Although enormous industrial advances were made in the USSR, the country still lagged behind the West in the post-industrial age. What the Soviets could not build or manufacture, they had to get from the West. The final outcome was a culture developed in which there was no regard for consumerism and no respect for the environment. The author traces the development of the Soviet malaise, but warns that a future authoritarian regime could still revive the technological race. Conversely, he also replies to the academic debate on the excesses of modern technology in the West, with a sharp criticism of feminist and post-modernist perspectives.

Recent bombing campaigns and peacekeeping efforts have achieved a fragile and uncertain peace in Kosovo. However, NATO will need help from both the European Union and the United Nations to create and maintain a lasting peace in the region. An expert in the affairs of the troubled region, Rezun traveled to the crisis zone to interview Kosovar refugees and foreign statesmen. He offers a sharp critique of the conflict, taking NATO and the entire Western Alliance to task and emphasizing the villainous behavior of the Milosevic regime. One cannot consider what happened in Kosovo to be an isolated affair, Rezun contends.

Based on the widest possible range of sources, including documentation in nearly every European language, this study will appeal to experts and laymen alike. Rezun refuses to take sides. In addition to his criticisms of foreign intervention, exaggerated statistics, and reverse ethnic cleansing, he is merciless in his condemnation of the Serbs, in particular the corrupt influence of Milosevic and the late Arkan. In writing laced with irony, wit, and satire, he reveals the foibles of limited war and the errors committed by all parties. Yet his primary focus remains on the sufferings of the men, women, and children who filled the refugee camps and the devastated villages to which they have returned.

One of the salient features of this study is the extent of German complicity in the unfolding events that destroyed Yugoslavia. Rezun emphasizes the roles of history, psychology, culture, religion, and pure economics that are at play here. The book focuses on the Serb-Croat conflict and how that conflict permeates the other regions. Rezun demonstrates that the story of this civil war has been grossly misreported by the popular media and that the crisis in Yugoslavia could be a prelude to the eventual destruction of the Balkans and the entire European order.

This book deals extensively with Iraq and Saddam Hussein--his rise to power, his mastery of Iraqi statecraft, his pan-Arab proclivities and his two Gulf wars: the first against Iran and the second against the U.S.-led multinational coalition in 1990-1991. Israeli sources, as well as materials gathered during a trip to Turkey and the Kurdish refugee areas in northern Iraq, provide additional perspective for the author and his analysis. The book portrays a multidimensional Saddam Hussein: good and bad, strategic and human. It throws light on the reasons the U.S. went to war against Saddam, and presents an in-depth analysis of the United States' policies, which at one time supported IraQ's cause, in the Gulf region. A valuable feature of the book is its detailed discussion of the psychology of Saddam, of the Arabs, the Iranians, the Israelis, and the American public before, during, and after the Gulf War.

Rezun's conclusions challenge generally accepted views that lay the blame for the war on Saddam Hussein. Although Saddam is a cruel and rapacious demagogue, U.S. policymakers are to blame for having supported Saddam for so long. The author also rejects the view that General Norman Schwartzkopf was a great hero of the last war. Contrary to general opinion, Schwartzkopf conducted a no-risk operation into which Saddam Hussein was caught because of his miscalculation of U.S. intentions. Critical of U.S. policies, Rezun finds them naive and short-sighted. Although disapproving of U.S. policies during the war, Rezun praises the support and sustenance given by the Bush administration to the Kurds in the final hours of the Gulf War. This book is addressed to generalists and academic specialists, and students of Middle East politics.

The Soviet polity is presently going through its most difficult transition ever. The Russian Center's point of view is that the crisis is an issue of imperialism: the decline and fall of the old Russian empire, the undoing of the pax Russica, the derangement of the Russian imperial consciousness. From the viewpoint of the former march-lands of the empire, the issue is nationalism. Since Mikhail Gorbachev launched his reform program under the rubric of perestroika and glasnost, the most dramatic changes taking place in the USSR have been in the area of ethnic and minority nationalism. The Soviet nationalities problem has become central to the nations of the world, as well as to all minority and national groups. The purpose of this book is to present a comprehensive analysis of the impact of nationalism on the break-up of the Soviet Union, measure the effects of this dissolution, and examine the remnants and revisions.

The authors conclude that the Russian Empire is at the end of its tether, but what will remain will still be a viable world power. The second conclusion is that the so-called center of the empire will be in Russia herself, much more than in the past, and that a new form of Russian nationalism is in the making, which could have aggressive and expansionist tendencies. Policymakers, Soviet-area specialists, and students will find this book provocative and useful.

The Great Game of rivalry and intrigue between the great powers in Southwest Asia and between the regional powers themselves is explored in Miron Rezun's comprehensive history of the region. The author traces the involvement of the Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, and the United States in the game of influence in the region, giving us a vivid account of what happens behind the scenes in diplomatic circles, behind closed doors, and the characteristics of the power struggle between charismatic or despotic leaders, foreign intervention, and the oppressed citizenry. The story touches on current concerns such as the international arms trade, fervent nationalism, and the subterfuge, greed, and ambition that emerge when ego and money are at stake. This examination of events in Iran and Iraq, the rebellion of the Kurds, and movements in Afghanistan and Azerbaijan revolves around nationalistic aspirations of a fanatical kind. Ultimately the book seeks to explain the causes of war in the region.

The book begins with a brief yet thorough history of the Southwest Asia region, from the time of Tsar Peter through the Persian Gulf War. Chapter 2 describes an early nationalist rebellion in Turkistan and its ultimate defeat by Russia, and uses this early rebellion as a model for the Soviet Union's thinking towards the region. Chapter 3 is a detailed history of the struggle in Afghanistan. Chapter 4 looks at the turbulent history of Iran, linking Iran's behavior to the history of the entire region. Chapter 5 focuses on Central Asia and Azerbaijan. The influence of Great Game thinking in the current movement of pan-Arabism and the New Babylon is discussed in Chapter 6, while the next chapter examines Iraq and Saddam Hussein, the Persian Gulf War, and its aftermath. This study will be of interest to students, scholars, and the reader who wants to learn about the history of this troubled region.

This book concerns more with Iran's foreign relations and problems in the area of international affairs in light of the Gulf war and in anticipation of the post-Khomeini period. It also deals with Iranian policies toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict. .

The chapters in this book were written by me or solicited from renowned experts to produce a work that anticipated an imminent post- Khomeini period in Iranian history. The first draft was not ready until June 1989, practically coinciding with the death of Khomeini and the tenth anniversary of the Iranian Revolution-an important milestone after a decade of turmoil. The book you are about to read took some time to put together. Based on extensive research, the project was undertaken in early 1988 and ended about the spring of 1990. A sincere debt of gratitude is naturally owed to all of my contributors. But the preparation of any book does not take place in a financial void. My gratitude is especially extended to the academic vice-president of my university, Dr. Robert Burridge, for granting me the seed money from the university's Development Fund. Substantial financial assistance to cover the bulk of the logistical expenses was offered by the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security in Ottawa and by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada through its program of aid to scholarly conferences.