Many people believe that the violent and disruptive nature of war makes a military ethic impossible. The authors of this book, originally published in 1986 however, develop an ethical system that aims to control the military monster at least to some degree, rather than one that preaches to it idealistically - with little or no effect. Military ethics, they believe, must be an ethics for peacetime as well as an ethics for war, an ethics for soldiers in the field as well as an ethics for political leaders, and their book is designed to meet these needs. It presents a practical, utilitarian approach: an ethics of what is possible rather than what is ideal, drawing on real military experience and different from any other work previously published. The authors argue that both the pacifists, who claim that the horrible and ungovernable nature of war makes it morally wrong, and the realists, who believe that wars must be fought, but fought without moral scruple, are mistaken. They show that careful attention to the actual circumstances in which individual combatants function and the social institutions shaping their action allows genuine moral constraint. With its emphasis on real problems, Military Ethics will be of practical help to policy makers and military personnel at all levels, as well as being of great interest to students of applied philosophy and ethics.

Many people believe that the violent and disruptive nature of war makes a military ethic impossible. The authors of this book, originally published in 1986 however, develop an ethical system that aims to control the military monster at least to some degree, rather than one that preaches to it idealistically - with little or no effect. Military ethics, they believe, must be an ethics for peacetime as well as an ethics for war, an ethics for soldiers in the field as well as an ethics for political leaders, and their book is designed to meet these needs. It presents a practical, utilitarian approach: an ethics of what is possible rather than what is ideal, drawing on real military experience and different from any other work previously published. The authors argue that both the pacifists, who claim that the horrible and ungovernable nature of war makes it morally wrong, and the realists, who believe that wars must be fought, but fought without moral scruple, are mistaken. They show that careful attention to the actual circumstances in which individual combatants function and the social institutions shaping their action allows genuine moral constraint. With its emphasis on real problems, Military Ethics will be of practical help to policy makers and military personnel at all levels, as well as being of great interest to students of applied philosophy and ethics.

How ought we evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend? In the briefest of terms, this question poses what is addressed here as the problem of contingent future persons, and as such it poses relatively novel challenges for philosophical and theological ethicists. For though it may be counter-intuitive, it seems that those contingent future persons who are actually brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by these actions in any conventional sense of the terms. This intriguing problem was defined almost three decades ago by Jan Narveson [2], and to date its implications have been explored most exhaustively by Derek Parfit [3] and David Heyd [1]. Nevertheless, as yet there is simply no consensus on how we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. Still, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. It is thus proving to be a very fruitful investigation, with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications.

How ought we evaluate the individual and collective actions on which the existence, numbers and identities of future people depend? In the briefest of terms, this question poses what is addressed here as the problem of contingent future persons, and as such it poses relatively novel challenges for philosophical and theological ethicists. For though it may be counter-intuitive, it seems that those contingent future persons who are actually brought into existence by such actions cannot benefit from or be harmed by these actions in any conventional sense of the terms. This intriguing problem was defined almost three decades ago by Jan Narveson [2], and to date its implications have been explored most exhaustively by Derek Parfit [3] and David Heyd [1]. Nevertheless, as yet there is simply no consensus on how we ought to evaluate such actions or, indeed, on whether we can. Still, the pursuit of a solution to the problem has been interestingly employed by moral philosophers to press the limits of ethics and to urge a reconsideration of the nature and source of value at its most fundamental level. It is thus proving to be a very fruitful investigation, with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications.

Most regard toleration as an unattractive fallback position of compromise and so tend to overlook it in favor of such active concepts as freedom, equality, and justice. Fotion and Elfstrom argue that toleration offers us the useful possibility of responding to a difficult situation with a degree of flexibility not possible with the dichotomous concepts of good-bad, right-wrong, ethical-unethical, Right-Left. Tolerating saturates ordinary human life and infuses public discussions of religion, morality, and politics. It forms a major strand in the history of Western European thought. Yet the word "toleration" and similar terms are rarely used. Unnoticed and unremarked, they are like the air that surrounds us, vitally important yet invisible. The authors seek to address this oversight in several ways. They begin with a thorough conceptual analysis of toleration and its kindred concepts. They are convinced that an appreciation of the importance of the family of toleration concepts must be founded on an understanding of the various ways in which they function in our language and our lives. In addition, they examine the historical development of the concept of toleration and canvass the major arguments people have employed either to urge toleration or to disparage it. They examine the role of toleration in liberal political philosophy and respond to the major critics of liberal toleration. The authors also discuss a number of factors that cause toleration to be overlooked in political debate and personal reflection and offer evidence to support the view that this omission is unfortunate. In particular, they argue that toleration has the crucial role of helping people live with one another with respect and dignity in the fractious and contentious world we inhabit. With the rise of racism and other forms of religious, political, and social intolerance, people on all sides of the present debates concerning multi-culturalism and diversity will benefit from this timely and lucidly argued philosophical discussion of the concepts of toleration and its possible application in a less-than-perfect world.