First Published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Glen Stassen has approached his life and work "as if Jesus mattered," and this new collection of essays in his honor demonstrates that the contributors share that commitment, each in her or his own way. Ethics as if Jesus Mattered will introduce Stassen's work to a new generation, advance dialogue and debate in Christian ethics, and inspire more faithful discipleship just as it honors one whom the contributors consider a mentor.

Chapter 1 addresses some preliminary issues that it is important to think about in formulating arguments from evil. Chapter 2 is then concerned with the question of how an incompatibility argument from evil is best formulated, and with possible responses to such arguments. Chapter 3 then focuses on skeptical theism, and on the work that skeptical theists need to do if they are to defend their claim of having defeated incompatibility versions of the argument from evil. Finally, Chapter 4 discusses evidential arguments from evil, and four different kinds of evidential argument are set out and critically examined.

Moving beyond traditional "liberal versus conservative" arguments for and against abortion, Abortion: Three Perspectives is an up-to-date, accessible, and engaging exploration of this highly contentious issue. Featuring a triangular debate between four prominent moral and political philosophers, it presents three different political perspectives: Michael Tooley argues the "liberal" pro-choice approach; Philip E. Devine and Celia Wolf-Devine argue the "communitarian" pro-life approach; and Alison M. Jaggar argues the "gender justice" approach. However, each of the authors' self-identifications is also challenged by one or more of the other authors, who offer alternative interpretations of liberalism, communitarianism, and feminism, as well as of what it means to be pro-choice and pro-life. All of these viewpoints are controversial, among both philosophers and general readers. Furthermore, because the arguments do not rely on religious authority, they are directed at all readers, regardless of religious affiliation.
Abortion: Three Perspectives is divided into two parts: the authors first develop their ideas in depth and then briefly critique the other positions. Drawing examples from real life, they also integrate logic and empirical data into their arguments and consider views of abortion across other disciplines. As philosophers, the authors possess expert skills in critical analysis; their debates provide students and other readers with a model of dialogue among those who very strongly disagree. Abortion: Three Perspectives is ideal for courses in contemporary moral problems, introduction to ethics, bioethics, medical ethics, and feminist philosophy.

Traditional empiricist accounts of causation and of laws of nature have been reductionist, in the sense of entailing that, given a complete specification of the non-causal properties of, and relations among, particulars, it is thereby logically determined both what laws there are, and what events are causally related. It is argued here, however, that reductionist accounts of causation, and of laws of nature, are exposed to decisive objections, and thus that the time has come for empiricists to break with that tradition. The basic goal of this book, therefore, is to set out, and to defend, realist accounts of these concepts. In the case of causal relations, for example, Tooley maintains that causation is basically a matter of theoretical relations which underlie and explain relative frequencies. He argues that such an approach avoids the objections that tell against reductionist accounts, and that it does so without making casual relations epistemologically inaccessible.