This book has two main tasks: (1) to call attention to the special challenges presented by our experience of affect-all varieties of pleasure and pain-and (2) to show how these challenges can be overcome by an "enrichment approach" that understands affect as the enrichment or deterioration of conscious activity as a whole. This "enrichment approach" draws from Alfred North Whitehead as well as the pragmatists John Dewey and William James, all of whom thought of affect as a fundamental aspect of experience rather than a special class of feelings. It also draws from recent scientific research that suggests that the dynamic repertoire of consciousness can change, effectively expanding and contracting our capacity to feel. Weaving these perspectives together, the book develops a theory that accounts for the peculiar phenomenology of affect and sheds new light on a diverse range of experiences, from everyday pleasures and pains to the special satisfactions of the arts and religious festivity. At the same time, it presents a fresh and distinctively affect-centered perspective on the nature of consciousness.

Some may consider that the language and concepts of philosophy will eventually be superseded by those of neuroscience. This book questions such a naive assumption and through a variety of perspectives and traditions, the authors show the possible contributions of philosophy to non-reductive forms of neuroscientific research. Drawing from the full range and depth of philosophical thought, from hylomorphism to ethics, by way of dynamical systems, enactivism and value theory, amongst other topics, this edited work promotes a rich form of interdisciplinary exchange. Chapters explore the analytic, phenomenological and pragmatic traditions of philosophy, and most share a common basis in the Aristotelian tradition. Contributions address one or more aspects of subjectivity in relation to science, such as the meaning and scope of naturalism and the place of consciousness in nature, or the relation between intentionality, teleology, and causality. Readers may further explore the nature of life and its relation to mind and then the role of value in mind and nature. This book shows how philosophy might contribute to real explanatory progress in science while remaining faithful to the full complexity of the phenomena of life and mind. It will be of interest to both philosophers and neuroscientists, as well as those engaged in interdisciplinary cooperation between philosophy and science.

Some may consider that the language and concepts of philosophy will eventually be superseded by those of neuroscience. This book questions such a naive assumption and through a variety of perspectives and traditions, the authors show the possible contributions of philosophy to non-reductive forms of neuroscientific research. Drawing from the full range and depth of philosophical thought, from hylomorphism to ethics, by way of dynamical systems, enactivism and value theory, amongst other topics, this edited work promotes a rich form of interdisciplinary exchange. Chapters explore the analytic, phenomenological and pragmatic traditions of philosophy, and most share a common basis in the Aristotelian tradition. Contributions address one or more aspects of subjectivity in relation to science, such as the meaning and scope of naturalism and the place of consciousness in nature, or the relation between intentionality, teleology, and causality. Readers may further explore the nature of life and its relation to mind and then the role of value in mind and nature. This book shows how philosophy might contribute to real explanatory progress in science while remaining faithful to the full complexity of the phenomena of life and mind. It will be of interest to both philosophers and neuroscientists, as well as those engaged in interdisciplinary cooperation between philosophy and science.