This book analyses in a comprehensive manner the phenomenon of 'public interest' in different areas of law, both public and private. The term 'public interest' can be found in a wide range of legislation and it is used extensively in judicial practice and public administration. Yet, it has received surprisingly little attention in academia. As a result, it is used for various, often contradictory purposes. Justifications for its application are rarely convincing and the concept is often confused with similar legal institutions such as state interest, societal interest and public welfare, which, however, serve quite different purposes. Further to the relevant public being defined, the weight of public interest in case of conflict with other considerations will be examined and the legal consequences of its breach (e.g. nullity, damages and penalties) considered.The book's objectives are therefore manifold. First and foremost, it aims to provide a definition of the notion of public interest and to determine its main attributes, particularly against the background of the notion of private interest. In order to achieve this, the concepts philosophical underpinnings will be outlined, as will its historical developments and its application in different times and socio-economic conditions. Consequently, the book will assist in applying the concept of public interest with a clear understanding of its substance, normative function and its relationship to other relevant legal institutions. The book focuses on the concept's application across the spectrum of legal disciplines ranging from constitutional and administrative law to corporate and insolvency law, from criminal law to environmental law, and from competition law to labour law. In order to provide concrete examples of legislative and judicial practice, the book analyses three jurisdictions in particular Austria, the Czech Republic and the European Union.This book is not only an important addition to legal scholarship but, importantly, contributes to the improvement of decision-making processes at all levels of government. It will be of interest to scholars, practicing lawyers, judges and officials in public administration alike.

The third volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series focuses on one of the most fiercely contested issues in contemporary legal philosophy: the question of the importance of legal reasoning and how to properly engage with it. This book considers legal reasoning from two different angles: it revolves, on the one hand, around debates concerning interpretation and balancing, but it also asks, on the other, whom we ought to entrust with decision-making based on legal reasoning and how this relates to the very concept of law. The book approaches these underlying problems from a variety of perspectives and against the backdrop of different academic traditions, showcasing the rich landscape of critical debates around contemporary legal reasoning.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation? If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a 'postnational constellation' and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

The first volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy illustrates the remarkable scope of contemporary legal philosophy. It introduces methodological questions rooted in national academic discourses, discusses the origin of legal systems, and contrasts constitutionalist and monist approaches to the rule of law with the institutionalist approach most prominently and vigorously defended by Carl Schmitt. The issue at the core of these topics is which of these perspectives is more plausible in an age defined both by a 'postnational constellation' and the re-emergence of nationalist tendencies; an age in which the law increasingly cancels out borders only to see new frontiers erected.

This second volume of the Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy series presents 11 chapters which are dedicated to normativist and anti-normativist approaches to law. The book focuses on the question: What is law? Is it a set of obligations imposed on courts and officials to guide their conduct and to assess the conduct of others? Or is it the result of settlements reached by opposing sides that accept arrangements and understandings to sustain peaceful cooperation? If law is the former its significance and meaning are independent of a shifting constellation of forces; if it is not, then what the law says depends on the relative power and prestige of the actors involved. With contributions from some of the leading scholars in the field, the collection presents a balanced and nuanced assessment of what is perhaps the most controversial debate in contemporary legal philosophy today.