On 7th June 1981 a group of F-16 fighter-bombers from the Israeli Air Force bombed the newly completed French-built Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, south-east of Baghdad. The F-16s dived in low and dropped 2000lb iron bombs and 900lb HE bombs on the main reactor building destroying the reactor, yet leaving only one casualty. Up above six F-15 fighters flew top cover while on the border of Iraq CH-53 Air Rescue helicopters were ready to retrieve any pilots who were shot down. The Iraqi air defences around the reactor were formidable with SA-6 (Gainful), SA-2 and SA-3 anti-aircraft missiles and ZSU-57-2 and ZSU-23-4 radar guided anti-aircraft guns and MIG-21 and MIG-23MF fighter interceptors based at a nearby airfield.

On 7th June 1981 a group of F-16 fighter-bombers from the Israeli Air Force bombed the newly completed French-built Iraqi nuclear reactor at Tuwaitha, south-east of Baghdad. The F-16s dived in low and dropped 2000lb iron bombs and 900lb HE bombs on the main reactor building destroying the reactor, yet leaving only one casualty. Up above six F-15 fighters flew top cover while on the border of Iraq CH-53 Air Rescue helicopters were ready to retrieve any pilots who were shot down. The Iraqi air defences around the reactor were formidable with SA-6 (Gainful), SA-2 and SA-3 anti-aircraft missiles and ZSU-57-2 and ZSU-23-4 radar guided anti-aircraft guns and MIG-21 and MIG-23MF fighter interceptors based at a nearby airfield.

Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.

Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.

In this work the authors develop a decomposition theory for subgroups of $\mathsf{Out}(F_n)$ which generalizes the decomposition theory for individual elements of $\mathsf{Out}(F_n)$ found in the work of Bestvina, Feighn, and Handel, and which is analogous to the decomposition theory for subgroups of mapping class groups found in the work of Ivanov.

This is a study based on a detailed textual analysis of the classical works on war by Clausewitz and Sun Tzu and to a lesser extent by Jamini and Machiavelli. The author takes a fresh look at what these thinkers actually said - not what they are widely believed to have said. He finds that despite their apparent differences in terms of time, place, cultural background and level of material and technological development, all had much in common. The central conclusion of this book is that the logic of waging war and of strategic thinking is universal. This second, enlarged edition contains a new chapter on the Clausewitzian principles of continuity and the culminating point of victory.