This first biography of Sir Raymond Priestley is well overdue, and its absence can only be explained by the scale of research necessary to cover the breadth and variety of his achievements over a very long and active life. It will be of interest across a wide range of disciplines, especially to those for whom the "Heroic Age" of Antarctic Exploration has a particular fascination. His involvement as a member of both Sir Ernest Shackleton's Nimrod and Robert Scott's Terra Nova Expeditions, during which he played a full and, on occasions, life threatening role was followed immediately by service in the First World War during which his gallantry was recognized by the award of a Military Medal; thereafter he made a further significant contribution in writing both the Official History of the British Army Signal Service and the History of the 46th (North Midland) Division in which he served. After the war, whilst at the University of Cambridge, he played a leading role in the establishment of the Scott Polar Research Institute followed by appointments as Vice-Chancellor of the Universities of Melbourne and then Birmingham, as well as helping to establish the University of the West Indies. Later he received a knighthood for his services to education. During his retirement, a complete misnomer in his case, he went with His Royal Highness, The Duke of Edinburgh, as an Antarctic expert on the RY Britannia followed closely as the British Observer on the American Deep Freeze IV Expedition during his tenure as Acting Director of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (later, the British Antarctic Survey). It was no surprise that, against this background, he was invited to become President of the Royal Geographical Society. Despite the demands made upon him, he maintained a strong and active interest in his family's affairs throughout the whole of his life.

Though the medium of wireless communication was in relative infancy during World War I, the technology could have made a profound impact on tactical operations and on the entire strategic conduct of the war. Providing details on how and why the technology did not fulfill its promise as a great military tool until years later, the book points primarily to the British Army's institutional bias against wireless communication as the technology's downfall, reinforced by the crude, unreliable wireless sets with which the army began the war. It also demonstrates how improved wireless communications between infantry, command, artillery and air observation could have improved the flexibility, accuracy and effectiveness of the British military strategy in the German Spring Offensive, the Hundred Days Counteroffensive and the battles of the Somme, Passchendaele, and Cambrai.