The Confederacy had a great opportunity to turn the Civil War in its favor in 1864, but squandered this chance when it failed to finish off a Union army cornered in Louisiana because of concerns about another Union army coming south from Arkansas. The Confederates were so confused that they could not agree on a course of action to contend with both threats, thus the Union offensive advancing from Arkansas saved the one in Louisiana and became known to history as the Camden Expedition. The Camden Expedition is intriguing because of the "might-have-beens" had the key players made different decisions. The author contends that if Frederick Steele, commander of the Federal VII Army Corps, had not received a direct order from General Ulysses S. Grant to move south, disaster would have befallen not only the Army of the Gulf in Louisiana but the entire Union cause, and possibly would have prevented Abraham Lincoln from winning reelection.

During his 2009-2010 combat tour in Afghanistan, battalion commander Lt. Col. Michael J. Forsyth kept a daily journal. In it he candidly writes about his daily interactions with the Afghan government, citizens, security forces, and his intermittent conflict with the enemy. As the deployment progresses, the journal reveals that his initial expectations for peace in Afghanistan were tempered by his experiences and encounters. In the process, Col. Forsyth learned critical lessons in leadership and changed his thinking about realistic goals that can be accomplished in Afghanistan. The journal, and its subsequent annotations, also provides a glimpse into how the U.S. Army functions at the unit level and what America's Soldiers do on a daily basis to prepare for and engage in combat.

In 1864, General Sterling Price with an army of 12,000 ragtag Confederates invaded Missouri in an effort to wrest it from the United States Army's Department of Missouri. Price hoped his campaign would sway the 1864 presidential election, convincing war-weary Northern voters to cast their ballots for a peace candidate rather than Abraham Lincoln. It was the South's last invasion of Northern territory. But it was simply too late in the war for the South to achieve such an outcome, and Price grossly mismanaged the campaign, guaranteeing defeat of his force and the Confederate States. This book chronicles the Confederacy's desperate final and ill-fated attempt win a decisive victory.