This monograph analyzes the capability of U.S. Army combat engineers to provide responsive survivability support to AirLand battle tactical operations. The discussion compares the abilities of the current engineer force with the protection requirements of the maneuver force. This issue is important because our AirLand Battle doctrine cannot be executed if our forces do not survive the lethality of the modern battleground. This monograph examines survivability concepts and requirements and investigates the best methods for attaining the degree of protection necessary to preserve the combat potential of the fighting force. The discussion begins with a consideration of the theoretical and doctrinal aspects of protection and survivability. The focus of analysis is on the heavy division in middle to high intensity operations. The importance of assessing prudent tactical survivability requirements is supported by a review of unit experiences and lessons learned at the National Training Center. The Soviet Army engineer force and its historically-oriented approach to protection is contrasted with the American combat engineer experience to illustrate the serious deficiency in survivability capability in our army today. The monograph concludes with an assessment of the current and future requirements for tactical protection measures and a recommendation on the best courses of action to pursue. The study suggests that to be effective on the AirLand battlefield, defensive survivability measures must support a decisive transition to offensive operations.

This monograph examines the concept of a mutual tank-free zone for the European Central Region and tests its validity as a possible operational concept for NATO. The discussion assesses the military implications of the concept and its usefulness as a mechanism of applying military means to achieve political ends. This issue is important because NATO leaders are looking for ways to strengthen deterrence and conventional defense at relatively low economic and political costs to their governments. The tank-free zone concept may be recommended as a serious proposal for future arms control talks as a method to reconfigure and realign conventional force asymmetries. The discussion begins with a contemporary perspective of the current NATO defensive capability and orientation. The political demands of deterrence are compared with the military requirements for defense. In turn, these are contrasted against the essential requirements for strong defense as expressed by Clausewitz and U.S. Army doctrine to identify the weaknesses in the NATO approach. The capability of a tank-free zone to redress these deficiencies constitutes the analysis. The monograph concludes with an assessment of how well the tankfree zone concept contributes to enhancing and strengthening the conventional defense of NATO, and recommends the beat courses of action to pursue. The study suggests that the tank-free zone is not militarily supportable until significant technological improvements in NATO antitank weaponry are realized.