Empire or Republic? makes the necessary, but much overlooked, link between international policies and the domestic situation. The authors contend that the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations have all focused on global leadership to the detriment of pressing social, economic and political problems at home. The continuing large-scale diversion of financial and human resources to promote US overseas interests will further undermine the possibilities for revitalising the national economy.

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"As the Empire expands and the Republic declines." This is the central argument of a revealing new book on America as a global power in the post-Cold War era. "Empire or Republic?" makes the necessary, but much overlooked, link between our nation's international policies and the domestic situation. The authors contend that the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations have all focused on global leadership to the detrminent of pressing social, economic and political problems at home. The continuing large-scale diversion of financial and human resources to promote US overseas interests will further undermine the possibilities for revitalizing the national economy.
In this compelling study, Petras and Morley offer a powerful critique of both Republican and Democratic policies over the past decade or more. Their analysis of the first year of the Clinton presidency indicates no sharp break with the past. Clinton gives priority to overseas goals while generating ill-conceived, exclusively "domestic" solutions to national problems. By situating urban blight, unemployment, poverty and other domestic ills within a global context, Petras and Morley take a much needed first rstep toward restructuring US policy so as to decrease the mounting socio-economic pressures that are straining the fabric of American society. "Empire of Republic?" is a provocative and original contribution to the debate surrounding America's position as an ascending or declining world power in the late twentieth century.

In this first comprehensive study of U.S. policy toward Cuba in the post-Cold War era, Morris Morley and Chris McGillion draw on interviews with Bush and Clinton policymakers, congressional participants in the policy debate, and leaders of the anti-sanctions business community to argue that Bush and Clinton operated within the same Cold War framework that shaped the Cuba policy of their predecessors. They also demonstrate that U.S. policy after 1989 was driven principally by domestic imperatives. The result was the pursuit of a policy that had nothing to do with its stated objectives of promoting reforms in Cuba and everything to do with dismantling Castro's regime. This study also addresses the international consequences: the extraterritorial applications of national laws to America's allies; and a willingness to put in danger the operations of the global free trade regime. Few issues more starkly revealed the degree to which U.S. policymakers exhibited a striking lack of realism about America's capacity to impose its will globally. Morris Morley has taught at SUNY-Binghamton and American Unversity. He is the author of Imperial State and Revolution (Cambridge, 1987) and Washington, Somoza and the Sandanistas (Cambridge, 1994) He is a senior research fellow with the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Chris McGillion has taught at the Universities of Sydney and New South Wales, and Macquarie University. He is a former editorial page editor of the Sydney Morning Herald and has written for the Political Science Quarterly. As a journalist, he has made several trips to Cuba.

This book is the first comprehensive study of the Reagan administration's policy toward the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile. Based on new primary and archival materials, as well as on original interviews with former US and Chilean officials, it traces the evolution of Reagan policy from an initial 'close embrace' of the junta to a re-evaluation of whether Pinochet was a risk to long-term US interests in Chile and, finally, to an acceptance in Washington of the need to push for a return to democracy. It provides fresh insights into the bureaucratic conflicts that were a key part of the Reagan decision-making process and reveals not only the successes but also the limits of US influence on Pinochet's regime. Finally, it contributes to the ongoing debate about the US approach toward democracy promotion in the Third World over the past half century.

In this first comprehensive study of U.S. policy toward Cuba in the post-Cold War era, Morris Morley and Chris McGillion draw on interviews with Bush and Clinton policymakers, congressional participants in the policy debate, and leaders of the anti-sanctions business community to argue that Bush and Clinton operated within the same Cold War framework that shaped the Cuba policy of their predecessors. They also demonstrate that U.S. policy after 1989 was driven principally by domestic imperatives. The result was the pursuit of a policy that had nothing to do with its stated objectives of promoting reforms in Cuba and everything to do with dismantling Castro's regime. This study also addresses the international consequences: the extraterritorial applications of national laws to America's allies; and a willingness to put in danger the operations of the global free trade regime. Few issues more starkly revealed the degree to which U.S. policymakers exhibited a striking lack of realism about America's capacity to impose its will globally. Morris Morley has taught at SUNY-Binghamton and American Unversity. He is the author of Imperial State and Revolution (Cambridge, 1987) and Washington, Somoza and the Sandanistas (Cambridge, 1994) He is a senior research fellow with the Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Chris McGillion has taught at the Universities of Sydney and New South Wales, and Macquarie University. He is a former editorial page editor of the Sydney Morning Herald and has written for the Political Science Quarterly. As a journalist, he has made several trips to Cuba.

This book is the first comprehensive study of the Reagan administration's policy toward the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile. Based on new primary and archival materials, as well as on original interviews with former US and Chilean officials, it traces the evolution of Reagan policy from an initial 'close embrace' of the junta to a re-evaluation of whether Pinochet was a risk to long-term US interests in Chile and, finally, to an acceptance in Washington of the need to push for a return to democracy. It provides fresh insights into the bureaucratic conflicts that were a key part of the Reagan decision-making process and reveals not only the successes but also the limits of US influence on Pinochet's regime. Finally, it contributes to the ongoing debate about the US approach toward democracy promotion in the Third World over the past half century.