On 7th June 1981 a group of F-16 fighter-bombers from the Israeli Air Force bombed the newly completed French-built Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, south-east of Baghdad. The F-16s dived in low and dropped 2000lb iron bombs and 900lb HE bombs on the main reactor building destroying the reactor, yet leaving only one casualty. Up above six F-15 fighters flew top cover while on the border of Iraq CH-53 Air Rescue helicopters were ready to retrieve any pilots who were shot down. The Iraqi air defences around the reactor were formidable with SA-6 (Gainful), SA-2 and SA-3 anti-aircraft missiles and ZSU-57-2 and ZSU-23-4 radar guided anti-aircraft guns and MIG-21 and MIG-23MF fighter interceptors based at a nearby airfield.

On 7th June 1981 a group of F-16 fighter-bombers from the Israeli Air Force bombed the newly completed French-built Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, south-east of Baghdad. The F-16s dived in low and dropped 2000lb iron bombs and 900lb HE bombs on the main reactor building destroying the reactor, yet leaving only one casualty. Up above six F-15 fighters flew top cover while on the border of Iraq CH-53 Air Rescue helicopters were ready to retrieve any pilots who were shot down. The Iraqi air defences around the reactor were formidable with SA-6 (Gainful), SA-2 and SA-3 anti-aircraft missiles and ZSU-57-2 and ZSU-23-4 radar guided anti-aircraft guns and MIG-21 and MIG-23MF fighter interceptors based at a nearby airfield.

Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.

Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.

Table of Contents

Part 1 The US Civil War: the role of intelligence in the Chancellorsville Campaign, 1863, Jay Luvaas; Lee at Gettysburg - a general without intelligence, Jay Luvaas. Part 2 The First World War: British intelligence in Mesopotamia, 1914-16, Richard Popplewell; institutionalized deception and perception reinforcement - Allenby's campaigns in Palestine, 1917-18, Yigal Sheffy. Part 3 The Second World War: flawed perception and its effect upon operational thinking - the case of the Japanese army, 1937-41, Alvin D. Coox; the British Army, signals and security in the desert campaign, 1940-42, John Ferris; Convoy PQ17 - a study of intelligence and decision-making, Patrick Beesley; Ultra intelligence and General Macarthur's leap to Hollandia, January-April 1944, Edward J. Drea; German air intelligence in World War II, Horst Boog; a comparative analysis of RAF and Luftwaffe intelligence in the Battle of Britain, 1940, Sebastian Cox; intelligence and strategy - some observations on the war in the Mediterranean, 1941-45, Ralph Bennet.

In this work the authors develop a decomposition theory for subgroups of $\mathsf{Out}(F_n)$ which generalizes the decomposition theory for individual elements of $\mathsf{Out}(F_n)$ found in the work of Bestvina, Feighn, and Handel, and which is analogous to the decomposition theory for subgroups of mapping class groups found in the work of Ivanov.