Human beings act together in characteristic ways, and these forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal. Think of friendship and love, singing duets, dancing together, and the joys of conversation. And think about the usefulness of conversation and how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals, from building buildings to putting on plays to establishing important results in the sciences.
With Shared Agency, Michael E. Bratman seeks to answer questions about the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of our sociality and to establish a framework for understanding basic forms of sociality. Bratman proposes that a rich account of individual planning agency facilitates the step to these forms of sociality.
There is an independent reason - grounded in the diachronic organization of our temporally extended agency - to see planning structures as basic to our individual agency. Once these planning structures are on board, we can expect them to play central roles in our sociality. This planning theory of individual agency highlights distinctive roles and norms of intentions, understood as plan states. In Shared Agency Bratman argues that appeals to these planning structures enable us to provide adequate resources for an account of sufficient conditions for these basic forms of sociality. Shared agency emerges, both functionally and rationally, from structures of interconnected planning agency.

Our human capacity for planning agency plays central roles in the cross-temporal organization of our agency, in our acting and thinking together (both at a time and over time), and in our self-governance (both at a time and over time). Intentions can be understood as states in such a planning system. The practical thinking at the bottom of this planning capacity is guided by norms that enjoin synchronic plan consistency and means-end coherence as well as forms of plan stability over time. The essays in this book aim to deepen our understanding of these norms and to defend their status as norms of practical rationality for planning agents. The general guidance by these planning norms has many pragmatic benefits, especially given our cognitive and epistemic limits. But appeal to these general pragmatic benefits does not fully explain the normative force of these norms in the particular case. In response to this challenge some think these norms are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one's beliefs; some think these norms are constitutive of intentional agency; some think they are norms of interpretation; and some think the idea of such norms of practical rationality is a myth. These essays chart an alternative path. This path sees these planning norms as tracking conditions of a planning agent's self-governance, both at a time and over time. It seeks associated models of such self-governance. And it appeals to the idea that the end of one's self-governance over time, while not essential to intentional agency per se, is, within the planning framework, rationally self-sustaining and a keystone of a rationally stable reflective equilibrium that involves the norms of plan rationality. This end is thereby in a position to play a role in our planning framework that parallels the role of a concern with quality of will within the framework of the reactive emotions, as understood by Peter Strawson.

Human beings act together in characteristic ways, and these forms of shared activity matter to us a great deal. Think of friendship and love, singing duets, dancing together, and the joys of conversation. And think about the usefulness of conversation and how we frequently manage to work together to achieve complex goals, from building buildings to putting on plays to establishing important results in the sciences.
With Shared Agency, Michael E. Bratman seeks to answer questions about the conceptual, metaphysical and normative foundations of our sociality and to establish a framework for understanding basic forms of sociality. Bratman proposes that a rich account of individual planning agency facilitates the step to these forms of sociality.
There is an independent reason - grounded in the diachronic organization of our temporally extended agency - to see planning structures as basic to our individual agency. Once these planning structures are on board, we can expect them to play central roles in our sociality. This planning theory of individual agency highlights distinctive roles and norms of intentions, understood as plan states. In Shared Agency Bratman argues that appeals to these planning structures enable us to provide adequate resources for an account of sufficient conditions for these basic forms of sociality. Shared agency emerges, both functionally and rationally, from structures of interconnected planning agency.

Our human capacity for planning agency plays central roles in the cross-temporal organization of our agency, in our acting and thinking together (both at a time and over time), and in our self-governance (both at a time and over time). Intentions can be understood as states in such a planning system. The practical thinking at the bottom of this planning capacity is guided by norms that enjoin synchronic plan consistency and means-end coherence as well as forms of plan stability over time. The essays in this book aim to deepen our understanding of these norms and to defend their status as norms of practical rationality for planning agents. The general guidance by these planning norms has many pragmatic benefits, especially given our cognitive and epistemic limits. But appeal to these general pragmatic benefits does not fully explain the normative force of these norms in the particular case. In response to this challenge some think these norms are, at bottom, norms of theoretical rationality on one's beliefs; some think these norms are constitutive of intentional agency; some think they are norms of interpretation; and some think the idea of such norms of practical rationality is a myth. These essays chart an alternative path. This path sees these planning norms as tracking conditions of a planning agent's self-governance, both at a time and over time. It seeks associated models of such self-governance. And it appeals to the idea that the end of one's self-governance over time, while not essential to intentional agency per se, is, within the planning framework, rationally self-sustaining and a keystone of a rationally stable reflective equilibrium that involves the norms of plan rationality. This end is thereby in a position to play a role in our planning framework that parallels the role of a concern with quality of will within the framework of the reactive emotions, as understood by Peter Strawson.

This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, know as the "planning theory of intention and agency." Bratman's primary concern is with what he calls "strong" forms of human agency--including forms of human agency that are the target of our talk about self-determination, self-government, and autonomy. These essays are unified and cohesive in theme, and will be of interest to philosophers in ethics and metaphysics.

This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. These essays enrich Bratman's account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for our understanding of temptation and self-control, shared intention and shared cooperative activity, and moral responsibility. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students, and will also be of interest to social and developmental psychologists, AI researchers, and game and decision theorists.

Our human lives involve remarkable forms of practical organization- diachronic organization of individual activity; small-scale organization of shared action; and the organization of institutions. In this book, Michael Bratman argues that the key to these multiple, inter-related forms of human practical organization is our capacity for planning agency. Drawing on earlier work on the roles of planning agency in our human, cross-temporal and small-scale social organization, it focuses on the role of planning agency within our organized institutions, whether a religious congregation, a small business, a professional association, a city council, a university, a non-profit organization, a corporation, a political party, a legal system, or a democratic state. Shared and Institutional Agency draws on ideas, inspired by H.L.A. Hart, that our organized institutions are rule-guided, and that to understand this, we need a theory of social rules. This book develops a planning theory of social rules and puts forth an organized institution as involving authority-according social rules of procedure. This supports a model of organized institutions that makes room for pluralistic divergence and leads to a model of institutional intention and institutional intentional agency. The view that emerges sees our capacity for planning agency as a core capacity that underlies not only string quartets and informal social rules, but also the rule-guided structure of organized institutions and institutional agency.

This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. These essays enrich Bratman's account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for our understanding of temptation and self-control, shared intention and shared cooperative activity, and moral responsibility. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students, and will also be of interest to social and developmental psychologists, AI researchers, and game and decision theorists.

Our human lives involve remarkable forms of practical organization- diachronic organization of individual activity; small-scale organization of shared action; and the organization of institutions. In this book, Michael Bratman argues that the key to these multiple, inter-related forms of human practical organization is our capacity for planning agency. Drawing on earlier work on the roles of planning agency in our human, cross-temporal and small-scale social organization, it focuses on the role of planning agency within our organized institutions, whether a religious congregation, a small business, a professional association, a city council, a university, a non-profit organization, a corporation, a political party, a legal system, or a democratic state. Shared and Institutional Agency draws on ideas, inspired by H.L.A. Hart, that our organized institutions are rule-guided, and that to understand this, we need a theory of social rules. This book develops a planning theory of social rules and puts forth an organized institution as involving authority-according social rules of procedure. This supports a model of organized institutions that makes room for pluralistic divergence and leads to a model of institutional intention and institutional intentional agency. The view that emerges sees our capacity for planning agency as a core capacity that underlies not only string quartets and informal social rules, but also the rule-guided structure of organized institutions and institutional agency.