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In this illuminating guide to the criteria of rational theorizing,
Michael Shepanski identifies, defends and applies W. V. Quine's
epistemic norms - the norms that best explain Quine's decisions to
accept some theories and not others. Parts I and II set out the
doctrines of this epistemology, demonstrating their potential for
philosophical application. The third part is a case study in which
Shepanski develops a theory of the propositional attitudes by the
method of formulating inferences to behaviour. Finally, he presents
critiques of popular alternative views, including foundationalism,
the centrality of knowledge and Quine's own epistemological
naturalism. By reassessing Quine's normative epistemology,
Shepanski advances our understanding of Quine's philosophy whilst
providing a guide for our own theorizing.
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