The Air Force's current doctrinal maxims of centralized control and decentralized execution have the potential to produce over centralized planning at the theater air operations center (AOC); the result of this tendency is a cumbersome air tasking order (ATO) and a campaign vulnerable to lost communications, information overload, and decapitation. One cure for such problem is the decentralization of tactical planning through the use of mission-type orders at the wing or air task-force level. Mission-type orders include a clear statement of the superior commander's intent and state each unit's tasks in terms of operational effects to be achieved in several days rather than daily targets and aim points. A related problem exists in the horizontal command relationships at the theater level. During Operation Desert Storm, there was friction between some ground commanders and the joint forces air component commander (JFACC) about the issue of air interdiction targeting. When the theater CINC insisted that ground commanders pick air targets and then micromanaged the targeting himself, without providing feedback to these commanders, they frequently blamed the JFACC and his staff for ignoring their targeting nominations. To reassert their influence, they supported the formation of a joint targeting board that had the potential to degrade the JFACC's control of his air interdiction assets. An alternative to such a system is the use of mission-type requests from the ground commander to the air commander couched in terms of desired operational effects over a discrete period of time. This study seeks to answer the question, "If a joint force air commander finds it useful or necessary to operate at the theater level and one level below with mission-type orders or requests, what are the preconditions that must exist in order to make such a partially decentralized command system work?"

The Air Force's current doctrinal maxims of centralized control and decentralized execution have the potential to produce overcentralized planning at the theater airoperations center (AOC); the result of this tendency is a cumbersome air taskingorder (ATO) and a campaign vulnerable to lost communications, informationoverload, and decapitation. One cure for such problem is the decentralization oftactical planning through the use of mission-type orders at the wing or air task-forcelevel. Mission-type orders include a clear statement of the superior commander'sintent and state each unit's tasks in terms of operational effects to be achieved inseveral days rather than daily targets and aimpoints.