both formats and consequences. Disputes over constitutions can lead to fights, contests, debates, and more. Vincent Ostrom is one of America's leading scholars on constitutions and has spent a lifetime researching, analyzing, and writing about constitutions in America and overseas. He provides methods to judge and to implement constitutions as citizens struggle with their formulation. In this book, scholars from around the world add to this intellectual quest of massive scholarly and practical importance. Using the research and methodology pioneered by Ostrom, they identify and analyze the criteria for successful constitutions in both theory and practice.

Elinor (Lin) Ostrom was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for her pathbreaking research on "economic governance, especially the commons"; but she also made important contributions to several other fields of political economy and public policy. The range of topics she covered and the multiple methods she used might convey the mistaken impression that her body of work is disjointed and incoherent. This four-volume compendium of papers written by Lin, alone or with various coauthors (most notably including her husband and partner, Vincent), supplemented by others expanding on their work, brings together the common strands of research that serve to tie her impressive oeuvre together. That oeuvre, together with Vincent's own impressive body of work, has come to define a distinctive school of political-economic thought, the "Bloomington School." Each of the four volumes is organized around a central theme of Lin's work. Volume 1 explores the roles played by the concept polycentricity in the disciplines of public administration, political science, and other forms of political economy. Polycentricity denotes a complex system of governance in which public authorities, citizens, and private organizations work together to establish and enforce the rules that guide their behavior. It encapsulates an approach toward policy analysis that blurs standard disciplinary boundaries between the social sciences. Throughout their long and remarkably productive careers, Elinor and Vincent Ostrom never tired of reminding us of the capacity of ordinary humans to transcend their own limitations by engaging with others in the myriad forms of collective action required to build and sustain a self-governing society. Their careers stand as exemplars of the proper relationship between rigorous scholarship and responsible citizenship.

In addition to winning the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for her path-breaking research on "economic governance, especially the commons," Elinor (Lin) Ostrom also made important contributions to other fields of political economy and public policy. This four-volume compendium of papers written by Lin (often with coauthors, most notably her husband, Vincent), along with papers by others expanding on her work, brings together the strands of her entire empirical, analytical, theoretical, and methodological research program. Together with Vincent's important theoretical contributions, they defined a distinctive "Bloomington School" of political-economic thought. Volume 2 examines Lin's work on "the commons," in which she demonstrated that, in many cases, local resource users can solve collective-action problems through common-property management regimes. It comprises papers, including some that are not well known, related to and building on the findings of Governing the Commons (1990). Part I focuses on key attributes of biophysical resources and the institutions human communities have designed to govern them. Part II shows how in various social and ecological circumstances, different sets of institutions facilitate or impede the long-run sustainability of resources. Part III highlights Ostrom's first major research project on water resources in Southern California. It was a topic she (and her students) returned to with the specific intention of gathering data (more than 50 years' worth) for longitudinal analyses of combined institutional and ecological change. In sum, this volume contextualizes what is, at present, thought to be Lin's greatest legacy to social science: the conditions under which resources can be sustainably managed over very long periods of time by the collective action of ordinary people, beyond markets and states.

For most of the period after World War II until the fall of the Soviet empire, there was a remarkable consensus in the United States in support of our policies toward the Soviet Union. This consensus resulted in enormous defense expenditures and in the development of a system of alliances that spanned the globe and marked a vast expansion of America's overseas obligations.
"Compound Dilemmas" addresses the question of how such widespread domestic support for a very expensive and continual arms race developed. Current models of the arms race often fail to explain the persistence of American support or the pattern of the U.S. response to Soviet actions. Michael D. McGinnis and John T. Williams use social choice theory to offer a new understanding of popular support for U.S. Cold War policies, including the American arms buildup. The authors consider the use domestic actors made of information about Soviet military expenditures in developing consensus on the size and nature of the appropriate American military response. In addition, their use of game theory and statistical analysis offers new insights into how these methods might be employed to understand foreign policy questions.
This book will appeal to political scientists interested particularly in methodology, international relations, and American aspects of the political system. It will also be of interest to readers seeking information about the Cold War and its arms race.
Michael D. McGinnis is Associate Professor of Political Science, Indiana University. John T. Williams is Professor of Political Science, Indiana University.

Polycentric Games and Institutions summarizes contributions to the analysis of institutions made by scholars associated with the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University.
The readings in this volume illustrate several varieties of institutional analysis. Each reading builds upon the foundation of game theory to address similar sets of questions concerning institutions and self-governance. The chapters in the first section lay out interrelated frameworks for analysis. Section two illustrates the normative component of institutions and their effects on human behavior. Readings in the following two sections detail how these frameworks have been applied to models of specific situations. Section five presents a modeling exercise exploring the functions of monitoring and enforcement, and the sixth section discusses approaches to the problems of complexity that confront individuals playing polycentric games. The final readings provide overviews of experimental research on the behavior of rational individuals.
Contributors include Arun Agrawal, Sue E. S. Crawford, Clark C. Gibson, Roberta Herzberg, Larry L. Kiser, Michael McGinnis, Stuart A. Marks, Elinor Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom, James Walker, Franz J. Weissing, John T. Williams, and Rick Wilson.
Michael McGinnis is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Co-Associate Director, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University.

Polycentric Games and Institutions summarizes contributions to the analysis of institutions made by scholars associated with the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University.
The readings in this volume illustrate several varieties of institutional analysis. Each reading builds upon the foundation of game theory to address similar sets of questions concerning institutions and self-governance. The chapters in the first section lay out interrelated frameworks for analysis. Section two illustrates the normative component of institutions and their effects on human behavior. Readings in the following two sections detail how these frameworks have been applied to models of specific situations. Section five presents a modeling exercise exploring the functions of monitoring and enforcement, and the sixth section discusses approaches to the problems of complexity that confront individuals playing polycentric games. The final readings provide overviews of experimental research on the behavior of rational individuals.
Contributors include Arun Agrawal, Sue E. S. Crawford, Clark C. Gibson, Roberta Herzberg, Larry L. Kiser, Michael McGinnis, Stuart A. Marks, Elinor Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom, James Walker, Franz J. Weissing, John T. Williams, and Rick Wilson.
Michael McGinnis is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Co-Associate Director, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University.