Within a few years of their liberation from Spanish rule in the 1820s, several of the new Spanish American republics floated loans in London's financial market. All the debtor nations, from Mexico to Chile, had defaulted within five years, a situation which resulted in their exclusion from European capital markets for much of the 19th century. Most studies of such debt approach the subject from the debtor's viewpoint, some arguing that the British government was an economic imperialist. Concentrating on Mexico, this book provides an important corrective, focusing on the creditors, the individual investors who risked their money to buy bonds. These investors ranged from country clergy to politicians of the rank of Benjamin Disraeli.

Thousands of investors lost their money due to Mexico's persistent defaults and failure to pay the promised dividends. They were represented by the Committee of Mexican Bondholders, a London based organization established in 1830 to negotiate a settlement of the debt with the Mexican government. Almost sixty years of futile discussions followed, with the debt rescheduled on several occasions until the final settlement in the 1880s. Costeloe analyzes the negotiations, the bond issues, the identity of the bondholders, the activities of the Committee, and the attitude of the British government. By concentrating on the creditor, he brings a new perspective to the whole issue of Third World or foreign debt in the 19th century.

It is a little known fact of British history that between 1824 and 1825, British people invested approximately 10 million pounds in Mexico. This enormous sum of money did not come from the British government, the Bank of England, or, for the most part, rich merchants, landowners, or British aristocrats. It came from the incomes, pensions, and savings of thousands of ordinary British people, including rural vicars, country doctors, merchants, local bankers and solicitors, retired army and navy officers, shopkeepers and myriad other individuals who risked their money in the future of Mexico. Why did they do it? Why did the four Cazenove brothers of the banking family, or the three Twining brothers of tea fame, or Dr. Peter Roget, author of the famous Theasaurus that most of us still use today, choose Mexico for their investments? What did they know about the country, its history, economoy, politics and prospects? Why was it that the British, even after losing millions of pounds in their Mexican investments, continued to believe that Mexico was a land of unlimited opportunity? Bubbles and Bonanzas is the first detailed study of British investments and investors in Mexico in the first four decades after independence. Costeloe gives economic history a human face that offers fascinating detail and new information about the origins and scope of British interest in independent Mexico.

Much of the so-called Age of Santa Anna in the history of independent Mexico remains a mystery and no decade is less well understood than the years from 1835 to 1846. In 1834, the ruling elite of middle class hombres de bien concluded that a highly centralized republican government was the only solution to the turmoil and factionalism that had characterized the new nation since its emancipation from Spain in 1821. The central republic was thus set up in 1835, but once again civil strife, economic stagnation, and military coups prevailed until 1846, when a disastrous war with the United States began in which Mexico was to lose half of its national territory. This study explains the course of events and analyzes why centralism failed, the issues and personalities involved, and the underlying pressures of economic and social change.

This book examines the Spanish response, military, economic and social, to the anti-imperial revolutions of Latin America in the early nineteenth century. History has for the most part concentrated on the heroic careers of the great liberators of America: but what did Spaniards themselves think of Simon Bolivar and his fellow revolutionaries? How did they view the events in America? What policies were adopted, what were their effects on Spanish trade and the merchants who conducted it, and what action did Spain take to meet American demands or to suppress them? It is with these and many related questions that this study is concerned. Analysing a broad spectrum of Spanish opinion which reflects the views of politicians, diplomats, merchants, journalists, the military and others, Professor Costeloe explains how Spaniards responded to revolution and how in retrospect, in the aftermath of defeat, they regarded the end of their nation's long role as a major imperial power.

Conflict between the Roman Catholic Church and the State in Mexico became prominent soon after independence in 1821, and during the next three decades national and state governments made various attempts to reduce ecclesiastical influence in the social, economic and political life of the nation. Few of such efforts met with much success, and it was not until 1856 that a major reform was initiated. Legislation was issued which affected all spheres of clerical activity but the most vital and controversial aspect of the reform involved the measures adopted to dispossess the Church of its wealth. The extensive ecclesiastical holdings of urban and rural real estate and capital were nationalized and redistributed. Professor Bazant examines earlier attempts at nationalization, and describes in detail the implementations of the 1856 Lerdo Law and subsequent decrees. Using selected areas of the country, he traces the precise effects of the redistribution of Church property and capital, describing the terms of sale or transfer, the number of sales, the buyers, their nationality and occupation, and the total value of the amounts involved.

The Juzgado de Capellanias was the most important fiscal institution within the Roman Catholic Church in Mexico. It operated in each diocese as a type of bank, receiving clerical revenues from various sources and investing them by way of loans at interest. The Roman Catholic Church in Mexico was both a cause and a victim of the political and economic chaos of this period. The liberals alleged that the concentration of much of the country's wealth in the hands of the clerical corporations hindered the political and economic progress of the nation. The clergy argued that they utilized much of their property and capital to the direct benefit of both society and the economy. Dr Costeloe examines these different views in relation to the Juzgado in Mexico. He discusses its complex internal administration, skilled employees, sources of revenue and the procedure for obtaining loans from it. Since the borrower was obliged to guarantee repayment of his loan by offering a property as security, the Church, through the Juzgado as creditor, gained control of the mortgaged property. Dr Costeloe analyses the effects of this investment and subsequent control of real estate via the clergy. In the final section, the author discusses the relations between the Juzgado and the State.

Much of the so-called Age of Santa Anna in the history of independent Mexico remains a mystery and no decade is less well understood than the years from 1835 to 1846. In 1834, the ruling elite of middle class hombres de bien concluded that a highly centralized republican government was the only solution to the turmoil and factionalism that had characterized the new nation since its emancipation from Spain in 1821. The central republic was thus set up in 1835, but once again civil strife, economic stagnation, and military coups prevailed until 1846, when a disastrous war with the United States began in which Mexico was to lose half of its national territory. This study explains the course of events and analyzes why centralism failed, the issues and personalities involved, and the underlying pressures of economic and social change.