Many people believe that the violent and disruptive nature of war makes a military ethic impossible. The authors of this book, originally published in 1986 however, develop an ethical system that aims to control the military monster at least to some degree, rather than one that preaches to it idealistically - with little or no effect. Military ethics, they believe, must be an ethics for peacetime as well as an ethics for war, an ethics for soldiers in the field as well as an ethics for political leaders, and their book is designed to meet these needs. It presents a practical, utilitarian approach: an ethics of what is possible rather than what is ideal, drawing on real military experience and different from any other work previously published. The authors argue that both the pacifists, who claim that the horrible and ungovernable nature of war makes it morally wrong, and the realists, who believe that wars must be fought, but fought without moral scruple, are mistaken. They show that careful attention to the actual circumstances in which individual combatants function and the social institutions shaping their action allows genuine moral constraint. With its emphasis on real problems, Military Ethics will be of practical help to policy makers and military personnel at all levels, as well as being of great interest to students of applied philosophy and ethics.

How ought we evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend? In the briefest of terms, this question poses what is addressed here as the problem of contingent future persons, and as such it poses relatively novel challenges for philosophical and theological ethicists. For though it may be counter-intuitive, it seems that those contingent future persons who are actually brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by these actions in any conventional sense of the terms. This intriguing problem was defined almost three decades ago by Jan Narveson [2], and to date its implications have been explored most exhaustively by Derek Parfit [3] and David Heyd [1]. Nevertheless, as yet there is simply no consensus on how we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. Still, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. It is thus proving to be a very fruitful investigation, with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications.

Many people believe that the violent and disruptive nature of war makes a military ethic impossible. The authors of this book, originally published in 1986 however, develop an ethical system that aims to control the military monster at least to some degree, rather than one that preaches to it idealistically - with little or no effect. Military ethics, they believe, must be an ethics for peacetime as well as an ethics for war, an ethics for soldiers in the field as well as an ethics for political leaders, and their book is designed to meet these needs. It presents a practical, utilitarian approach: an ethics of what is possible rather than what is ideal, drawing on real military experience and different from any other work previously published. The authors argue that both the pacifists, who claim that the horrible and ungovernable nature of war makes it morally wrong, and the realists, who believe that wars must be fought, but fought without moral scruple, are mistaken. They show that careful attention to the actual circumstances in which individual combatants function and the social institutions shaping their action allows genuine moral constraint. With its emphasis on real problems, Military Ethics will be of practical help to policy makers and military personnel at all levels, as well as being of great interest to students of applied philosophy and ethics.

How ought we evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend? In the briefest of terms, this question poses what is addressed here as the problem of contingent future persons, and as such it poses relatively novel challenges for philosophical and theological ethicists. For though it may be counter-intuitive, it seems that those contingent future persons who are actually brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by these actions in any conventional sense of the terms. This intriguing problem was defined almost three decades ago by Jan Narveson [2], and to date its implications have been explored most exhaustively by Derek Parfit [3] and David Heyd [1]. Nevertheless, as yet there is simply no consensus on how we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. Still, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. It is thus proving to be a very fruitful investigation, with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications.