Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has moved away from its traditional way of using military force to achieve decisive victory. Instead, the U.S. used limited coercive engagements designed to compel an adversary to bend to our will. In these campaigns, the U.S. did not fight to protect vital national interests but to promote less important or humanitarian goals. The national interest was not at stake in these campaigns and legitimacy replaced military effectiveness as the primary factor for maintaining international and domestic support. These operations usually relied upon airpower as the military option of choice to accomplish the objectives. However, airpower experts chafed over the growing number of restrictions placed upon them while conducting coercive campaigns. This paper addresses these concerns by determining how, in an era of limited war, external constraints and self-imposed restraints affect the ability of aerospace power to coerce or punish an adversary. The paper starts with a historical study of another era of limited war: the 18th century. Examination of this era of limited warfare builds a foundation of knowledge about how leaders in the past overcame the challenges of limited war. Next, the paper explores four recent military operations and provides an in-depth assessment of aerospace power in coercive campaigns to date since the end of the Cold War. Having established the historical background, the paper then analyzes the parallels and disparities between coercive and warfighting campaigns and provides a template for planners to enhance success when conducting future missions. In the end, the analysis finds that the value of airpower for use in compelling campaigns will increase but we must improve our ability to plan and conduct these emerging types of airpower operations in the next century. Finally, the paper offers operational planners four maxims to enhance airpower's ability to coerce future adversaries.

In the past doctrinal differences between the services over how best to use airpower in joint campaigns have led to disagreements over airpower mission and target priorities. During World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, ground commanders demanded greater influence over airpower employment, while at the same time, the Air Force and the Navy disagreed over the most effective method for command and control of airpower throughout the theater. In all four cases, the joint force commander (JFC) set up a targeting board or an equivalent to address individual service concerns. This thesis follows the history of joint targeting boards since World War II to illustrate the foundations that have led to today's joint airpower targeting process. Having established the historical background, this thesis explores the current solutions for determining airpower mission and target priorities. Joint doctrine has institutionalized the concept of targeting boards and recommends that a JFC use a Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCB) to eliminate service disagreements over target priorities. In response to joint doctrine, the theater commanders have developed two contrasting models on how the JTCB interacts in the campaign planning process. One model integrates the board into the air component staff while the second model places the JTCB at the theater commander level, separated from component planning. Using the principles of war as a framework for analysis, this thesis compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each model to determine whether a targeting board is an effective tool for the JFC in future operations. In the end, this thesis finds a Joint Targeting Coordination Board integrated into the air component staff as the greatest potential for providing a future joint commander with an effective process for determining airpower mission priorities and selecting targets.

In the past doctrinal differences between the services over how best to use airpower in joint campaigns have led to disagreements over airpower mission and target priorities. During World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm, ground commanders demanded greater influence over airpower employment, while at the same time, the Air Force and the Navy disagreed over the most effective method for command and control of airpower throughout the theater. In all four cases, the joint force commander (JFC) set up a targeting board or an equivalent to address individual service concerns. This thesis follows the history of joint targeting boards since World War II to illustrate the foundations that have led to today's joint airpower targeting process. Having established the historical background, this thesis explores the current solutions for determining airpower mission and target priorities. Joint doctrine has institutionalized the concept of targeting boards and recommends that a JFC use a Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCB) to eliminate service disagreements over target priorities. In response to joint doctrine, the theater commanders have developed two contrasting models on how the JTCB interacts in the campaign planning process. One model integrates the board into the air component staff while the second model places the JTCB at the theater commander level, separated from component planning. Using the principles of war as a framework for analysis, this thesis compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each model to determine whether a targeting board is an effective tool for the JFC in future operations. In the end, this thesis finds a Joint Targeting Coordination Board integrated into the air component staff as the greatest potential for providing a future joint commander with an effective process for determining airpower mission priorities and selecting targets. Finally, organizational changes and recommendations are suggested to assure the targeting pr