Naval War College Historical Monograph Series, 18. Examines in detail, making extensive use of the Naval War College archives, each of the U.S. Navy's twenty-one "fleet problems" conducted between World Wars I and II, elucidating the patterns that emerged, finding a range of enduring lessons, and suggesting their applicability for future naval warfare.

International Law Studies, Volume 88. Edited by Kenneth Watkin and Andrew J. Norris. Contains papers from the conference: "Non-International Armed Conflict in the 21st Century" hosted by the Naval War College on June 21-23, 2011. Examines the legal issues surrounding non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in the modern era.

International Law Studies Volume 87. Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo and Daria P. Wollschlaeger, editors. Contains a compilation of scholarly papers and remarks derived from the proceedings of a conference hosted at the Naval War College on June 22-24, 2010 entitled "International Law and the Changing Character of War." The objectives of the conference were to catalogue the extent to whichh existing international law governs these changing aspects of warfare and to assess whether these developments warrant revision of existing international law.

International Law Studies, Volume 86. Raul A. "Pete" Pedrozo, editor. Provides legal examination of the armed conflict in Iraq during the secondd Gulf War that began in 2003. Discusses legal issues associated with the initial decision to use armed force, the manner in which force was employed, the legal framework and evolution of military activities from invasion to occupation, detention and counterinsurgency operations, as well as policy and legal issues associated with the establishment of the rule of law and return of governance to the people of Iraq.

From June 25 to 27, 2008, the Naval War College had the honor to convene an International Law Expert's Workshop, "The War in Afghanistan - A Legal Analysis." This volume captures the legal lessons of the war in Afghanistan as reported, studied and debated by a rare gathering of eminent scholars and practitioners of international law. The workshop's mission was to provide a comprehensive legal examination of the Afghan conflict-from the decision to use force, to the manner with which force was employed, to the legal construct for the evolution of military operations transitioning away from the use of force. Renowned international academics and legal advisers, both military and civilian, representing military, diplomatic, nongovernmental and academic institutions from throughout the world contributed to the workshop and this volume.

This illustrated history covers the history of the U.S. Navy in the Middle East. America's interests in the Middle East, southwest Asia, and eastern Africa date almost to the founding of the nation. Since World War II, the Navy has been the first line of defense for these interests. From the establishment of the Middle East Force (MEF) in 1949 through the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. Navy served as a force for stability and peace in the region.

Excerpt from the introduction: "In the late nineteenth century, the French Jeune Ecole, or "new school," of naval thinking promoted a commerce-raiding strategy for the weaker naval power to defeat the dominant naval power. France provided the vocabulary for the discussion-Jeune Ecole and guerre de course (war of the chase)-and embodied the geopolitical predicament addressed: France had been a dominant land power, known for its large and proficient army and resentful of British imperial dominance and commercial preeminence. But its navy had rarely matched the Royal Navy in either quantity or quality, and its economy could not support both a preeminent army and navy. So its naval thinkers thought of an economical way out of its predicament. They argued that a guerre de course allowed weaker maritime power, such as France, to impose disproportionate costs on the stronger sea power in order to achieve its objectives. Sadly for France, the strategy did not work as anticipated, and British naval dominance and imperial primacy endured. The case studies in this book reveal why this was so, and they shed light on the dynamic of rivalries between maritime and continental powers. This issue is an important one in that from the heyday of the British Empire to the present, maritime powers have set the global order, and continental powers have contested it. So the dynamic is still with us, and it is of vital national import to all countries that benefit from the present international order of freedom of navigation, free trade, and the rule of international law."

U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s: Selected Documents is the thirty-third in the Naval War College Press's Newport Papers monograph series, and the third in a projected four volume set of authoritative documents relating to U.S. Navy strategy and strategic planning during and after the Cold War. Edited by John B. Hattendorf, a distinguished naval historian and chairman of the Maritime History Department at the Naval War College, this volume is an indispensable supplement to Professor Hattendorf 's uniquely informed narrative of the genesis and development of the Navy's strategy for global war with the Soviet Union, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986, Newport Paper 19 (2004). It continues the story of the Navy's reaction to the growing Soviet naval and strategic threats over the decade of the 1970s, as documented in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 30 (2007), and sets the stage for the rethinking of the Navy's role following the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, as presented in U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents, Newport Paper 27 (2006). Both of these volumes were also edited by John Hattendorf. A fourth volume, of documents on naval strategy from the 1950s and 1960s, will eventually round out this important and hitherto very imperfectly known history. This project will make a major contribution not just to the history of the United States Navy since World War II but also to that of American military institutions, strategy, and planning more generally. Including as it does both originally classified documents and statements crafted for public release, it shows how the Navy's leadership not only grappled with fundamental questions of strategy and force structure but sought as well to translate the strategic insights resulting from this process into a rhetorical form suited to the public and political arenas. Finally, it should be noted that all of this is of more than merely historical interest. In October 2007, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Gary Roughead, unveiled (in a presentation to the International Seapower Symposium at the Naval War College) "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower," the first attempt by the sea services of this country to articulate a strategy or vision for maritime power in the contemporary security environment-a new era of protracted low-intensity warfare and growing global economic interdependence. It is too early to tell what impact this document will have on the Navy, its sister services, allies and others abroad, or the good order of the global commons. To understand its meaning and significance, however, there is no better place to begin than with the material collected in this volume and its forthcoming successor.