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This book brings together insights from the enactivist approach in
philosophy of mind and existing work on autonomous agency from both
philosophy of action and feminist philosophy. It then utilizes this
proposed account of autonomous agency to make sense of the
impairments in agency that commonly occur in cases of dissociative
identity disorder, mood disorders, and psychopathy. While much of
the existing philosophical work on autonomy focuses on threats that
come from outside the agent, this book addresses how inner
conflict, instability of character, or motivational issues can
disrupt agency. In the first half of the book, the author
conceptualizes what it means to be self-governing and to exercise
autonomous agency. In the second half, she investigates the extent
to which agents with various forms of mental disorder are capable
of exercising autonomy. In her view, many forms of mental disorder
involve disruptions to self-governance, so that agents lack
sufficient control over their intentional behavior or are unable to
formulate and execute coherent action plans. However, this does not
mean that they are utterly incapable of autonomous agency; rather,
their ability to exercise this capacity is compromised in important
respects. Understanding these agential impairments can help to
deepen our understanding of what it means to exercise autonomy, and
also devise more effective treatments that restore subjects'
agency. Autonomy, Enactivism, and Mental Disorder will be of
interest to researchers and advanced students working in philosophy
of mind, philosophy of action, philosophy of psychiatry, and
feminist philosophy.
"Beginning with the view that human consciousness is essentially
embodied and that the way we consciously experience the world is
structured by our bodily dynamics and surroundings, the book argues
that emotions are a fundamental manifestation of our embodiment,
and play a crucial role in self-consciousness, moral evaluation,
and social cognition"--
Building on contemporary research in embodied cognition,
enactivism, and the extended mind, this book explores how social
institutions in contemporary neoliberal nation-states
systematically affect our thoughts, feelings, and agency. Human
beings are, necessarily, social animals who create and belong to
social institutions. But social institutions take on a life of
their own, and literally shape the minds of all those who belong to
them, for better or worse, usually without their being
self-consciously aware of it. Indeed, in contemporary neoliberal
societies, it is generally for the worse. In The Mind-Body Politic,
Michelle Maiese and Robert Hanna work out a new critique of
contemporary social institutions by deploying the special
standpoint of the philosophy of mind-in particular, the special
standpoint of the philosophy of what they call essentially embodied
minds-and make a set of concrete, positive proposals for radically
changing both these social institutions and also our essentially
embodied lives for the better.
Building on contemporary research in embodied cognition,
enactivism, and the extended mind, this book explores how social
institutions in contemporary neoliberal nation-states
systematically affect our thoughts, feelings, and agency. Human
beings are, necessarily, social animals who create and belong to
social institutions. But social institutions take on a life of
their own, and literally shape the minds of all those who belong to
them, for better or worse, usually without their being
self-consciously aware of it. Indeed, in contemporary neoliberal
societies, it is generally for the worse. In The Mind-Body Politic,
Michelle Maiese and Robert Hanna work out a new critique of
contemporary social institutions by deploying the special
standpoint of the philosophy of mind-in particular, the special
standpoint of the philosophy of what they call essentially embodied
minds-and make a set of concrete, positive proposals for radically
changing both these social institutions and also our essentially
embodied lives for the better.
Beginning with the view that human consciousness is essentially
embodied and that the way we consciously experience the world is
structured by our bodily dynamics and surroundings, the book argues
that emotions are a fundamental manifestation of our embodiment,
and play a crucial role in self-consciousness, moral evaluation,
and social cognition.
Embodied Selves and Divided Minds examines how research in embodied
cognition and enactivism can contribute to our understanding of the
nature of self-consciousness, the metaphysics of personal identity,
and the disruptions to self-awareness that occur in case of
psychopathology. It begins with the assumption that if we take
embodiment seriously, then the resulting conception of the self (as
physically grounded in the living body) can help us to make sense
of how a minded subject persists across time. However, rather than
relying solely on puzzle cases to discuss diachronic persistence
and the sense of self, this work looks to schizophrenia and
dissociative identity disorder as case studies. Here we find
real-life examples of anomalous phenomena that signify disruptions
to embodied self-experience and appear to indicate a fragmentation
of the self. However, rather than concluding that these disorders
count as genuine instances of multiplicity, the book's discussion
of the self and personal identity allows us to understand the
characteristic symptoms of these disorders as significant
disruptions to self-consciousness. The concluding chapter then
examines the implications of this theoretical framework for the
clinical treatment of schizophrenia and dissociative identity
disorder. Embodied Selves and Divided Minds reveals how a critical
dialogue between Philosophy and Psychiatry can lead to a better
understanding of important issues surrounding self-consciousness,
personal identity, and psychopathology.
In Embodied Minds in Action, Robert Hanna and Michelle Maiese work
out a unified treatment of three fundamental philosophical
problems: the mind-body problem, the problem of mental causation,
and the problem of action. This unified treatment rests on two
basic claims. The first is that conscious, intentional minds like
ours are essentially embodied. This entails that our minds are
necessarily spread throughout our living, organismic bodies and
belong to their complete neurobiological constitution. So minds
like ours are necessarily alive. The second claim is that
essentially embodied minds are self-organizing thermodynamic
systems. This entails that our mental lives consist in the
possibility and actuality of moving our own living organismic
bodies through space and time, by means of our conscious desires.
The upshot is that we are essentially minded animals who help to
create the natural world through our own agency. This doctrine--the
Essential Embodiment Theory--is a truly radical idea which subverts
the traditionally opposed and seemingly exhaustive categories of
Dualism and Materialism, and offers a new paradigm for contemporary
mainstream research in the philosophy of mind and cognitive
neuroscience.
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