Exploring the visions of the end of the Cold War that have been put forth since its inception until its actual ending, this volume brings to the fore the reflections, programmes, and strategies that were intended to call into question the bipolar system and replace it with alternative approaches or concepts. These visions were associated not only with prominent individuals, organized groups and civil societies, but were also connected to specific historical processes or events. They ranged from actual, thoroughly conceived programmes, to more blurred, utopian aspirations - or simply the belief that the Cold War had already, in effect, come to an end. Such visions reveal much about the contexts in which they were developed and shed light on crucial moments and phases of the Cold War.

Roy Jenkins brought great talent to Europe's top job. He played a key role in re-launching European monetary integration, winning the right to attend the new global summits, and smoothing Greece's path to EC membership. But he fell short of other targets. Commission reform remained elusive, as did an improvement of the UK's troubled relationship with the EC. Indeed the row over Britain's contribution to the EC budget, meant that Britain's position in Europe was as difficult when he left Brussels as it had been when he arrived. This study will look at how Jenkins approached his role, identifying his priorities, examining his working methods, and exploring his rapport with the European and international statesmen with whom he had to work. In the process, the book will shed light on the nature of the job, on Jenkins' own talents and limitations, and on the European Community as it struggled with the global economic crisis of the 1970s.

This edited volume uses newly released archival material to show linkages between the development of the European Union and the Cold War.

Containing essays by well-known Cold War scholars such as Jussi Hanhimaki, Wilfried Loth and Piers Ludlow, the book looks at:

• France, where neither de Gaulle nor Pompidou felt committed to the status quo in East-West or West-West relations
• Germany, where Brandt's Ostpolitik was acknowledged to be linked to the success of Bonn's Westpolitik
• and Britain, where the move towards Community membership was tightly bound up with a variety of calculations about the organization of the West and its approach to the Cold War.

Nixon and Kissinger's policies are set out as the background of US policy against which each of the European players was compelled to operate, explaining how Washington saw European integration as part of the over-arching Cold War.

European Integration and the Cold War will appeal to students of Cold War history, European politics, and international history.

Exploring the visions of the end of the Cold War that have been put forth since its inception until its actual ending, this volume brings to the fore the reflections, programmes, and strategies that were intended to call into question the bipolar system and replace it with alternative approaches or concepts. These visions were associated not only with prominent individuals, organized groups and civil societies, but were also connected to specific historical processes or events. They ranged from actual, thoroughly conceived programmes, to more blurred, utopian aspirations - or simply the belief that the Cold War had already, in effect, come to an end. Such visions reveal much about the contexts in which they were developed and shed light on crucial moments and phases of the Cold War.

This edited volume uses newly released archival material to show linkages between the development of the European Union and the Cold War. Containing essays by well-known Cold War scholars such as Jussi Hanhimaki, Wilfried Loth and Piers Ludlow, the book looks at: France, where neither de Gaulle nor Pompidou felt committed to the status quo in East-West or West-West relations Germany, where Brandt's Ostpolitik was acknowledged to be linked to the success of Bonn's Westpolitik and Britain, where the move towards Community membership was tightly bound up with a variety of calculations about the organization of the West and its approach to the Cold War. Nixon and Kissinger's policies are set out as the background of US policy against which each of the European players was compelled to operate, explaining how Washington saw European integration as part of the over-arching Cold War. European Integration and the Cold War will appeal to students of Cold War history, European politics, and international history.

This book seeks to reassess the role of Europe in the end of the Cold War and the process of German unification.

Much of the existing literature on the end of the Cold War has focused primarily on the role of the superpowers and on that of the US in particular. This edited volume seeks to re-direct the focus towards the role of European actors and the importance of European processes, most notably that of integration. Written by leading experts in the field, and making use of newly available source material, the book explores "Europe" in all its various dimensions, bringing to the forefront of historical research previously neglected actors and processes. These include key European nations, endemic evolutions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, European integration, and the pan-European process. The volume serves therefore to rediscover the transformation of 1989-90 as a European event, deeply influenced by European actors, and of great significance for the subsequent evolution of the continent.

The end of the Cold War, in particular German unification and the demise of the Soviet Empire, are among the best documented and the most thoroughly researched events in recent history. Yet, efforts to understand the end of the Cold War historically can be described, to this day, as partial. The time has come for a broader and, at the same time, more European-focused endeavor. Such an effort is made possible by the growing availability of new sources, including archives which are now beginning to open up systematically. By choosing to concentrate on "Europe" in its various dimensions (Western Europe, Eastern Europe as well as the pan-European dimension) this book aims at bringing to the forefront of historical research previously neglected actors or processes whose contributions to the end of the Cold War were, in our view, decisive, including key European nations, endemic evolutions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, European integration, and the pan-European process.

This book will be of great interest to students of Cold War Studies, Contemporary European History and International Relations in general.

A new and detailed study of the European Community's development between 1963 and 1969, with a special focus on the struggle between France and its EC partners over the purpose, structure and membership of the emerging European Community.

On all three, French President Charles de Gaulle held divergent views from those of his fellow leaders. The six years in question were hence marked by a succession of confrontations over what the Community did, the way in which it functioned, and the question of whether new members (notably Britain) should be allowed to enter. Despite these multiple crises, however, the six founding members continued to press on with their joint experiment, demonstrating a surprisingly firm commitment to cooperation with each other. The period thus highlights both the strengths and the weaknesses of the early Community and highlights the origins of many of the structures and procedures that have survived until the current day.

A new and detailed study of the European Community's development between 1963 and 1969, with a special focus on the struggle between France and its EC partners over the purpose, structure and membership of the emerging European Community.

On all three, French President Charles de Gaulle held divergent views from those of his fellow leaders. The six years in question were hence marked by a succession of confrontations over what the Community did, the way in which it functioned, and the question of whether new members (notably Britain) should be allowed to enter. Despite these multiple crises, however, the six founding members continued to press on with their joint experiment, demonstrating a surprisingly firm commitment to cooperation with each other. The period thus highlights both the strengths and the weaknesses of the early Community and highlights the origins of many of the structures and procedures that have survived until the current day.

Roy Jenkins brought great talent to Europe's top job. He played a key role in re-launching European monetary integration, winning the right to attend the new global summits, and smoothing Greece's path to EC membership. But he fell short of other targets. Commission reform remained elusive, as did an improvement of the UK's troubled relationship with the EC. Indeed the row over Britain's contribution to the EC budget, meant that Britain's position in Europe was as difficult when he left Brussels as it had been when he arrived. This study will look at how Jenkins approached his role, identifying his priorities, examining his working methods, and exploring his rapport with the European and international statesmen with whom he had to work. In the process, the book will shed light on the nature of the job, on Jenkins' own talents and limitations, and on the European Community as it struggled with the global economic crisis of the 1970s.

Britain's 1961 application was the first time that the European Community was obliged to consider a membership application from one of its neighbors. Piers Ludlow's study challenges traditional views of the British application and casts new light on the way in which the EEC responded to the challenge of enlargement. The book provides an original analysis of a crucial chapter in European history, and offers important insights into differing conceptions of the European Community that remain relevant to contemporary debates.

Britain's 1961 application was the first time that the European Community was obliged to consider a membership application from one of its neighbours. This 1997 book, based on material from the archives, challenges traditional views of the British application and casts light on the way in which the EEC responded to the challenge of enlargement. The author explains the initial inability of de Gaulle to oppose British membership, and draws attention to the hesitant and conditional nature of Britain's application. In combination these two factors ensured that the sixteen months of negotiations, and the balance the Six struck between their conflicting desires to widen and to deepen the Community, became crucial to the outcome of the UK's membership bid. This book provides a detailed analysis of a vital chapter in postwar European history, and offers important insights into differing conceptions of the European Community which persist in contemporary debates.