This book, first published in 1985, examines the Cold War risks of superpower confrontations, mainly in the Third World, resulting in war in Europe. European security is usually analysed in the context of East-West relations in Europe, where though tensions often ran high, actual war seemed remote. The risks of war were much greater in other parts of the world, where the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other using proxies. This book analyses these proxy confrontations, and the risks that they posed to the security of Europe.

This book, first published in 1985, examines the Cold War risks of superpower confrontations, mainly in the Third World, resulting in war in Europe. European security is usually analysed in the context of East-West relations in Europe, where though tensions often ran high, actual war seemed remote. The risks of war were much greater in other parts of the world, where the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other using proxies. This book analyses these proxy confrontations, and the risks that they posed to the security of Europe.

This study challenges the belief that liberal democracy is incompatible with an effective foreign policy. The author focuses initially on the effect of democratic practices and institutions on the efficacy and wisdom of international dealings. Then he examines the pursuit and consequences of American foreign policy objectives on some of the central aspects of US democracy, including the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches, civil liberties and freedom of speech.

Recent American foreign policy has depended heavily on the use of negative inducements to alter the behavior of other states. From public browbeating through economic sanctions to military invasion, the last several presidents have chosen to use coercion to advance U.S. interests when dealing with adversaries. In this respect, as Miroslav Nincic notes, the United States differs from many of its closest allies: Canada has long maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba, and several of the European democracies have continued diplomatic engagement with governments that the United States considers pariah regimes. In The Logic of Positive Engagement, Nincic outlines the efficacy of and the benefits that can flow from positive rather than negative engagement.

Nincic observes that threats and punishments may be gratifying in a symbolic sense, but that they haven't affected the longevity or the most objectionable policies of the regimes against which they are directed. Might positive inducements produce better results? Nincic examines two major models of positive inducements: the exchange model, in which incentives are offered in trade for altered behavior, and the catalytic model, in which incentives accumulate to provoke a thorough revision of the target's policies and priorities. He examines the record with regard to long-term U.S. relations with Cuba, Libya, and Syria, and then discusses the possibility that positive inducements might bring policy success to current relations with Iran and North Korea.

This monograph challenges the belief that liberal democracy is incompatible with an effective foreign policy. The author seeks to prove that if any such incompatibility exists, it is rooted in the incentives of professional statesmen rather than in the impulses which drive the public and its legislative representatives.